THE STANDARD EDmON OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOWGICAL WORKS OF

SIGMUND FREUD Translatedfrom the German under the General Editorship of JAMES STRACHEY In Collaboration with ANNA FREUD Assistetf by

ALIX STRACHEY and ALAN TYSON VOLUME XX/ (1927-1931)

The Future of an Illusion Civilization and its Discontents anti

Other Works

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Ungekiirzte Ausgabe Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag Aprilt982 Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main Lizenzausgabe mit freundiicher Genehmigung des S. Fischer Verlages GmbH, Frankfurt am Main Fiir siimtliche Freud-Texte: © S. Fischer Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, 1974 Filr das aus der Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud entnommene Material: ©The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London, und Angela Richards, Eynsham, 1974 Filr zus3.tzliches editorisches Material: ©Angela Richards, Eynsham, 1974 Alie Rechte, auch die des Abdrucks im Au~zug und der photomechanischen Wiedergabe, vorbehalten. Umschlaggestaltung: Mendell & Oberer Satz: Buchdruckerei Eugen Gobel, Tiibingen Druck und Bindung: Clausen&; Bosse, Leck Printed in Germany 3880-ISBN 3-596-2730'!-9

NOTES ON THE CREATION OF THE Bl-LINGUAL EDITION OF CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS/ DAS UNBEHAGEN IN DER KUL TUR

I have used the Standard Edition for the English text and the Studienausgabe for the German text as it is said to be more accurate and has some of the notes from the Standard Edition translated into German In this particular translation, there is a minimum of Strachey's changing the paragraph breaks in the translation. It is interesting to note that at the bottom of the English page 135, almost the very last word on the page, the word, malaise is used to translate the German word Unbehagen, instead of the word discontent. For today's reader, the whole title Civilization and Its Discontents like Instincts and Their Vicissitudes has a very Bloomsbury sound to it. The title today might be translated as a combinatory of the following elements:

The malaise/uneasiness/uncomfortableness of culture/civilization About the title in German, Das Unbehagen in der Kulturwhich was originally going to be, Das Ung/Ock in der Kultur-1 am reminded of Lacan's story of the two German Jewish refugees meeting on the street after the war. One says to the other, "are you happy?" And the other one answers, "Yes, happy, aber nicht glilcklich!" And as for the title in English, Civilization and Its Discontents, I would say a more cynical title might have been Syphilization and Its Discontents. Because wasn't it white man's civilization that brought the scourge of syphilis to the American natives for the first time as well as their 'fire water'?. Or as the Englishman would say, "we brought them the French disease" or as the Frenchman would say,"we brought them the Neapolitan disease". Or as both the Englishman and the Frenchman and the Neapolitan, or anyone else for that matter would probably say, "we brought them the Jewish disease". Or as Freud said to Jung, "we brought them the plague!"

I cannot, like Freud, call upon my witch meta-psychology for help in explaining this essay, but I can call upon my namesake, a Lacanian analyst residing in London, a Dr. Richard Klein, for a brief and very interesting seminar on the first four chapters of Civilization and its Discontents, which is included here. This is an article published in Vol. 3, Winter 1994 from the Journal of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research. And last and probably least, for a friend of mine who advised me to please leave out the Klang associations of Klein: Unbehagen-Uta Hagen-Haagendasz!

Richard G. Klein Spring 2006 New York City

Vol. 3, Wint@r 1994, Journal of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research.

From a seminar on the first four chapters of Civilisation and its Discontents Richard Klein I. The beautiful and the sublime In Chapter I in a letter to Freud Romain Rolland expresses his experience of what he calls an oceanic feeling as one of eternity and limitlessness and claims that it is the source of religious feeling. In opening his Civilisation and its Discontents on an aesthetic judgement which has the earmarks of the sublime and in remarking briefly in Chapter II on the judgement which elevates an object to the status of the beautiful, it seems to me that Freud is inviting the reader to explore these notions further especially since he considers them as operations in psychic structure.

2. The oceanic feeling For my taste Romain Rolland's oceanic feeling is not an especially impressive illustration of the sublime. He orients it on the source of religious feeling. In other words, it falls into the field of the Other of guarantee which always incarnates the Father of protection. It structures the sublime as noble or as splendid, two of the three effects of the sublime in critical philosophy. The third effect is terrifying. The terrifying sublime does not seem to have the same structure in that it excludes the Other of guarantee and the Father of protection. The oceanic feeling does conform to a category of the sublime called mathematical, being immeasurably great. Whether Romain Rolland imbues it with the power of nature which is the category of the dynamical sublime is not clear, cannot be decided from Freud's comment on his letter.

/

Freud traces the origin of the oceanic feeling to a sublime which is terrifying and asserts that it is transformed into a splendid or noble sublime when a longing for the Father of protection affects the structure. Or,as we say, the splendid and noble sublime are effects of the paternal metaphor. The judgement of the sublime in critical philosophy is based on a disaccord between the imagination and reason. Confronting the sublime with imagination and without reason outrages the imagination in presenting it with the infinite. The sublime object is limitless, formless and deformed, bringing pain to the subject in a confrontation with it. Imagine being a citizen of a city of Renaissance splendour and then exiled to a desolate wasteland. It becomes limitless and deformed incarnating the Thing. Not being limited, it has no absence and cannot be dialectised by presence and absence. The sublime as terrifying falls into the category of the real. Reason in critical philosophy is linked to a supersensible world for which t.he only definition I can give is that it is not the phenomenal world. The supersensible self is in charge of reason. When it intervenes in a confrontation with the sublime, it brings pleasure by freeing the imagination from the sublime object. A sensuous link is broken. The pleasure is of a higher form. This explanation falls out of this world, according to Freud. Until reason intervenes, the imagination is connected to the object itself with an effect of the real. The subject can extract pleasure from pain which is the idea in Edmund Burke's notion of enjoyment in horror, or he can grasp the manifold of the sublime object for which reason must intervene. It leaves one to wonder whether this is the ethical position that cleared the way for the infinite cardinal. Judging the sublime prepares the subject for the advent of the moral law. The subject in a confrontation with it is in a state of fear and helplessness. In actual fear no judgement can be made, says Kant. The subject must cross through fear, must face destruction unflinchingly and courageously. Fear is not without an object written a to give it its real status. According to Kant the subject must resist it morally which brings pleasure. The Thing makes the moral law appear. Romain Rolland orients the oceanic feeling on the source of religious feeling which is a sign of the advent of the moral law as contained in the Name-of-the-Father.

3. Jouissance and the sublime In the pass~ge still in Chapter I in which Freud is designing a topology of mternal and external the subject begins in a state of fear and helplessness. His thesis is that an infant at the breast does not yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of sensations and excitations. He doesn't say that the ego does not exist, but he also doesn't say that the external world does not exist for it. It is not a matter of the external world as such but the external world as a source of excitations. His construction is based on the excitations to which the body is susceptible. Thi~ is a continuation of the theme which begins in The Project: the subject's own q~antity called Q-eta is summating in the psi- system where the quan~1ty called Q with_ which his external perceptions are

loaded also arnves. The perception that Freud focuses on is called The Thing. I~ a Lacanian formulation component a of the Nebenmensch 1s the Other plus the Thing. In a confrontation with it the subject is in a state of fear and helplessness. The external world ~s a source i~ the Thing, but it could be internal since the Thing is hnke~ to psi. !he o~e~a-s~stem which covers the concept of ego does, _m ~act, give_ an md1cat10n of reality, but in this logic translates qu~nt1ty mto qu~hty, that is, into an experience in the pleasure-pain ~enes. The ego m a confrontation with the Thing experiences Un/ust m the field of Lust. In another formulation the external world is the source of the

~th~r's. jouissance. Freud's construction is based on a non-

d1stmct1on at the level of jouissance. It creates an effect of something boundless, says Freud, and is the source of the oceanic !eeling._ The su~ject in an encounter with the Thing has not grasped its mamfold. It 1s the sublime as terrifying. As .a topol?gy it seems to be a matter of a continuity of jouissance

wh1~h 1s 1mn:ieasurably great and the subject cannot grasp its

manifold creatmg a sublime effect.

evacuated leaving a residue called object a which in the term extimate persist with an effect of a continuity. The next step in Freud's construction breaks this logic. He argues that the external world as such has to be established and distinguished from the internal space. This depends on the appearance and disappearance of the breast in which dialectic it becomes an extern11I object. But, the breast is a source of jouissance and, according to the first argument is in a continuity. It cannot disappear. There is the hallucination which is a non-belief in absence. In the second argument in appearance and disappearance the breast becomes responsible for breaking the continuity and evacuating jouissance. A source of jouissance becomes responsible for evacuating jouissance. There is a contradiction in the second argument. The special action of the mother is to incarnate the function of the Other of the signifier and to subtract the Thing. Through the signifier the Other contracts a bond with the world for the subject. "We cannot fall out of this world", Freud quotes. It is quoted as something given, as an axiom. There exists the external world with which the subject has a bond of the One. It is not a oneness with the universe which could conceivably create an oceanic effect. It is a social bond which is the obstacle to falling out of this world.

4. The paternal metaphor Freud asks what claims the oceanic feeling has to be regarded as the source of religious feeling. The latter is derived from a state of helplessness in an encounter with the sublime. The subject in a state of fear and helplessness is experiencing the sublime but not judging it. There is no judgement , here but a longing for the Father and for his protection. The expected logical effect is a shrinkage of jouissance. Through the paternal metaphor the subject is separated from its jouissance but makes no judgement of the sublime in its mathematical, dynamic and terrifying modes.

Our p~esent ego-feeling, says Freud, is a shrunken residue of ~omethmg mo.re boundless. The e~o-feeling - to keep to the logic -,

is the experience of the ego m the pleasure-pain series on encountenng a shrunken residue of jouissance. Jouissance is

Freud in Chapter II finds it painful that man should have imagined for himself such an enormously exalted father. It seems that Freud prefers that the subject makes a judgement of the sublime.

36

37

5. The Beautiful In man's quest for happiness Freud considers briefly in Chapter II the role of beauty. It offers no protection against suffering but compens~tes for a great deal. For Kant beauty has no sensuous link to the Object, and for Freud beauty is derived from the attributes of the. sexual object through an impulse inhibited in its aim; these attributes are the object's secondary sexual characteristics. In. critica.1 philosophy beauty is not logically implicated in the It 1s the effect of a subjective judgement of taste, synthetic. If the judgement involves a desire for similar objects, a judgement on the agre~ablei;iess of the object has been made and not a judgement of taste m which the subject responds with disinterested pleasure. It has to qualify as universal, that is, be such that others can share it. Pleasure is of a higher form, being linked to the supersensible self which includes a will determined by the moral law.

obj~ct.

This unfathomable connection to the supersensible elevates the beautiful object to the status of the morally good - which it doesn't do at all, of course. It elevates the judgement to the status of the morally good. !he j_udg~ment of taste is based on a harmonious play between the 1magmat1on and the understanding in which the understanding leaves the imagination undetermined by a concept. ~or Freud •. the attribute "beautiful" is also not logically implicated m the object. It has to be added in a judgement. Given a fundamental object a, the subject appears as a lack in the field of the Other _and in a ju?gement adds the attribute capital A to a. The result 1s the syll?g1sm of love: Aa. The subject in an operation of the understandmg becomes a signifier which determines the imagination with a concept. The subject does not fall out of this world, and a becomes the subject's reality which is useless for civilis:ition, accor~ii;ig to Freud, but it offers some compensation for suffering. The_ add1t1on of A to a is a judgement of taste involving a concept. and 1t define~ Freudian idealisation. Kant's judgement of taste 1s not metonym1c whereas the judgement involved in the syllogism_ of love is ~etonymic evoking desire for similar objects, x, to which the attribute "beautiful" is added: Ax. The Oedipal lover adds A to a, and the Oedipalised lover of beauty adds A to a metonymic object x.

38

In Lacan's Seminar VII the subject's good is discovered in the Oth_cr, and it is the morally good which is the Ideal-signifier that the sub~cct becomes. In the syllogism of love the desire it evokes is the desire of the Other. In love of beauty desire is conjoined to love and regulated by the morally good. Freud says that love of beauty is an example of an impulse inhibited in its aim. Freud's assertion has to be interpreted from the perspective of a desire regulated by the morally good in which love in conjoined to desire. In this sense one can call the addition of A to x a judgement of taste. Idealisation is a judgement of taste. The aim of a drive is to extract satisfaction from an object. If the aim is inhibited, the extraction of pleasure stops, and jouissance affects the structure. It is not the aim that is inhibited but the impulse itself at source. In which case love of beauty is also based on a subtraction of jouissance. Otherwise, the subject passes to the sublime. The judgement of taste in Freud's doctrine excludes the genitals and attaches to the secondary sexual characteristics which define the Other sex. Love of beauty based on a desire regulated by the morally good gives the subject access to the Other sex. In Kant's judgement of taste beauty stops desire. It is based on love with duty ~i~h which a will determined by the moral Jaw ~s mcludcd. In Kant s judgement of taste the ideal of the angel is mcarn~tcd. (Sec, Jacques~Alain Miller, Revue de l'Ecolc No 25). There 1s no regulated dcstre, a.nd Kant is associated with Sade. The subject experiences the moral law in the field of beauty without desire. Herc, the subject has no access to the Other sex. Love of beauty as a duty leaves desire aberrant elsewhere to fall under duty and not under love. An aberrant desire does not lead to the sublime since the moral law cannot reach it. The advent of the moral Jaw occurs ~here the object is elevated to the dignity of the Thing, and the su~ject passes from_ beauty to the sublime. It has to be an object of ~est.re~ and_ the ~Ubject passes from the imaginary to the real, which ts m this log~c a sublimation. Where desire stops the risk is that the moral law m the form of a superego not contained in the Name-of-the-Father intervenes in the relation between love and duty. ?s~ociatcd

39

6. The narcissistic structure of the ego In the syllogism of love Aa beauty becomes an attribute of an imaginary object. The effect of it is certainty. There is nothing of which we arc more certain than the feeling of our own ego, says Freud in Chapter I. The addition of A to a gives the ego a guarantee that it docs not lack. He continues that the ego is marked off sharply towards the exterior and towards the interior shades into a continuity with the id. One can take this id from two Lacanian perspectives. The id speaks, and it is impossible for the id to speak. In the first instance, the id is a chain of significrs about which something can be said. In order to say anything the subject becomes a signifier and signifies the ego:

SI - S2

$

subjective position. If, in addition, the operator of the barred Other is not in play, then jouissance returns to the Other. In this state a thought is ascribed to the external world, says Freud. A, though, is ascribed to the little other since each represents the other by the same meaning. For instance, to take the classical illustration, a woman says she has just been to the pork butchers to a man whom she meets in the corridor. Being represented by the same meaning as the little other, she hears him say 'sow'. At the level of jouissance he is going to cut her up into little pieces. Any imaginary identification has the effect of representation by the same meaning on which the paranoiac delusion is based. Narcissism has paranoiac effects, but for a paranoiac structure jouissance must return to the Other.

7. The signifier of the phallus.

a

(e)

When the id speaks, the subject of the unconscious is concealed in an ego. The subject becomes a signifier and _is concealed in the

beautiful. In the syllogism of love the ego acqmrcs a guarantee from the Other. In so far as the immeasurably great of Romain Rolland's oceanic feeling is falling under the father of protection, it is not the Freudian sublime but the noble and splendid sublime of the Other of guarantee. In the case where the id does not speak the ego is in a confrontation with a with a sublime effect. I would take this effect as the division of the subject by the object: $ a. In passing from the id where ra parle to an object which is impossible to say, one arrives at the fundamental fantasy. There is, nonetheless, a state of the ego, says Freud in Chapter I, in which it is not sharply marked off towards the exterior: the state of being in love. In the syllogism of love, Aa, a want-to-be is registered since the subject appears in the field of the Other. The lover puts this lack up against the lack in the Other which separates him from his jouissance. In Chapter I in the state of being in love the pronouns "I" and "you" mingle. In other words, in an imaginary identification each subject represents the other in the same meaning: a - a'. There is no

40

In Chapter Ill Freud lists a few founding acts of civilisation, amongst these man's conquest of fire. His explanation has by now become a little banal which I take as a challenge to make it fresh again. This founding act is like psychoanalytical material which is, he says, always incomplete and not susceptible to clear interpretation. Freud's interpretation is clear. So, it must be a construction. Freud is constructing the signifier of desire from the desire of man in a founding act. He starts with a fact: a man can extinguish a fire by urinating on it, and a woman cannot. Man began pissing on fire, which Freud takes as a phallic symbol, in a homosexual rivalry with each other, but sparing the fire is the founding act. Pissing on fire is not the founding act. Men were pissing on it before the murder of the father when fire could not be taken as a phallic symbol. There was no signficr. The founding act par excellence was the murder of the father. Sparing fire was a corrollary to that act. One retells the Freudian story of man's conquest of fire always with a little humour that evokes an imaginary scene of a woman trying to piss on a fire. It is humour of a special kind which Freud calls superego humour. In superego humour the man is avoiding his castration. Not in Freudian speculation but in Freudian logic which is how the reader must take the story castration is indicated.

41

Sparing the fire is associated with renunc1at10n of libidinal satisfaction, says Freud. In the orgy following the murder of the father the sons abandoned themselves to jouissance. Then, totems and taboos arrived, and the sons renounced jouissance. It was the moment of identification with the phallus which is associated with mortification of the body, that is, of symbolic castration. The phallus implicates symbolic castration. The phallus is not an organ that pisses. If, as Freud says, women became the guardians of fire, it isn't because they cannot dissolve the identification in a flow of urine. The women supported the identification and became the guardians of castration.

8.

Freudian ethics

Although a Freudian ethics as such is not elaborated - Freud would have held the idea in contempt, an ethical direction is quite graspable from his text. It is not in the direction of a traditional ethics based on the paternal metaphor. Such an enormously exalted signifier as the Father he finds painful. It is not in the direction of an ethics of the beautiful nor of some forms of the sublime. Traditional ethics has an end which Freud calls in Chapter II the purpose of life: happiness which is traditionally situated in the field of pleasure. It is programmed by the pleasure principle. Freudian ethics is not in this direction. Given that the pleasure principle is the rule of the discourse of the unconscious, then the direction is not towards the unconscious. The unconscious is not the end of Freudian ethics. One is inclined to conclude that traditional ethics i's symptomatic. It is not necessarily symptomatic, but .a part of the symptom is traditionalised by this ethics. Oh, how much our analysands arc traditionaliscd! Oh, how much our analysts arc traditionaliscd! In so far as the analysand is traditionaliscd, one is obliged to analyse the unconscious, but it is not the direction, not the end. h's and end not realisable in Freud's opinion. In Chapter II he gives a list of reasons why not: this end is subverted by pain, by forces of destruction, by our relations to other men. The principle reason comes in Chapter IV: the phallic function cannot support man in happiness.

42

9. Genital love and happiness Work and love are two pillars of civilisation. Love leads to t.he development of the family providing the basis of commun~l hfe which work needs. Everyone knows that work can proceed without the family. Firms remain quite profitable. with or without .the family. There are better reasons for the existence of the family. Freud is talking about the locus in which tradition becm?es symptomatic. He is talking about his doctrine of love. Frcud1B:n psychoanalysis is, in effect, a doctrine of love. The. result of love 1s an unwillingness to be deprived of the sexual object, namely, the woman. For the woman the result is an unwillingness to be deprived of that part of herself which has been separated off from her - her children. You sec immediately that the result of love for the man and the woman is dissymmetrical. Through her children which are her objects a she castrates the man. How anyone in the post-Freudian movement can extract from this passage one contemporary aim of the treatment is surprising: genital love based on a satisfying object-relation. In this passage the man has a symptom which is the woman, and the wom~n has her children. Genital love becomes the prototype of happiness, says Freud, and since happiness is not the end of psychoanalysis nor is genital love. Aim-inhibited love is not to Freud's taste and he has two objections. It is Jove displaced onto all men which firstly does an injustice to the sexual object, and secondly, not all men are worthy of love. Those who Jove all men are refusing to accept their castration since our discovery that the woman is the guardian of castration. It is not part of Freudian ethics to do an injustice to the woman. The man does an injustice by a refusal to accept his castration. In choosing a woman who wants to fuck a man, one has also chosen a guardian of castration. If the man wants one, he has to take both. One can add a ' risk which is to live in fear of the sublime object. He says that the man in carrying out the business of civilisation requires instinctual sublimation, and the woman is not capable of it. Women have been carrying out the business of civilisation for a long time, and some significant few already when Freud was writing this text. He knew them. This passage can only be understood from a Lacanian perspective. In so far as instinctual sublimation designates loss of jouissance, the woman is not capable of it. She has her own jouissance, and it is in opposition not just to

43

civilisation but to the phallic function. But, she also has a relation to the phallus. She carries out the business of civilisation in her relation to the phallus. In her relation to the phallus she is the guardian of castration, including herself as castrated. In her relation to her own jouissance she is not the guardian of castration. She does not lose it and preserves a relation of solitude to it. It is her solitude, and the man encounters it as sublime. The man's phallic function has undergone an involution comparable, says Freud amusingly, to his hair and teeth. Phallic jouissance is an involuted function and does not support happiness. It supports an object-relation but not a satisfying one .

.·1A

C.W. Stud. S.E.

c.w.

Stud. S.E.

G. W. Stud. S.E.

1930a

14

9

21

419

191 193

57 59 60

421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 431 432

194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206

433 434 435 436 437

207 208 209 210

438

211 212 213 214 215 216 217

439 440

441 442 443 444

445 446

447 448

449 450

218 219 220 221

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 73 74 7S 76

n

78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

14 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 458 459

9

21

222 223

92 93 94

224 225

226 227 228

229 230

460

461 462 463 464

231 232 233 234

465

466 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483

235 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 24S 246 247 248 249 250 251

95 96 97 98 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 11S 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124

14 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 S03 504

sos

506

9

252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264

21 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139

265 266 267 268 269 270

140 141 142 143 144 145

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1930 [1929])

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur {1930 [1929])

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

EDITORISCHE VORBEMERKUNG

DAS UNBEHAGEN IN DER KULTUR

(a) GERMAN EDITIONS: 1930 Vienna: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Pp. 136. 1931 2nd ed. (Reprint of 1st ed., with some additions.) 1934 G.S., 12, 29-114. 1948 G.W., 14, 421-506.

(b)

Deutsche Ausgaben: 1930 Wien, Intcrnationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. 136 Seiten. 1931 2. Aufl. (Nachdruck der 1. Aufl., mit einigen Erganzungen) 136 Seiten. 1934 G. S., Bd. 12, 29-114. 1948 G. \V., Bd. 14, 421-506.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION:

Civilization and its Discontents 1930 London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis. New York: Cape and Smith. Pp. 144. (Tr. Joan Riviere.) The present translation is based on that published in 1930.

The first chapter of the German original was published slightly in advance of the rest of the book in Psychoanal. Bewegung, 1 (4), November-December, 1929. The fifth chapter appeared separately in the next issue of the same periodical, 2 (1), January-February, 1930. Two or three extra footnotes were included in the edition of 1931 and a new final sentence was added to the work. None of these additions appeared in the earlier version of the English translation. Freud had finished The Future of an Illusion in the autumn of 1927. During the following two years, chiefly, no doubt, on account of his illness, he produced very little. But in the summer of 1929 he began writing another book, once more on a sociological subject. The first draft was finished by the end of July; the book was sent to the printers early in November and was actually published before the end of the year, though it carried the date '1930' on its title-page Qones, 1957, 157-8). The original title chosen for it by Freud was 'Das Ungluck in der Kultur' ('Unhappiness in Civilization'); but 'Ungliick' was later altered to 'Unhehagen'-a word for which it was difficult to 8.F. XXl-E

59

·Das erste Kapitel dieses Werkes wurde etwas friiher als die iibrigen Teile in PsyclJoanalytische Bewegung, Bd.1 (4), November-Dezember 1929, veroffentlidlt. Das fiinftc Kapitel erschien als selbstandiger Artikel in der nachsten Ausgabe dieser Zcitschrift, Bd. 2 (1), Januar-Februar 1930. In der Ausgabe von 1931 waren zwei oder drei zusatzliche FuBnoten sowie ein neuer SchluBsatz hinzugekommen. Diese Veranderungen sind in der vorliegendcn Ausgabe kenntlich gemacht. Freud hatte im Herbst 1927 Die Zukunfl einer Illusion beendet. In den folgen'den beiden, Jahren veroffentlichte er, zweifellos hauptsachlich wegen seiner Krankheit, nur sehr wenig. Im Sommer 1929 aber begann er mit der Niedersduift eines neuen Buches, wiederum iiber ein soziologisches Thema. Der erste &twurf war Ende Juli abgeschlossen; Anfang November wurde das Manuskript in Satz gegeben; tatsachlich erschien das Buch noch im selben Jahr, obgleich das Titelblatt dieJahreszahl 1930 tragt.

60

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur

choose an English equivalent, though the French 'malaise' might have served. Freud suggested 'Man's Discomfort in Civili;;,ation' in a letter to his translator, Mrs. Riviere; but it was she herself who found the ideal solution of the difficulty in the title that was finally adopted. The main theme of the book-the irremediable antagonism between the demands of instinct and the restrictions of civilization-may be traced back to some of Freud's" very earliest psychological writings. Thus, on May 31, 1897, he wrote to Fliess that 'incest is anti-social and civilization consists in a progressive renunciation of it' (Freud, 1950a, Draft N); and a year later, in a paper on 'Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses' (1898a), he wrote that 'we may justly hold our· civilization responsible for the spread of neurasthenia'. Nevertheless, in his early writings Freud does not seem to have regarded repression as being wholly due to external social influences. Though in his Three Essays (l905d) he spoke of 'the

inverse relation holding between civilization and the free development of sexuality' (Standard Ed., 7, 242), elsewhere in the same work he had the following comment to make on the dams against the sexual instinct that emerge during the latency period: 'One gets an impression from civilized children that the construction of these dams is a product of education, and no doubt education has much to do with it. But in reality this development is organically determined and fixed by heredity, and it can occasionally occur without any help at all from education.' (Ibid., 177-8.) The notion of there being an 'organic repression' paving the way to civilization-a notion that is expanded in the two long footnotes at the beginning and end of Chapter IV (pp. 99 f. and 105 ff. below)-goes back to the sanie early period. In a letter to Fliess of November 14, 1897, Freud wrote that he had often suspected 'that something organic played a part in repression' (Freud, I950a, Letter 75). He went on, in precisely the sense of these footnotes, to suggest the importance as factors in repression of the adoption of an upright carriage and the replacement of smell by sight as the dominant sense. A still earlier hint at the same idea occurs in a letter of January 11, 1897 (ibid., Letter 55). In Freud's published writings the only mentions of these ideas before the present one seem to be a short passage in the

Das Hauptthema des Buches, der unversohnliche Antagonismus zwischen den Triebforderungen und den von der Zivilisation auferlegten Einschrankungen, laBt sich bis zu Freuds friihesten. Schriften zuriickverfolgen. Die Arbeit, die den vorliegenden Band eroffnet, >Die .. kulturelle« Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervositat< (1908d), ist zwar bei weitem ausfiihrlicher als alle vorhergehenden Erorterungen des Themas, aber die >Editorische Vorbemerkung< zu jelier Arbeit gibt eine Reihe von Hinweisen auf noch friihere Bemerkungen hierzu (S. 11, oben). In diesen friihen Darlegungen scheint Freud die Einschrankung und Verdrangung der Triebwiinsche in den meisten Fallen auf auBere soziale Einfliisse zuriickzufiihren. Das ist jedoch nicht durchgehend der Fall. Zwar spricht er. in den Drei Abhandlungen (1905d), wie auf S. 11, oben, erwahnt, von der »gegensatzlichen 'Beziehung zwischen Kultur und freier Sexualitatsentwicklung« (Studienausgabe, Bd. 5, S. 144); in demselben Werk aber macht, er an anderer Stelle folgende Bemerkung iiber die Damme, die in der Latenzzeit gegen den Sexualtrieb errichtet wer~n: »Man gcwinnt beim Kulturkinde den Eindruck, daB dcr Aufbau dicser Damme ein Werk ~er Erziehung ist, und sicherlich tut die Erziehung viel dazu. In WirkIichkeit ist d,iese Entwicklung eine organisch bedingte, hereditar fixierte und kann sich geleg·entlich ganz ohne Mithilfe der Erziehung herstellen.« (Ibid., s. 85.)

Dies fiihrt uns zum ersten von zwei wichtigen weiteren Themen des vorliegenden Werks. Die Vorstellung, es bestehe-.eine »Organische Verdrangung, die den Weg zur Kultur gebahnt hat« - eine Vorstellung, die in den beiden langen FuBnoten zu Beginn und am SchluB von Kapitel IV (S. 229.f. und S. 235 f., untc11) weiter ausgefiihrt wird -, geht auf die gleiche friihe Periode zuriick. In einem Brief an FlieB vom 14. November 1897 schrieb Freud: ,.DaB bei der Verdrangung etwas Organisches mitwirkt, habe ich oft geahnt« (Freud, 1950a, Brief 75). Ganz im Sinne dieser FuBnoten fahrt er fort, die Bedeutung des aufrechten Ganges und der Vorherrschaft des Gesichts- iiber den Geruchssinn als Faktoren der Verdrangung zu erwagen. Eine noch friihere Andeutung derselben Idec findet sich in einem Brief vom 11. Januar 1897 (ibid., Brief 55). In seinen veroffent!ichten Werken scheint Freud diese Gedal1kengange fri.iher nur kurz in der

Editorische Vorbemt:rkung

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

61

'Rat Man' analysis {1909d), Standard Ed., 10, 247-8 and a still shorter one in the second paper on the psychology of love (1912d), ibid., 11, 189. In particular, no analysis of the deeper, internal origins of civilization is to be found in what is by far the longest of Freud's earlier discussions of the subject, 1 his paper on' "Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modem Nervous Illness' ( l 908d), which gives the impression of the restrictions of civilization as something imposed from without. But indeed no clear evaluation of the part played in these restrictions by internal and external influences and of their reciprocal effects was possible till Freud's investigations of egopsychology had led him to his hypotheses of the super-ego and its origin from the individual's earliest object-relations. It is because of this that such a large part of the present work (especially in Chapters VII and VIII) is concerned with the further exploration and clarification of the nature of the sense of guilt, and that Freud (on p. 134) declares his 'intention to represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the development of civilization'. And this, in turn, is the ground for the second major side-issue of this work (though neither of them is in fact a side-issue)-the destructive instinct. The history of Freud's views on the aggressive or destructive instinct is a complicated one and can only be summarily indicated here. Throughout his earlier writings the context in which he viewed it predominantly was that of sadism. His first lengthy discussions of this were in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexualiry ( l 905d), where it appeared as one of the 'component instincts' of the sexual instinct. 'Thus', he wrote in Section 2 (B) of the first essay, 'sadism would correspond to an aggressive component of the sexual instinct which has become independent and exaggerated and, by displacement, has usurped the leading position' (Standard Ed., 7, 158). Nevertheless, later on, in Section 4 of the second essay, the original independence of the aggressive impulses was recognized: 'It may be assumed that the impulses of cruelty arise from sources which are in fact independent of sexuality, but may become united with it at an early 1 The subject is touched on in many other works, among which may be mentioned a paper on 'The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis' (1925e), Standard Ed., 19, 219 ff., the first pages of The Future of an Illusion (1927c), and the last paragraphs of Why War? (1933b).

Analyse des ,.Rattenmannes« (1909d), StudienausgaH, Bd. 7, S. 102, und in einer nodt knapperen Passage in der z.weiten Arbeit iiber die Psydtologie des Liebeslebens (1912d), ibid., Bd. 5, S. 208, angedeutet zu haben. Die ldee des »Kulturprozessesc, die mit derjenigen der »organischen Verdrangung« gekoppelt ist und an mehreren Stellen in der vorliegenden Arbeit Gestalt' gewinnt, wird nodt einmal in den SdtluBabsatzen von 'Warum Krieg? (1933 b), S. 285 f., unten, berilhrt. Vgl. auch den damit verwandten Gedanken eines »Fortsdtritts in der Geistigkeit« in Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion (1939 a), Aufsatz III, Teil II, Abschnitt C, S. 557 ff., unten. Man darf jedodt nidtt auBer adtt !assen, daB eine klare Einsdtatzung der Rolle, weldt.e auBere und innere Einflilsse sowie deren Wedtselwirkungen bei den von der 15.ultur auferlegten Einschrankungen spielen, erst moglidt war, nadtdem Freuds ich-psychologisdie Forsdtungen ihn zur Hypothese des OberIdts und seiner Entstehung aus den friihesten Objektbeziehungen des Individuums gefiihrt hatten. Deshalb nimmt in der vorliegenden Arbeit (besonders in Kapitel VII und VIII) die weitere Erforsdiung und Klarstellung des Sdtuldgefiihls einen so breiten Raum ein, und deshalb erklart Freud (auf S. 260) seine ,.Absidtt, das Sdtuldgefiihl als das widitigste Problem der Kulturentwicklung hinzustellen«. Dies wiederum begrilndet das zweite groBe Nebenthema dieser Arbeit (keines von beiden ist eigentlidt ein Nebenthema), nim-

lich das Thema des Destruktionstriebes.

Die Gesdtidtte der Ansidtten Freuds iiber den Aggressions- .oder Destruk.tionstrieb ist kompliziert und kann hier nur summarisdi angedeutet werden. Ia alien seinen friiheren Schriften betradttete er diesen hauptsadilich im Kontca: de& Sadismus. Die ersten langeren Erorterungen stehen in den Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie (1905d), wo der Sadismus als einer der »Partialtriebec des Sexualtriebs ersdteint. So sdtrieb er in der ersten Abhandlung: »Der Sadismus entspradte dann einer selbstandig gewordenen, iibertriebenen, Aggressionstricb< statuicrcn miisscn, der

aidit m1t dem -!\dlerschen zusammenfallt. Ich ziehe cs vor, ihn >Destruktions- oder Todestrieb< zu hcillenc (ibid., S. 117, Anm. 2). Adlers Begriff hatte in der Tat mchr die aedeutung eincs Selbstbehauptungstriebs.

195

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

63

Editorische Vorbemerkung

1937, to Princess Marie Bonaparte,1 in which he appears to be hinting at a greater original independence of external destructiveness: 'The turning inwards of the aggressive instinct is of course the counterpart to the turning outwards of the libido when it passes over from the ego to objects. We should have a neat schematic picture if we supposed that originally, at the beginning of life, all libido was directed to the inside and all aggressiveness to the outside, and that in the course of life this gradually altered. But perhaps this may not be correct.' It is only fair to add that in his next letter Freud wrote: -'I beg you not to set too much value on my remarks about the destructive instinct. They were only made at random and would have to be carefully thought over before being published. Moreover there is little that is new in them.'

1937 an die Prinzessin Marie &,naparte zu zitieren, mit denen er cine groBere urspriingliche Selbstandigkeit der auBeren Destruktivitat anzudeuten scheint: ·Die Einwartswendung des Aggressionstriebs ist natiirlich das Gegenstiic:k zur Auswartswendung der Libido, wenn sie vom Ich auf die Objekte iibergeht. Es gabe eine hiibsche schematische Vorstellung, daB anfanglich zu Beginn des Lebens alle Libido nach innen, alle Aggression nach auBen gerichtet ist, und daB sich dies im Verlauf des Lebens allmahlich andert. Aber das ist vielleicht nicht richtig.« Man muB jedoch gerechterweise hinzufiigen, daB Freud im nachsten Brief fortfahrt: ,., .. Die Bemerkungen iiber den Destruktionstrieb bitte ich Sie, nicht zu ilberschatzen. Sie sind nur so hingeworfen worden und sollten sorgfaltig iiberlegt werden, wenn man sie in die Offentlichkeit [bringen?] will. Es ist auch zu wenig Neues dabei.« 1

It will thus be obvious that Civilization and its Discontents is a work whose interest ranges far beyond sociology.

Otfensichtlich ist Das Unbehagen in der Kultur also ein Werk, dessen Bedeutung weit iiber den Bereich der Soziologie hinausreicht.

Considerable portions of the earlier (1930) translation of this work were included in Rickman's Civilization, War and Death: Selections from Three Works by Sigmund Freud (1939, 26-81).

1 D~r erst~ Brief und dcr obige Auszug aus dem zweiten sind in Anhang A (Nr. 33 und 34) im drmen. Band .von .Ernest Jones' Freud-Biographic enthalten (Jones, 1962/r, S. 536). Allerd1~.gs ~eu:ht ?ort dcr Wonlaut des Auszugs erbeblich von dem Wicdcrge~ebenen a~ .. Fur die vorhegende Ausgabe wurden die handschriftlichen Originalc du Bnefe konsuluert. Das Wort nach ·Offentlichkeit« ist unleserlich.

1 She has very kindly allowed us to reproduce it here. The whole passage will also be found (in a different translation) in Appendix A (No. 33) ofEmestJones's biography (Jones, 1957, 494). The topic had been considered by Freud in Section VI of the paper, written shortly before this letter, on 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' (1937c).

196

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS IT is impossible to escape the impression that people commonly use false standards of measurement-that they seek power, success and wealth for themselves and admire them in others, and that they underestimate what is of true value in life. And yet, in making any general judgement of this sort, we are in danger of forgetting how variegated the human world and its mental life are. There are a few men from whom their contemporaries do not withhold admiration, although their greatness rests on attributes and achievements which are completely foreign to the aims and ideals of the multitude. One might easily be inclined to suppose that it is after all only a minority which appreciates these great men, while the large majority cares nothing for them. But things are probably not as simple as that, thanks to the discrepancies between people's thoughts and their actions, and to the diversity of their wishful impulses.

One of these exceptional few calls himself my friend in his letters to me. I had sent him my small book that treats religion as an illusion, 1 and he answered that he entirely agreed with my judgement upon religion, but that he was sorry I had not properly appreciated the true source of religious sentiments. This, he says, consists in a peculiar feeling, which he himself is never without, which he finds confirmed by many others, and which he may suppose is present in millions of peoplt. It is a feeling which he would like to call a sensation of 'eternity', a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded-as it were, 'oceanic'. This feeling, he adds, is a purely subjective fact, not an article of faith; it brings with it no assurance of personal immortality, but it is the source of the religious energy which is seized upon by the various Churches and religious sy~tems, directed by them into particular channels, and doubtless also exhausted by them. One may, he thinks, rightly call oneself religious on the ground of this oceanic feeling alone, even if one rejects every belief and every illusion. The views expressed by the friend whom I so much honour, 1 [The Future of an Illusion (l927c); seep. 5 above.] 64

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur Man kann sich des Eindrucks nicht erwehren, daB die Menschen gemeinhin mit falschen MaBstaben messen, Macht, Erfolg und Reichtum fiir sich anstreben und bei anderen bewundern, die wahren Werte des Lebens aber unterschatzen, Und doch ist man bei jedem solchen allgemeinen Urteil in Gefahr, an die Buntheit der Menschenwelt und ihres seelischen Lebens zu vergessen. Es gibt einzelne Manner, denen sich die Verehrung ihrer Zeitgenossen nicht versagt, obwohl ihre GroBe auf Eigenschaften und Leistungen ruht, die den Zielen und Idealen der Menge durchaus fremd sind. Man wird leicht annehmen wollen, daB es doch nur eine Minderzahl ist, welche diese groBen Manner anerkennt, waJuend die groBe Mehrheit nichts von ihnen wissen will. Aber es diirfte nidit so einfach zugehen, dank den Unstimmigkeiten zwischen dem Denken unq dem Handeln der Menschen und der Vielstimmigkeit ihr~r Wunschregungen. Einer dieser ausgezeidmeten Manner nennt sidi in Briefen meinen Freund. Ich hatte ihm meine kleine Schrift zugeschickt, welche die Religion als Illusion behandelt 1, und er antwortete, er ware mit meinem Urteil iiber die Religion ganz einverstanden, bedauerte aber, daB ich die eigentliche Quelle der Religiositat nicht gewiirdigt hatte. Diese sei ein besonderes Gefiihl, das ihn selbst nie zu verlassen pflege, das er von vielen anderen bestatigt gefunden und bei Millionen Menschen voraussetzen diirfe. Ein Gefiihl, das er die Empfindung der »Ewigkeit« nennen mochte, ein Gefiihl wie von etwas Unbegrenztem, Schrankenlosem, gleichsam »Ozeanischem«. Dies Gefiihl sei eine rein subjektive Tatsache, kein Glaubenssatz; keine Zusicherung personlicher Fortdauer kniipfe sich daran, aber es sei die Quelle der religiosen Energie, die von den verschiedenen Kirchen und Religionssystemen gefaBt, in bestimmte Kanale geleitet und gewiB auch aufgezehrt werde. Nur auf Grund dieses ozeanischen Gefiihls diirfe man sich religios heiBen, auch wenn man jeden Glauben und jede Illusion ablehne. Diese Aufierung meines verehrten Freundes, der selbst einmal den 1

[Die Zukunfl einer Illusion (1927 c), in dicsem Band die vorhergehcndc Arbeit.]

197

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

65

and who himself once praised the magic of illusion in a poem, 1 caused me no small difficulty. I cannot discover this 'oceanic' feeling in myself. It is not easy to deal scientifically with feelings. One can attempt to describe their physiological signs. Where this is not possible-and I am afraid that the oceanic feeling too will defy this kind of characterization-nothing remains but to fall back on the ideational content which is most readily associated with the feeling. If I have understood my friend rightly, he means the same thing by it as the consolation offered by an original and somewhat eccentric dramatist to his hero who is facing a self-inflicted death. 'We cannot fall out of this world.' 2 That is to say, it is a feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world as a whole. I may remark that to me this seems something rather in the nature of an intellectual perception, which is not, it is true, without an accompanying feeling-tone, but only such as would be present with any other act of thought of equal range. From my own experience I could not convince myself of the primary nature of such a feeling. But this gives me no right to deny that it does in fact occur in other people. The only question is whether it is being correctly interpreted and whether it ought to be regarded as the Jons et origo of the whole need for religion. I have nothing to suggest which could have a decisive influence on the solution of this problem. The idea of men's receiving an intimation of their connection with the world around them through an immediate feeling which is from the outset directed to that purpose sounds so strange and fits in so badly with the fabric of our psychology that one is justified in attempting to discover a psycho-analytic-that is, a geneticexplanation of such a feeling. The following line of thought suggests itself. Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our self, of our own ego. 8 This ego 1 [Footrwte added 1931 :] Liluli [1919].-Since the publication of his two books La vie de Ramakrishna [1929] and La vie de Vivekananda (1930), I need no longer hide the fact that the friend spoken of in the text is Romain Rolland. [Romain Rolland had written to Freud about the 'oceanic feeling' in a letter of December 5, 1927, very soon after the publication of The Future of an Illusion.] •Christian Dietrich Grabbe [1801-36], Hannibal: 'Ja, aus der Welt werden wir nicht fallen. Wir sind einmal darin.' ['Indeed, we shall not fall out ofthis world. We are in it once and for all.'] 1 [Some remarks on Freud's we of the terms 'ego' and 'self' will be

--------------------

Das UnbehaEen in der Kultur

Zaub~r der Iilusion poetisch gewiirdigt hat, brachte mir nich~ geringe Schwierigkeiten 1 • Ich selbst kann dies »ozeanischec Gefiihl nicht in mir entdecken. Es i,St nicht bequem, Gefiihle wissenschaftlich zu bearbeiten. Man kann versuchen, ihre physiologischen Anzeichen zu beschreiben. Wo dies nicht angeht - ich fiirchte, auch das ozeanische Gefiihl wird sich einer solchen Charakteristik entziehen -, bleibt doch nichts iibrig, als sich an den Vorstellungsinhalt zu halten, der sich assoziativ am ehesten zum Gefiihl gesellt. Habe ich meinen Freund richtig verstanden, so meint er dasselbe, was ein origineller und ziemlich absonderlicher Dichter seinem Helden als Trost vor dem freigewahlten Tod mitgibt: »Aus dieser Welt konnen wir nicht fallen.« 2 Also ein Gefiihl der unauflosbaren Verbundenheit, der Zusammengehorigkeit mitdemGanzen der AuBenwelt. Ich mochte sagen, fiir mich ·hat dies eher den Charakter einer intellektuellen Einsicht, gewiB nicht ohne begleitenden Gefiihlston, wie er aber auch bei anderen Denkakten von ahnlicher Tragweite nicht fehlen wird. An meiner Person konnte ich mich von der primaren Natur eines solchen Gefiihls nicht iiberzeugen. Darum darf ich aber sein tatsachliches Vorkommen bei anderen nicht bestreiten. Es fragt sich nur, ob es richtig gedeutet wird und ob es als "Jons et origo• aller religiosen Bediirfnisse'anerkannt werden soll. Ich habe nichts vorzubringen, was die Losung dieses Problems entscheidend beeinflussen wiirde. Die Idec, daB der Mensch durch ein unmittelbares, von Anfang an hierauf gerichtetes Gefiihl Kunde von seinern Zusammenhang mit der Umwelt erhalten sollte, klingt so fremdartig, fiigt sich so iibel in das Gewebe unserer Psychologie, daB cine psychoanalytische, d. i. genetische Ableitung eines solchen Gefiihls ver~ sucht werden darf. Dann stellt sich uns folgender Gedankengang zur Verfiigung: Normalerweise ist uns nichts gesicherter als das Gefiihl unseres Selbst, unseres eigenen Ichs. Dies Ich t [Z14satz 1931 :] Liluli [1919]. - Seit dem Ersdieinen der beiden Biidier La vie th /Wmalerisbna [1929] und" La vie de Vivekananda (1930) brauche idi nidit mehr zu vu. bergen, dall der im Text gemeinte Freund Romain Rolland ist.

I D. Chr. Grabbe [1801-36], Hannibal: •Ja, aus der Welt werden wir_nidit fallen. sind einmal darin.c

Wir

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (I)

appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off distinctly from everything else. That such an appearance is deceptive, and that on the contrary the ego is continued inwards, without any sharp delimitation, into an unconscious mental entity which we designate as the id and for which it serves as a kind of fac;ade-this was a discovery first made by psycho-analytic research, which should still have much more to tell us about the relation of the ego to the id. But towards the outside, at any rate, the ego seems to maintain clear and sharp lines of demarcation. There is only one state-admittedly an unusual state, but not one that can be stigmatized as pathological-in which it does not do this. At the height of being in love the boundary between ego and object threatens to melt away. Against all the evidence of his senses, a man who is in love declares that 'I' and 'you' are one, and is prepared to behave as if it were a fact. 1 What can be temporarily done away with by a physiological [i.e. normal] function must also, of course, be liable to be disturbed by pathological processes. Pathology has made us acquainted with a great number of states in which the boundary lines between the ego and the external world become uncertain or in which they are actually drawn incorrectly. There are cases in which parts of a person's own body, even portions of his own mental life-his perceptions, thoughts and feelings-, appear alien to him and as not belonging to his ego; there are other cases in which he ascribes to the external world things that clearly originate in his own ego and that ought to be acknowledged by it. Thus even the feeling of our own ego is subject to disturbances and the boundaries of the ego are not constant. Further reflection tells us that the adult's ego-feeling cannot have been the same from the beginning. It must have gone through a process of development, which cannot, of course, be demonstrated but which admits of being constructed with a fair degree of probability. a An infant at the breast does not as yet found in the Editor's Introduction to Tll4 Ego and th4 Id (1923b),

erscheint uns selbstandig, einheitlidi, gegen alles andere gut abgesetzt. DaB dieser Anschein ein Trug ist, daB das Ich sich vielmehr nach innen ohne scharfe Grenze in ein unbewuBt seelisches Wesen fortsetzt, das wir als Es bezeichnen, dem es gleichsam als Fassade dient, das hat uns erst die psychoanalytische Forschung gelehrt, die uns noch viele Auskiinfte iiber das Verhaltnis des Ichs zum Es schuldet. Aber nach auBen wenigstens $cheint das Idi klare und scharfe Grenzlinien zu behaupten. Nur in einem Zustand, einem au6ergewohnlichen zwar, den man aber nicht als krankhaft verurteilen kann, wird es anders. Auf der Hohe der Verliebtheit droht die Grenze zwischen Ich und Objekt zu verschwimmen. Allen Zeugnissen der Sinne entgegen behauptet der Verliebte, daB Ich und Du eines seien, und ist bereit, sich, als ob es so ware, zu benehmen. Was voriibergehend durch eine physiologische [d. h. normale] Funktion aufgehoben werden kann, muB natiirlich auch durch krankhafte Vorgange gestort werden konnen. Die Pathologic lehrt uns eine groBe Anzahl von Zustanden kennen, in denen die Abgrenzung des Ichs gegen die AuBenwelt unsicher wird oder die Grenzen wirklich unrichtig gezogen werden; Falle, in denen uns Teile des eigenen Korpers, ja Stucke des eigenen Seelenlebens; Wahrnehmungen, Gedanken, Gefiihle wie fremd und dem Ich nicht :zugehorig erscheinen, andere, in denen man der AuBenwelt zuschiebt, was offenbar im Ich entstanden ist und von ihm anerkannt werden sollte. Also ist auch das Ichgefiihl Storungen unterworfen, und die Ichgrenzen sind nicht ~esta11~ig.

66

Standard Ed., 19, 7.] i [Cf. a footnote to Section III of the Schreber case history (191 lc}, Standard Ed., 12, 69.] • Cf. the many writings on the topic of ego-development and ego-

feeling, dating from Ferenczi's paper on 'Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality' (1913) to Federn's contributions of 1926, 1927 and later.

Eine weitere Oberlegung sagt: Dies Ichgefiihl des Erwachsenen kann nicht von Anfang an so gewesen sein. Es muB eine Entwic:klung durdi~macht haben, die sich begreiflicherweise nicht nac:hweisen, aber mit ziemlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit konstruieren laBt '· Der Saugling sondert

1 _s. die zahlreimcn A~bei~en iiber Idientwicklung und Idigefiihl von Ferenczi, •Entw1ddungsstufen des W1rkhdikeitssinnes• {1913), bis zu den Bcitragen von P. Fcdera 1926, 1927 und spater.

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

67

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur

distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him. He gradually learns to do so, in response to various promptings. 1 He must be very strongly impressed by the fact that some sources of excitation, which he will later recognize as his own bodily organs, can provide him with sensations at any moment, whereas other sources evade him from time to time-among them what he desires most of all, his mother's breast-and only reappear as a result of his screaming for help. In this way there is for the first time set over against the ego an 'object', in the form of something which exists 'outside' and which is only forced to appear by a special action. 1 A further incentive to a disengagement of the ego from the general mass of sensations-that is, to the recognition of an 'outside', an external world-is provided- by the frequent, manifold and unavoidable sensations of pain and unpleasure the removal and avoidance of which is enjoined by the pleasure principle, in the exercise of its unrestricted domination. A tendency arises to separate from the ego everything that can become a source of such unpleasure, to throw it outside and to create a pure pleasure-ego which is confronted by a strange and threatening 'outside'. The boundaries of this primitive pleasureego cannot escape rectification through experience. Some of the tltlngs that one is unwilling to give up, because they give pleasure, are nevertheless not ego but object; and some sufferings that one seeks to expel tum out to be inseparable from the ego in virtue of their internal origin. One comes to learn a procedure by which, through a deliberate direction of one's sensory activities and through suitable muscular action, one can differentiate between what is internal-what belongs to the ego -and what is external-what emanates from the outer world. In this way one makes the first step towards the introduction of the reality principle which is to dominate future development.•

noch nicht sein Ich von einer AuBenwelt als Quelle der auf ihn einstromenden Empfindungen. Er lernt es allmahlich auf verschiedene AnregWlgen hin 2 • Es muB ihm den starksten Eindruck machen, daB manche der Erregungsquellen, in denen er spater seine Korperorgane erkennen wird, ihm jederzeit Empfindungen zusenden konnen, wahrend andere sich ihm zeitweise entziehen - darunter das Begehrteste: die Mutte,rbrust - und erst durch ein Hilfe heischendes Schreien herbeigeholt werden. Damit stellt sich dem Ich zuerst ein »Objekt« entgegen, als etwas, was sich »auBerhalb« befindet und erst durch eine besondere Aktion in die Erscheinung gedrangt wird. Einen weiteren Antrieb zur Loslqsung des Ichs von der Empiindungsmasse, also zur Anerkennung eines •DrauBen«, einer AuBenwelt, geben die haufigen, vielfaltigen, unvermeidlichen Schmerz- und Unlustempfindungen, die das unum· schrankt herrschende Lustprinzip aufheben und vermeiden heiBt. Es entsteht die Temlenz, alles, was Quelle soldier Unlust werden kann, vom Ich abzusondern, es nach auBen zu werfen, ein reines Lust-Ich zu bilden, dem ein fremdes, drohendes DrauBen gegeniibersteht. Die Grenzen dieses primitiven Lust-Ichs konnen der Berichtigung durch die Erfahrung nicht entgehen. Manches, was man als lustspendend nicht aufgeben mochte, ist doch nicht !ch, ist Objekt, und manche Qual, die man hinausweisen will, erweist sich doch als unabtrennbar vom Ich, als in~ nerer Herk~nA:. Man lernt ein Verfahren kennen, wie man durch absichtliche Lenkung der Sinnestatigkeit und geeignete Muskelaktion Jnnerliches - dem Ich Angehoriges - und XuBerliches - einer AuBenwelt Entstammendes - unterscheiden kann, und tut damit den ersten Schriet zur Einsetzung des Realitatsprinzips, das die weitere Entwicklung beherrschen soll 1.

1 [In this paragraph Freud was going over familiar ground. He had discussed the matter not long before, in his paper on 'Negation' (1925h), StandardEd., 19, 236-8. But he haddealtwithitonseveralearlieroccasions. See, for instance, 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915c), ibid., 14, 119 and 134-6, and The Interpretation of Dreams (l900a), ibid., 5, 565-6. Its essence, indeed, is already to be found in the 'Project' of 1895, Sections 1, 2, 11 and 16 of Part I (Freud, 1950a).] •[The 'specific action' of the 'Project'.] •[Cf. 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (19llb), Standard Ed., 12, 222-3.]

1 [In diesem Absatz bewegt sich Freud auf \•ertrautem Grund. Er hatte das Them'>._ kurz zuvor in dem Artikel >Die Verneinungc (1925 h) eriirtcrt, es aber auch friiher sc:hon behandelt, so z. B. an einer Stelle unwcit des Anfangs und dann wieder gcgen SdiluB der Arbeit >Triebe und Triebschidtsalec (1915 c) sowic in der Traumdeutuna (1900a), Studienausgabe, Bd. 2, S. 538-9.)

199 1 (Vgl. >Formulierungen Uber die zwei Prinzipien des psychischcn Geschehensc (1911 b), eine Passage gegen Ende des zweiten Drittels der Arbeit.]

200

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Das Unbehagen in der Kulttir (/)

This differentiation, of course, serves the practical purpose of enabling one to defend oneself against sensations of unpleasure which one actually feels or with which one is threatened. In order to fend off certain unpleasurable excitations arising from within, the ego can use no other methods than those which it uses against unpleasure coming from without, and this is the starting-point of important pathological disturbances. In this way, then, the ego detaches itself from the external world. Or, to put it more correctly, originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external world from itself. Our present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive-indeed, an all-embracing-feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond betweeri the ego and the world about it. If we may assume that there are many people in whose mental life this primary ego-feeling has persisted to a greater or less degree, it would exist in them side by side with the narrower and more sharply demarcated egofeeling of maturity, like a kind of counterpart to it. In that case, the ideational contents appropriate to it would be precisely those of limitlessness and of a bond with the universe-the same ideas with which my friend elucidated the 'oceanic' feeling. But have we a right to assume the survival of something that was originally there, alongside of what was later derived from it? Undoubtedly. There is nothing strange in such a phenomenon, whether in the mental field or elsewhere. In the animal kingdom we hold to the view that the most highly developed species have proceeded from the lowest; and yet we find all the simple forms still in existence to-day. The race of the great saurians is extinct and has made way for the mammals; but a true representative of it, the crocodile, still lives among us. This analogy may be too remote, and it is also weakened by the circumstance that the lower species which survive are for the most part not the true ancestors of the present-day more highly developed species. As a rule the intermediate links have died out and are known to us only through reconstruction. In the realm of the mind, on the other hand, what is primitive is so commonly preserved alongside of the transformed version which has arisen from it that it is unnecessary to give instances as evidence. When this happens it is usually in consequence of a divergence in development: one portion {in the quantitative sense) of an

Diese Unterscheidung client natiirlich der praktischen Absicht, sich der verspiirten und der drohenden Unlustempfindungen :zu erwehren. DaB das Ich zur Abwehr gewisser Unlusterregungen aus seinem Inneren keine anderen Methoden zur Anwendung bringt, als deren es sich gegen Unlust von auBen bedient, wird dann der Ausgangspunkt bedeutsamer krankhafter Storungen. Auf solche Art lost sich also das Ich von der AuBenwelt. Richtiger gesagt: Urspriinglich enthalt das Ich alles, spater scheidet es eine AuBenwelt von sich ab. Unser heutiges Ichgefiihl ist also nur ein eingeschrumpfter Rest eines weit umfassenderen, ja - eine~ allumfassenden Gefiihls, welches einer innigeren Verbundenheit des Ichs mit der Umwelt entsprach. W enn wir annehmen diirfen, daB dieses primare Ichgefiihl sich im Seelenleben vieler Menschen - in groBerem oder geringerem Au~­ maBe - erhal ten hat, so wiirde es sich dem enger und scharfer umgrenzten Ichgefiihl der Reifezeit wie eineArtGegenstiick an dieSeite stellen, und die zu ihm passenden Vorstellungsinhalte waren gerade die der Unbegrenztheit und der Verbundenheit mit dem All, dieselben, mit denen mein Freund das »OZeanische« Gefiihl erlautert. Haben wir aber ein Recht zur Annahme des Oberlebens des Urspriinglichen neben dem Spateren, das aus ihm geworden ist? Unzweifelhaft; ein solches Vorkommnis ist weder auf seelischem nodi auf anderen Gebieten befremdend. Fiir die Tierreihe halten wir an der Annahme fest, daB die hochstentwickelten Arten aus den niedrigsten heivorgegaagen .sind. Doch fin den wir. alle einfachen Lebensformen noch heute unter den Lebenden. Das Geschlecht der groBen Saurier ist ausgestorben und hat den Saugetieren Platz gemacht, aber ein richtiger Vertreter dieses Geschlechts, das Krokodil, lebt noch mit uns. Die Analogie mag zu entlegen sei1:1, krankt auch an dem Umstand, daB die iiberlebenden niedrigen Arten zumeist nicht die richtigen Ahnen der heutigen, hoher entwickelten sind. Die Zwischenglieder sind in der Regel ausgestorben und nur durch Rekonstruktion bekannt. Auf seelischem Gebiet hingegen ist die Erhaltung des Primitiven neben dem daraus entstandenen Umgewandelten so haufig, daB es sich erilbrigt, es durch Beispiele zu beweisen. Meist ist dieses Vorkommen Folge einer Entwicklungsspaltung. Ein quantitativer Anteil einer Einstellung, einer

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Das Unbehagen in der Kultur

69

attitude or instinctual impulse has remained unaltered, while another portion has undergone further development. This brings us to the more general problem of preservation in the sphere of the mind. The subject has hardly been studied as yet; 1 but it is so attractive and important that we may be allowed to tum our attention to it for a little, even though our excuse is insufficient. Since we overcame the error of supposing that the forgetting we are familiar with signified a destruction of the memory-trace-that is, its annihilation-we have been inclined to take the opposite view, that in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish-that everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstances (when, for instance, regression goes back far enough) it can once more be brought to light. Let us try to grasp what this assumption involves by taking an analogy from another field. We will choose as an example the history of the Eternal City. a Historians tell us that the oldest Rome was the Roma Quadrata, a fenced settlement on the Palatine. Then followed the phase of the Septimontium, a federation of the settlements on the different hills; after that came the city bounded by the Servian wall; and later still, after all the transformations during the periods of the republic and the early Caesars, the city which the Emperor Aurelian surrounded with his walls. We will not follow the changes which the city went through any further, but we will ask ourselves how much a visitor, whom we will suppose to be equipped with the most complete historical and topographical knowledge, may still find left of these early stages in the Rome ofto-day. Except for a few gaps, he will see the wall of Aurelian almost unchanged. In some places he will be able to find sections of the Servian wall where they have been excavated and brought to light. If he knows enough-more than presentday archaeology does-he may perhaps be able to trace out in the plan of the city the whole course of that wall and the outline of the Roma Quadrata. Of the buildings which once occupied this ancient area he will find nothing, or only scanty remains, for they exist no longer. The best information about Rome in

Triebregung, ist unverandert erhalten geblieben, ein anderer hat die weitere Entwicklung erfahren. Wir riihren hiermit an das allgemeinere Problem der Erhaltung im Psychischen, das kaum noch Bearbeitung gefunden hat, aber so reizvoll und bedeutsam ist, daB wir ihm auch bei unzureichendem AnlaB eine Weile Aufmerksamkeit schenken diirfen. Seitdem wir den Irrtum iiberwunden haben, daB das uns gelaufige Vergessen eine Zerstorung der Gedachtnisspur, also eine Vernichtung bedeutet, neigen wir zu der entgegengesetzten Annahme, daB im Seelenleben nichts, was einmal gebildet wurde, untergehen kann, daB alles irgendwie erhalten bleibt und unter geeigneten Umstanden, z. B. art ~1~ed to it by Voltaire's wise advice [p. 75 above]. It is not possible, withm the limits of a short survey, to discuss adequately the significance of work for the economics of the libido. No other technique for the conduct of life attaches the individuai so firmly to reality as laying emphasis on work; for his work at least gives him a secure place in a portion ofreality, in the human community. The possibility it offers of displacing a large amount of libidinal components, whether narcissistic, ag~ive or even ero~c, on to professional work and on to the human rel.auo~ connected ~th it lends it a value by no means second to what it enjoys as something indispensable to the preservation and jus~ificatic;in of ~xis~~ce.in society. Professional activity is a source of special satisfactlon if it is a freely chosen one-if, that is to say, by means of sublimation, it ~~es possible the use of existing inclinations, of persisting or constitutionally reinforced instinctual impulses. And yet, as a path to happiness, work is not highly prized by men. They do not strive after it as they do after other possibilities of satisfaction. The great majority of people only work wider the stress of necessity, and this natural human aversion to work raises most difficult social problema.

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (II)

dampft; sie erschiittern nicht unsere Leiblichkeit. Die Schwache dieser Methode liegt aber darin, daB sie nicht allgemein verwendbar, nur wenigen Menschen zuganglich ist. Sie setzt besondere, im wirksamen AusmaB nicht gerade haufige Anlagen -und Begabungen voraus. Auch diesen wenigen kann sie nicht vollkommenen Leidensschutz gewahren, sie schaffi ihnen keinen filr die Pfeile des Schicksals undurchdringlichen Panzer, und sie pflegt zu versagen, wenn der eigene Leib die Quelle des Leidens wird 1. Wenn schon bei diesem Verfahren die Absicht deutlich wird, sich von der AuBenwelt unabhangig zu machen, indem man seine Befriedigungen in inneren, psychischen Vorgangen sucht, so treten die gleichen Ziige n.och starker bei dem nachsten hervor. Hier wird der Zusammenhang mit der Realitat noch mehr gelockert, die Befriedigung wird aus Illusionen gewonnen, die man als solche erkennt, ohne sich durch deren Abweichung von der Wirklichkeit im GenuB storen zu !assen. Das Gebiet, aus dem diese Illusionen stammen, ist das des Phantasielebens; es wurde seinerzeit, als sich die Entwicklung des Realitatssinnes vollzog, ausdriicklieh den Anspriichen der Realitiitspriifung entzogen und blieb fiir die Erfiillung schwer durchsetzbarer Wiinsche bestimmt. Obenan unter diesen Phantasiebefriedigungen steht der GenuB an Werken der Kunst, Wenn nicht besondere Veranlagung den Lcbensinteressc·n gcbieterisch die Richtung v111"Miweibt, kann die gemeine, jedcrmann zugangliche Berufsarbeit an die Stelle r-iickcn, ~ ihr VOA dem weisen Ratschlag Voltaires angewicscn wird [s. S. 207]. Es iat nicht m01Pidt, die Bodeutung der Arbeit fiir die Libidookonomie im Rahmcn einer knappen Obersicht ausreichend zu wiirdigen. Keine ;i.ndete Technik der Lebensfiihrung birulet den Einzelnen so fest an die Realitat als die Betonung der Arbeit, die ihn wenigstens in ein Stiick der Realitat, in die menschliche Gemeinschafl: sicher einfiigt, Die Moglichkeit, ein Starkes AusmaB libidinoser Komponenten, narziBtische, aggressive und selbst erotische, auf die Berufsarbeit und auf die ll)it ihr verkniipften menschlichen Beziehungen zu verschieben, leiht ihr einen Wert, der hinter ihrer Unerlafilichkeit zur Behauptung und Rechtfertigung der Existenz in der Gesellschafl: nicht zuriicksteht. Besondere. Befriedigung vermittelt die Berufstatigkeit, wenn sic cine frei gewahlte ist, also bestehende Neigungen, fortgefiihrte oder konstitutionell verstarkte Triebregungen durdi Sublimierung nutzbar zu machen gestattet. Und dennoch wird Arbeit als Weg zum Glili:k von den Menschen wenig geschatzt. Man drangt sich nicht zu ihr wic zu andcren MO&lid:ikeiten der Befriedigung. Die groBe Mehrzahl der Menscben arbeitct nur nocpdruapn, und aus dieser natiirlichcn Arbeitsscheu der Menschen leiten sicb die schwie.s:igJtu, ~­ !en Probleme ab. 1

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

81

agency of the artist, is made accessible even to those who are not themselves creative. 1 People who are receptive to the influence of art cannot set too high a value on it as a source of pleasure and consolation in life. Nevertheless the mild narcosis induced in us by art can do no more than bring about a transient withdrawal from the pressure of vital needs, and it is not strong enough to make us forget real misery. Another procedure operates more energetically and more thoroughly. It regards reality as the sole enemy and as the source of all suffering, with which it is impossible to live, so that one must break off all relations with it if one is to be in any way happy. The hermit turns his back on the world and will have no truck with it. But one can do more than that; one can try to re-create the world, to build up in its stead another world in which its most unbearable features are eliminated and replaced by others that are in conformity with one's own wishes. But whoever, in desperate defiance, sets out upon this path to happiness will as a rule attain nothing. Reality is too strong for him. He becomes a madman, who for the most part finds no one to help him in carrying through his delusion, It is asserted, however, that each one of us behaves in some one respect like a paranoic, corrects some aspect of the world which is unbearable to him by the construction of a wish and introduces this delusion into reality. A special importance attaches to the case in which this attempt to procure a certainty of happiness and a protection against suffering through a delusional remoulding of reality is made by a considerable number of people in common. The religions of mankind must be classed among the massdelusions of this kind. No one, needless to say, who shares a delusion ever recognizes it as such. I do not think that I have made a complete enumeration of the methods by which men strive to gain happiness and keep suffering away and I know, too, that the material might have been differently arranged. One procedure I have not yet mentioned-not because I have forgotten it but because it will concern us later in another connection. And how could one :ROssibly forget, of all others, this technique in the art of living? It is conspicuous for a most remarkable combination of characteristic features. It, too, aims of course at making the subject 1 Cf. 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (19llb), and Lecture XXIII of my Introductory Le&turu (1916-17).

Das Vt:ibehagen in der Kultur

der auc:h dem nic:ht selbst Schi:ipferischen durc:h .die Vermittlung des Kiinstlers zuganglic:h gemac:ht wird 1• Wer fiir den Einflu:B der Kunst . empfanglich ist, weiB ihn als Lustquelle und Lebenstri:istung nic:ht hocb genug einzusc:hatzen. Doc:h vermag die milde Narkose, in die uns die Kunst versetzt, nicht mehr als eine fliichtige Entriickung aus den Ni:iten des Lebens herbeizufiihren und ist nidit stark genug, um reales Elend vergessen zu mac:hen. Energischer und griindlic:her geht ein anderes Verfahren vor, das den ·einzigen. Feind in der Reali tat erblickt, die die Quelle alles Leids ist, mit der sic:h nic:ht leben laBt, mit der man darum alle Beziehungen abbrechen muB, wenn man in irgendeinem Sinne gliicklich sein will. Der Eremit kehrt dieser Welt den Riicken, er will nichts mit ihr zu sc:haff en haben. Aber man kann mehr tun, man kann sie umschaffen wollen. anstau ihrer eine andere aufbauen, in der die unertrli.glichsten Zilge ausgetilgt und durch andere im Sinne der eigenen Wiinsc:he ersetzt sind. Wer in verzweifelter Empi:irung diesen Weg zum Glilck einsc:hlagt, wird in der Regel nic:hts erreic:hen; die Wirklic:hkeit ist zu stark filr ihn. Er wird ein Wahnsinniger, der in der Durc:hsetzung seines Wahns meist keine Helfer findet. Es wird aber behauptet, daB jeder von uns sic:h in irgendeinem Punkte ahnli~ wie der Paranoiker benimmt, eine ihm unleidlic:he Seite der Welt durc:h eine Wunschbildung korrigiert und diesen Wahn in die Realitat eintragt. Eine besondere Bedeutung beanspruc:ht der Fall, daB eine gri:iBere Anzahl von Mensc:hen gemeinsam den Versuc:h unternimmt, sic:h Gliicksversic:herung und Leidenssc:hutz durc:h wahnhafte Umbildung der Wirklic:hkeit zu sc:haffen. Als solc:hen Massenwahn miissen wir auch die Religionen der Mensc:hheit kennzeic:hnen. Den Wahn erkennt natiirlich niemals, wer ihn selbst noch teilt.

Ic:h glaube nic:ht, daB diese Aufzahlung der Methoden, wie die Mensc:hen das Gliick zu gewinnen und das Leiden fernzuhalten bemiiht sind, vollstandig ist, weiB auc:h, daB der Stoff andere Anordnungen zulaBt. Eines dieser Verfahren babe ich noc:h nic:ht angefiihrt; nic:ht daB ic:h daran vergessen hatte, sondern weil es uns noc:h in anderem Zusammenhange besc:haftigen wird. Wie ware es auc:h moglic:h, gerade an diese Technik der Lebenskunst zu vergessen! Sie zeic:hnet sich durc:h die merkwiirdigste Vereinigung von c:harakteristisc:hen Zilgen aus. Sie strebt na· 1

Vgl. >Formulicrungen iiber die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens< (t9U").

uacl VorJesungm zur Einfubrung in die Psychoanalyse (1916-17), XXIII. 212

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independent of Fate (as it is best to call it), and to that end it locates satisfaction in internal mental processes, making use, in so doing, of the displaceability of the libido of which we have already spoken [p. 79]. But it does not tum away from the external world; on the contrary, it clings to the objects belonging to that world and obtains happiness from an emotional relationship to them. Nor is it content to aim at an avoidance of unpleasure-a goal, as we might call it, of weary resignation; it passes this by without .heed and holds fast to the original, passionate striving for a positive fulfilment of happiness. And perhaps it does in fact come nearer to this goal than any other method. I am, of course, speaking of the way of life which makes love the centre of everything, which looks for all satisfaction in loving and being loved. A psychical attitude of this sort comes naturally enough to all of us; one of the forms in which love manifests itself-sexual love-has given us our most intense experience of an overwhelming sensation of pleasure and has thus furnished us with a pattern for our search for happiness. What is more natural than that we should persist in looking for happiness along the path on which we first encountered it? The weak side ofthis technique of living is easy to see; otherwise no human being would have thought of abandoning this path to happiness for any other. It is that we are never so defenceless against suffering as when we love, never so helplessly unhappy as when we have lost our loved object or its love. But this does not dispose of the technique of living based on the value oflove as a means to happiness. There is much more to be said about it. [See below, p. 101.] We may go on from here to consider the interesting case in which happiness in life is predominantly sought in the enjoyment of beauty, wherever beauty presents itself to our senses and our judgement-the beauty of human forms and gestures, of natural objects and landscapes and of artistic and even scientific creations. This aesthetic attitude to the goal of life offers little protection against the threat of suffering, but it can compensate for a great deal. The enjoyment of beauty has a peculiar, mildly intoxicating quality offeeling. Beauty has no obvious use; nor is . there any clear cultural necessity for it. Yet civilization could not do without it. The science of aesthetics investigates the conditions under which things are felt as beautiful, but it has been unable to give any explanation of the nature and origin of

Das Unbeha.gen in der Kultur (II)

tiirlich auch die Unabhangigkeit vom Schicksal - so nennen wir es am besten - an und verlegt in dieser Absicht die Befriedigung in innere seelische Vorgange, bedient sich dabei der vorhin [S. 211] erwahnten Verschiebbarkeit der Libido, aber sie wendet sich nicht von der AuBenwelt ab, klammert sich im Gegenteil an deren Objekte und gewinnt das Gliick aus einer Gefiihlsbeziehung zu ihnen. Sie gibt sich dabei auch nicht mit dem gleichsam miide resignierenden Ziel der Unlustvermeidung zufrieden, eher geht sie achtlos an diesem vorbei und halt am urspriinglichen, leidenschaftlichen Streben nach positiver Gliickserfiillung fest. Vielleicht kommt sie diesem Ziele wirklich naher als jede andere Methode. Ich meine natiirlich jene Richtung des Lebens, welche die Liebe zum Mittelpunkt nimmt, alle Befriedigung aus dem Lieben und Geliebtwerden erwartet. Eine solche psychische Einstellung liegt uns allen nahe genug; eine der Erscheinungsformen der Liebe, die geschlechtliche Liebe, hat uns die starkste Erfahrung einer iiberwaltigenden Lustempfuidung vermittelt und so das Vorbild fiir unser Gliicksstreben geseben. Was ist natiirlicher, als daB wir dabei beharren, das Gluck auf demsel~ Wege zu suchen, auf dem wir es zuerst begegnet haben. Die schwadie Seite dieser Lebenstechnik liegt klar zutage; sonst ware es auch keinem Menschen eingefallen, diesen Weg zum Gliick fiir einen anderen zu verlassen. Niemals sind wir ungeschiitzter gegen das Leiden, als wenn wir lieben, niemals hilfloser ungliicklich, als wenn wir das geliebte Objekt oder seine. Liebe verloren haben. Aber die auf den Gliickswert der Liebe gegriindete Lebenste~nik ist damit nicht erledigt, es ist vie! mehr dZur Gewinnung des Feuers< (1932a) noch cinmal auf. Eine vollstandige Liste seiner Erwihnungen des Themas findet sich in der >Editorischen Vorbemerkung• zu jener spateren Arbeit, S. 447 f., unten.] 1

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telescope he sees into the far distance; and by means of the microscope he overcomes the limits of visibility set by the structure of his retina. In the photographic camera he has created an instrument which retains the fleeting visual impressions, just as a gramophone disc retains the equally fleeting auditory ones; both are at bottom materializations of the power he possesses of recollection, his memory. With the help of the telephone he can hear at distances which would be respected as unattainable even in a fairy tale. Writing was in its origin the voice of an absent person; and the dwelling-house was a substitute for the mother's womb, the first lodging, for which in all likelihood man still longs, and in which he was safe and felt at ease. These things that, by his science and technology, man has brought about on this earth, on which he first appeared as a feeble animal organism and on which each individual of his species must once more make its entry ('oh inch of nature!' 1) as a helpless suckling-these things do not only sound like a fairy tale, they are an actual fulfilment of every-or of almost every-fairy-tale wish. All these assets he may lay claim to as his cultural acquisition. Long ago he formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and omniscience which he embodied in his gods. To these gods he attributed everything that seemed unattainable to his wishes, or that was forbidden to him. One may say, therefore, that these gods were cultural ideals. To-day he has come very close to the attainment of this ideal, he has almost become a god himself. Only, it is true, in the fashion in which ideals are usually attained according to the general judgement of humanity. Not completely; in some respects not at all, in others only half way. Man has, as it were, become a kind of 1 [In English in the original. This very Shakespearean phrase is not in fact to be found in the canon of Shakespeare. The words 'Poore inch of Nature' occur, however, in a novel by George Wilkins, 1714 Painful.l Adventures of Pericles Prince of Tyre, where they are addressed by Pericles to his infant daughter. This work was first printed in 1608,just after the publication of Shakespeare's play, in which Wilkins has been thought to have had a hand. Freud's unexpected acquaintance with the phrase is explained by its appearance in a discussion of the origins of Pericles in Georg Brandes's well-known book on Shakespeare, a copy of the German translation of which had a place in Freud's library (Brandes, 1896). He is known to have greatly admired the Danish critic (cf.Jones, 1957, 120), and the same book is quoted in his paper on the three caskets (1913 {).]

S.F. XXI-0

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur

mit dem Fernrohr schaut er in entfernte Weiten, mit dem Mikroskop iiberwindet er die Grenzen der Sichtbarkeit, die durch den Bau seiner Netzhaut abgesteckt werden. In der photographischen Kamera hat er ein Instrument geschaffen, das die fluchtigen Seheindrucke festhalt, was ihm die Grammophonplatte fur die ebenso verganglichen Schalleindrucke leisten muB, beides im Grunde Materialisationen des ihm gegebenen Vermogens der Erinnerung, seines Gedachtnisses. Mit Hilfe des Telephons hort er aus Entfernungen, die selbst das Marchen als unerreichbar respektieren wiirde; die Schrift ist ursprunglich die Sprache des Abwesenden, das Wohnhaus ein Ersatz fur den Mutterleib, die erste, wahrscheinlich noch immer ersehnte Behausung, in der man sicher war und sich so wohl fuhlte. Es klingt nicht nur wie ein Marchen, es ist direkt die Erfullung aller - nein, der roeisten - Marchenwunsche, was der Mensch durch seine Wi.s11enschaft und Technik auf dieser Erde hergestellt hat, in der er ZU'." erst als ein schwaches Tierwesen auftrat und in die jedes Individuum seiner Art wiederuro als hilfloser Saugling - »oh inch of nature/., 1 .,.. eintreten muB. All diesen Besitz darf er als Kulturerwerb ansprechen. Er hatte sim seit langen.Zeiten eine Idealvorstellung von Allroamt und Allwissenheit gebildet, die er in seinen Gottern verkorperte. Ihnen smrieb er alles zu, was seinen Wunschen unerreichbar schien - oder ihm verboten war. Man darf also sagen, diese Gotter waren Kulturideale. Nun hat er sich der Erreichung dieses Ideals sehr angenahert, ist beinahe .selbst ein Gott geworden. Freilich nur so, wie man nach allgemein menschlichero Urteil Ideale zu erreichen pflegt. Nicht vollkommen, in einigen Stuck.en gar nicht, in anderen nur so halbwegs. Der Mensch ist sozusagen eine Art 1 [Tatsachlich findet sich diescr sehr shakespearchafl: klingende Ausspruch nirgend.$ bQ Shakespeare. Dagcgen kommen die Worte ~Poore inch of Nature• in einem Romu "GI George Wilkins, The Painfull .Aduentures of Pericles Prince of 15mt, vor; Pericles richtet sie an seine neugcborene Tochtcr. Der Roman erschicn 1608, kurz nach dcr Vu• offcntlichung des Shakespearcsdien Dramas, an desscn Entstehung Wilkins mutmal11"h beteiligt war. Freuds unerwartete Vertrautheit mit dcr Formulierung lallt sich da8liit erklaren, dall sic in einer Diskussion iiber die Entstehung des .Pericles in dem bekannten Shakespeare-Buch des danischen Literaturkritikers Georg Brandes vorkolillllt; cine deutsche Obersetzung des Buches stand in Freuds Bibliothek (Brandes, 1896).]

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prosthetic1 God. When he puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at times. Nevertheless, he is entitled to console himself with the thought that this development will not come to an end precisely with the year 1930 A.D, Future ages will bring with them new and probably unimaginably great advances in this field of civilization and will increase man's likeness to God still more. But in the interests of our investigations, we will not forget that present-day man does not feel happy in his Godlike character. We recognize, then, that countries have attained a high level of civilization if we find that in them everything which can assist in the exploitation of the earth by man and in his protection against the forces of nature-everything, in short, which is of use to him-is attended to and effectively carried out. In such countries rivers which threaten to flood the land are regulated in their flow, and their water is directed through canals to places where there is a shortage of it. The soil is carefully cultivated and planted with the vegetation which it is suited to support; and the mineral wealth below ground is assiduously brought to the surface and fashioned into the required implements and utensils. The means of communication are ample, rapid and reliable. Wild and dangerous animals have been exterminated, and the breeding of domesticated animals flourishes. But we demand other things from civilization besides these, and it is a noticeable fact that we hope to find them realized in these same countries. As though we were seeking to repudiate the first demand we made, we welcome it as a sign of civilization as well if we see people directing their care too to what has no practical value whatever, to what is useless-if, for instance, the green spaces necessary in a town as playgrounds and as reservoirs of fresh air are also laid out with flower-beds, or if the windows of the houses are decorated with pots of flowers. We soon observe that this useless thing which we expect civilization to value is beauty. We require civilized man to reverence beauty wherever he sees it in nature and to create it in the objects of his handiwork so far as he is able. But this is far from exhausting our demands on civilization. We expect 1 [A prosthesis is the medical term for an artificial adjunct to the body to make up for some missing or inadequate part: e.g. false teeth or ~ false leg.]

Das

U11b5J,~g!_n

in i/er Kultur (Ill)

P~othesengott geworden, recht gr~ artig, wenn er alle seine Hilfsorg~ne anlegt, aber sie sind nicht mit ilun vc:rwachsen und machen ihm gelegentlich noch viel zu schaffen. Er hat iibrigens ein Recht, sich damit zu trosten, daB diese Entwicklung nidit gerade mit dem Jahr 1930 A. D. abgeschlossen sein wird. Ferne Zeiteri werden neue, wahrscheinlich unvorstellbar groBe Fortschritte auf diesem. Gebiete der Kultur mit sidi bringen, die Gottahnlichkeit noch weiter steigern. Im Interesse unserer Untersuchung wollen wir aber audi nicht daran vergessen, daB der heutige Mensch sich in seiner Gottahn· lichkeit nicht gliicklich fiihlt. Wir anerkennen also die Kulturhohe eines Landes, wenn wir finden, daB alles in ihm gepflegt und zweckmaBig besorgt wird, was der Ausniitzung der Erde durdi den Menschen und dem Schutz desselben vor den Naturkraften dienlidi, also kurz zusammengefaBt: ihm niitzlich ist. In einem solchen Land seien Fliisse, die mit Oberschw:e~en droh.n, in ihrem Lauf reguliert, ihr Wasser durch Kana.le hingeleitet, ' wo es eatbehrt wird. Der Erdboden werde sorgfaltig bearbeitet und , m.it den Gewachsen besdiickt, die er zu tragen geeignet ist, die mineralischen Schatze der Tiefe emsig zutage gefOrdert und zu den verlangten Werkzeugen und Geraten verarbeitet. Die Verkehrsmittel seien reichlich, rasch und zuverlassig, die wilden und gefahrlichen Tiere seien ausgerottet, die Zucht der zu Haustieren gezahmten sei in Bliite. Wir haben aber an die Kultur noch andere Anforderungen zu stellen und hoffen hemerkenswerterweise sie in denselben Landern verwirklicht zu finden. Als wollten wir unseren zuerst erhobenen Anspruch verleugnen, begriiBen wir es auch .als kulturell, wenn wir sehen, daB sich die Sorgfalt der Menschen auch Dingen zuwendet, die ganz und gar nicht niitzlich sind, eher unniitz erscheinen, z. B. wenn die in einer Stadt als Spielplatze und Luftreservoirs notwendigen Gartenflachen auch Blumenbeetetragen oder wenndie Fenster derWohnungen mitBlumentopfen geschmiickt sind. Wir merken bald, das Unniltze, dessen S.chatzung wir VOil, der Kultur erwarten, ist die Schonheit; wir fordern, daB der Kulturmensch die Schonheit verehre, wo sie ihm in der Natur be-: gegnet, ·und sie herstelle an Gegenstanden, soweit seiner Hande Arheit a v&rmag. Weit entfernt, daB unsere Anspriiche an die Kultur dan:Ut enchopft waren. Wir verlangen

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

93

besides to see the signs of cleanliness and order. We do not think highly of the cultural level of an English country town in Shakespeare's time when we read that there was a big dungheap in front of his father's house in Stratford; we are indignant and call it 'barbarous' (which is the opposite of civilized) when we find the paths in the Wiener Wald 1 littered with paper. Dirtiness of any kind seems to us incompatible with civilization. We extend our demand for cleanliness to the human body too. We are astonished to learn of the objectionable smell which emanated from the Roi Soleil ; 1 and we shake our heads on the Isola Bella 8 when we are shown the tiny wash-basin in which Napoleon made his morning toilet. Indeed, we are not surprised by the idea of setting up the use of soap as an actual yardstick of civilization. The same is true of order. It, like cleanliness, applies solely to the works of man. But whereas cleanliness is not to be expected in nature, order, on the contrary, has been imitated from her. Man's observation of the great astronomical regularities not only furnished him with a model for introducing order into his life, but gave him the first points of departure for doing so. Order is a kind of compulsion to repeat which, when a regulation has been laid down once and for all, decides when, where and how a thing shall be done, so that in every similar circumstance one is spared hesitation and indecision. The benefits of order are incontestable. It enables men to use space and time to the best advantage, while conserving their psychical forces. We should have a right to expect that order would have taken its place in human activities from the start and without difficulty; and we may well wonder that this has not happened-that, on the contrary, human beings exhibit an inborn tendency to carelessness, irregularity and unreliability in their work, and that a laborious training is needed before they learn to follow the example of their celestial models. Beauty, cleanliness and order obviously occupy a special position among the requirements of civilization. No one will maintain that they are as important for life as control over the forces of nature or as some other factors with which we shall 1 1

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur

noch die Zeichen von Reinlic:hkeit und Ordnung zu sehen. Wir denken nicht hoch von der Kultur einer eng1.ischen Landstadt zur Zeit Shakespeares, wenn wir lesen, daB ein hoher Misthaufen vor der Tiire seines vaterlichen Hauses in Stratford lagerte; wir sind ungehalten und schelten es iobarbarisch«, was der Gegensatz zu kulturell ist, wenn wir die Wege des Wiener Waldes mit weggeworfenen Papieren bes.treut finden. Unsauberkeit jeder Art scheint uns qiit Kultur unvereinbar; auch auf den menschlichen Korper dehnen wir die Forderung der Reinlichkeit aus, horen mit Erstaunen, welch iiblen Geruch die Person des Roi Soleil zu verbreiten pflegte, und schiitteln den Kopf, wenn uns auf Isola Bella 1 die winzige Waschschiis.sel gezeigt wird, deren sich Napoleon bei seiner Morgentoilette bedietite. Ja, wir sind nicht ii.berrascht, wenn jemand den Gebrauch von Seife direkt als Kulturmesser aufstellt. Ahnlich ist es mit der Ordnung, die ebenso wie die Reinlichkeit sich ganz auf Menschenwerk bezieht. Aber wahrend wir Reinlichkeit in der Natur nicht erwarten diirfen, ist die Ordnung vielmehr der Natur abgelauscht; die Beobachtung der gro.Ben astronomisdieo R.egdma.Bigkeiten hat dem Menschen nicht nur das Vorhild. sondern die ersten Anhaltspunkte fiir die Einfiihrung der Ordnung in sein Leben gegeben. Die Ordnung ist eine Art Wiederholungszwang, die durch einmalige Einrichtung entscheidet, wann, wo und wie etwas getan werden soll, so daB man in jedem gleichen Falle Zogern und Schwanken erspart. Die Wohltat der Ordnung ist ganz unleugbar, sie ermoglicht dem Menschen die beste Ausniitzung von Raum und Zeit, wahrend sie seine psychischen Krafte schont. Man hatte ein Recht zu erwarten, da.B sie sich von Anfang an und zwanglos im menschlidien Tun durdisetzt, und darf erstaunen, da.B dies nicht der Fall ist, da.B der Mensch vielmehr einen natiirlidien Hang zur Nachlassigkeit, Unregelma.Bigkeit und Unzuverlassigkeit in seiner Arbeit an den Tag legt \ind erst milhselig zur Nachahmung der himmlischen Vorbilder erzogen werden mu.B. Schonheit, Reinlichkeit und Ordnung nehmen offenbar eine besondere Stellung unter den Kulturanforderungen ein. Niemand wird behaupten, dafi sie ebenso lebenswichtig seien wie die Beherrschung der Natur... krafte und andere Momente, die wir noch

[The wooded hills on the outskirts of Vienna.] [Louis XIV of France.]

• [The well-known island in Lake Maggiore, visited by Napoleon a few days before the battle of Marengo.]

J [Die bekannte Insel im Lago Maggiore, die Napoleon wenige Tage vor der Sdiladit ,,_Marengo besudite.]

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become acquainted. And yet no one would care to put them in the background as trivialities. That civilization is not exclusively taken up with what is useful is already shown by the example of beauty, which we decline to omit from among the interests of civilization. The usefulness of order is quite evident. With regard to cleanliness, we must bear in mind that it is demanded of us by hygiene as well, and we may suspect that even before the days of scientific prophylaxis the connection between the two was not altogether strange to man. Yet utility does not entirely explain these efforts; something else must be at work besides. No feature, however, seems better to characterize civilization than its esteem and encouragement of man's higher mental activities-his intellectual, scientific and artistic achievementsand the leading role that it assigns to ideas in human life. Foremost among those ideas are the religious systems, on whose complicated structure I have endeavoured to throw light elsewhere.1 Next come the speculations of philosophy; and finally what might be called man's 'ideals'-his ideas of a possible perfection of individuals, or of peoples or of the whole of humanity, and the demands he sets up on the basis of such ideas. The fact that these creations of his are not independent of one another, but are on the contrary closely interwoven, increases the difficulty not only of describing them but of tracing their psychological derivation. If we assume quite generally that the motive force of all human activities is a striving towards the two confluent goals of utility and a yield of pleasure, we must suppose that this is also true of the manifestations of civilization which we have been discussing here, although this is easily visible only in scientific and aesthetic activities. But it cannot be doubted that the other activities, too, correspond to strong needs in men-perhaps to needs which are only developed in a minority. Nor must we allow ourselves to be misled by judgements of value concerning any particular religion, or philosophic system, or ideal. Whether we think to find in them the highest achievements of the human spirit, or whether we deplore them as aberrations, we cannot but recognize that where they are present, and, in especial, where they are dominant, a high level of civilization is implied. The last, but certainly not the least important, of the characteristic features of civilization remains to be assessed: the 1 [Cf. The Future of an Illusion (1927c).]

Das Uf!behagen in der Kulturl!JJ) kennenlernen sollen, und doch wird niemand gern sie als Nebensachlidikeiten zuriid.utellen wollen. DaB die Kultur nidit allein auf Nutzen bedadit ist, zeigt sdioo ~ Beispiel der Sdionheit, die wir unter den Interessen der Kultur nicht vermissen wollen. Der Nutzen der Ordnung ist ganz offenbar; bei der Reinlidikeit haben wir zu bedenken, daB sie audi von der Hygiene gefordert wird, und konrien vermuten, da.B dieser Zusammenhang den Mensch.en audi vor der Zeit einer wissenschaftlidien Krankheitsverhiitung iiidit ganz fremd war. Aber der Nutzen erklart uns das Streben nidit ganz; es muB noc:h etwas anderes im Spiele sein. Durch keinen anderen Zug vermeinen wir aber die Kultur besser zu -kennzeichnen als durdi die Schatzung und Pflege der hoheren psyc:hisc:hen Tatigkeiten, der intellektuellen, wissensc:haftlic:hen und kiinstlerisdien Leistungen, der fiihrenden Rolle, welche den Idrzn im Leben der Mensdien eingeraumt wird. Unter diesen Ideen stehen obenan die religiosen Systeme, auf deren verwickelten Aufbau ic:h an anderer Stelle Licht zu werfen versuchte 1 ; neben ihnen die philosophisdien Spekulationen und endlic:h, was man die Idealbildungen der Menschen hei.Ben kann, ihre Vorstellungen von einer moglichen Vollkommenheit der einzelnen Person, des Volkes, der ganzen Menschheit und die AnforderWJ.gen, die sie auf Grund solc:her Vorstellungen erheb~ Da& SchOpfungen nic:ht unabhangig voneinander sind, vielmebr inuig ~ ci.oaAde.r ve.rwoben, ersc:hwert sowohl ihre Darstellung wie ihre psychologisdie Ableitung. Wenn wir ganz allgemein annehmen, die Triebf eder aller mensc:hlidien Tatigkeiten sei das Streben nac:h den beiden zusammenflieEenden Zielen, Nutzen und Lustgewinn, so miissen wir dasselbe auc:h fiir die hier angefiihrten kulturellen .ituBerungen gelten lassen, obw~hl es our fiir die wissensdiaftlic:he und kiinstlerisc:he Tatigkeit leidit ersic:htlich ist. Man kann aber nic:ht bezweifeln, daB auch die anderen starken Bediirfnissen der Menschen entsprec:hen, vielleic:ht solc:hen, die nur bei einer Minderzahl entwickelt sind. Auch darf man sich nicht durch Werturteile iiber einzel11e dieser religiosen, philosophisclien Systeme und dieser Ideale beirren lassen; ob man die hocliste Leistung des Mensc:hengeistes in ihnen suc:ht oder ob man sie als Ver.; irrungen beklagt, man muB anerkennen, daB ihr Vorhandensein, besonders ihre Vorherrschaft, einen Hoc:hstand der Kultur bedeutet.

Als letzten, gewlll n.id:it unwic:htigsten Charakterzug einer Kultur haben wir zu wiirdigen, l

[V&l.

in diesem Band die vorhergehende Arbeit, Die Z11kim/l einer I~] 224

' r

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

95

manner in which the relationships of men to one another, their social relationships, are regulated-relationships which affect a person as a neighbour, as a source of help, as another person's sexual object, as a member of a family and of a State. Here it is especially difficult to keep clear of particular ideal demands and to see what is civilized in general. Perhaps we may begin by explaining that the element of civilization enters on the scene with the first attempt to regulate these social relationships. If the attempt were not made, the relationships would be subject to the arbitrary will of the individual: that is to say, the physically stronger man would decide them in the sense of his own interests and instinctual impulses. Nothing W(:mld be changed in this if this stronger man should in his tum meet someone even stronger than he. Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals. The power of this community is then set up as 'right' in opposition to the power of the individual, which is condemned as 'brute force'. This replacement of the power of the individual by the power of a community constitutes the decisive step of civilization. The essence of it lies in the fact that the members of the community restrict themselves in their possibilities of satisfaction, whereas the individual knew no such restrictions. The first requisite of civilization, therefore, is that of justice-that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favour of an individual. This implies nothing as to the ethical value of such a law. The further course of cultural development seems to tend towards making the law no longer an expression of the will of a small community-a caste or a stratum of the population or a racial group-which, in its turn, behaves like a violent individual towards other, and perhaps more numerous, collections of people. The final outcome should be a rule of law to which all-except those who are not capable of entering a community-have contributed by a sacrifice of their instincts, and which leaves no one-again with the same exception-at the mercy of brute force. ,The liberty of the individual is no gift of civilization. It was greatest before there was any civilization, though then, it is true, it had for the most part no value, since the individual was scarcely in a position to defend it. The development of civilization imposes restrictions on it, and justice demands that no one

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur in welcher Weise die Beziehu~gen der Men-

schen zueinander, die sozialen Beziehungen, geregelt sind, die den Menschen als Nachbarn, als Hilfskraft, als Sexualobjekt eines anderen, als Mitglied einer Familie, eines Staates betreffen. Es wird hier besonders schwer, sich von bestimmten Idealforderungen frei zu halten und das, was iiberhaupt kultui:ell ist,·zu erfassen. Vielleicht beginnt man mit der Erklarung, das kulturelle Element sei mit dem ersten Versuch, diese sozialen Beziehungen zu regeln, gegeben. Unterbliebe ein solcher Versuch, so waren · diese Beziehungen der Willkiir des Einzelnen unterworfen, d. h. der physisch Stiirkere wiirde sie im Sinne seiner Interessen und Triebregungen entscheiden. Daran anderte sich nichts, wenn dieser Starkere seinerseits einen einzelnen noch Starkeren fande. Das men,schliche Zusammenleben wird erst ermoglicht, wenn sich eine Mehrheit zusammenfindet, die starker ist als jeder Einzelne und gegen jeden Einzelnen zusammenhalt. Die Macht dieser Gemeinschaft stellt sich nun als •Recht« der Macht des Einzelnen, die als •rohe Gewalt« verurteilt wird, entgegen. Diese Ersetzung der Macht des Einzelnen durch die der Gemeinschaft ist der entscheidende kulturelle Schritt. Ihr Wesen besteht darin, daB sich die Mitglieder der Gemeinschaft in ihren Befriedigungsmoglichkeiten beschranken, wahrend der Einzelne keine solche Schranke ltannte. Die nachste kulturelle Anforderung ist also die der Gerechtigkcit, d. h. die Versicherung, daB die einmal gegebene Rechtsordnung &idit wieder zu Gunsten eines Einzelnen durchbrochen werde. Uber den whischen Wert eines solchen Rechts wird hierinit nLcht entschieden. Der weitere Weg der kulturellen Entwicklung scheint dahin zu streben, daB dieses Recht nicht mehr der Willensausdruck einer kleinen Gemeinschaft - Kaste, Bevolkerungsschichte, Volksstammes - sei, welche sich zu anderen und vielleicht umfassenderen solchen Massen wieder wie ein gewalttatiges Individuum verhalt. Das Endergebnis soll ein Recht sein, zu dem alle - wenigstens alle Gemeinschaftsfahigen - durch ihre Triebopfer beigetragen haben und das keinen - wiederum mit der gleichen Ausnahme - zum Opfer der rohen Gewalt werden laBt.

Die individuelle Freiheit ist kein Kulturgut. Sie war am groBten vor jeder Kultur, allerdings damals meist ohne Wert, weil das Individuum kaum imstande war, sie zu verteidigen. Durch die Kulturentwicklung erfahrt sie Einschrankungen, und die Gerechtigkeit fordert, daB keinem

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shall escape those restrictions. What makes itself felt in a human community as a desire for freedom may be their revolt against some existing injustice, and so may prove favourable to a further development of civilization; it may remain compatible with civilization. But it may also spring from the remains of their original personality, which is still untamed by civilization and may thus become the basis in them of hostility to civilization. The urge for freedom, therefore, is directed against particular forms and demands of civilization or against civilization altogether. It does not seem as though any influence could induce a man to change his nature into a termite's. No doubt he will always defend his claim to individual liberty against the will of the group. A good part of the struggles of mankind centre round the single task of finding an expedient accommodation-one, that is, that will bring happiness-between this claim of the individual and the cultural claims of the group; and one of the problems that touches the fate of humanity is whether such an accommodation can be reached by means of some particular form of civilization or whether this conflict is irreconcilable. · By allowing common feeling to be our guide in deciding what features of human life are to be regarded as civilized, we have obtained a clear impression of the general picture of civilization; but it is true that so far we have discovered nothing that is not universally known. At the same time we have been careful not to fall in with the prejudice that civilization is synonymous with perfecting, that it is the road to perfection pre-ordained for men. But now a point of view presents itself which may lead in a different direction. The development of civilization appears to us as a peculiar process which mankind undergoes, and in which several things strike us as familiar. We may characterize this process with reference to the changes which it brings about in the familiar instinctual dispositions of human beings, to satisfy which is, after all, the economic task of our lives. A few of these instincts are used up in such a manner that something appears in their place which, in an individual, we describe as a 'Character-trait. The most remarkable example of such a process is found in the anal erotism of young human beings. Their original interest in the excretory function, its organs and products, is changed in the course of their growth into a group of traits which are familiar to us as parsimony, a sense of order and

Das U nbehagen in der Kultur (II I)

diese Einschrankungen erspart werden. Was sich in einer menschlichen Gemeinschafl: als Freiheitsdrang riihrt, kann Auflehnung gegen eine bestehende Ungerechtigkeit sein und so einer weiteren. Entwicklung , die Veranderungen charakterisieren, die er mit den bekannten menschlichen Triebanlagen vornimmt, deren Befriedigung doch die okonomische Aufgabe unseres Lehens ist. Einige dieser Triebe werden in solcher Weise aufgezehrt, daB an ihrer Stelle etwas auftritt, was wir beim Einz.elindividuum als Charaktereigenschafl: beschreiben. Das merkwiirdigste Beispiel dieses Vorganges haben wir an der Analerotik des jugendlichen Menschen gefunden. Sein urspriingliches Interesse an der Exkretions. funktion, ihren Organen und Produkten wandelt sich im Lauf des Wachstums in die Gruppe von Eigenschaften um, die uns als Sparsamkeit,, Sinn fiir Ordnung und

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97

Das Unhehagea in ae,r Kultur

cleanliness-qualities which, though valuable and welcome in themselves, may be intensified till they become markedly dominant and produce what is called the anal character. How this happens we do not know, but there is no doubt about the correctness of the finding. 1 Now we have seen that order and cleanliness are important requirements of civilization, although their vital necessity is not very apparent, any more than their suitability as sources of enjoyment. At this point we cannot fail to be struck by the similarity between the process of civilization and the libidinal development of the individual. Other instincts [besides anal erotism] are induced to displace the conditions for their satisfaction, to lead them into other paths. In most cases this process coincides with that of the sublimation (of instinctual aims) with which we are familiar, but in some it can be differentiated from it. Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life. If one were to yield to a first impression, one would say that sublimation is a vicissitude which has been forced upon the instincts entirely by civilization. But it would be wiser to reflect upon this a little longer. In the third place, 2 finally, and this seems the most important of all, it is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction (by suppression, repression or some other means?) of powerful instincts. This 'cultural frustration' dominates the large field of social relationships between human beings. As we already know, it is the cause of the hostility against which all civilizations have to struggle. It will also make severe demands on our scientific work, and we shall have much to explain here. It is not easy to understand how it can become possible to deprive an instinct of satisfaction. Nor is doing so without danger. If the loss is not compensated for economically, one can be certain that serious disorders will ensue. But if we want to know what value can be attributed to our view that the development of civilization is a special process,

_ ReinlUhk.eit bekannt sind, die, an und for si.ch wertvoll und willkommen,' sich zu auffalliger Vorherrschaft steigern konnen und dann das ergeben, was man den Analcharakter heiik Wie das zugeht, wissen wir nicht, an der Richtigkeit dieser Auffassung ist kein Zweifel 1• Nun haben wir gefunden, daB Ordnung und Reinlichkeit wesentliche Kulturansprilche sind, obgleich ihre Lebensnotwendigkeit nicht gerade einleuchtet, ebensowenig wie ihre Eignung als GenuBquellen. An dieser Stelle muBte sich uns die Khnlichkeit des Kulturprozesses mit der Libidoentwicklung des Einzelnen zuerst aufdrangen. Andere Triebe [neben denen der Analerotik] werden dazu veranlaBt, die Bedingungen ihrer Befriedigung zu verschieben, auf andere Wege zu verlegen, was in den meisten Fallen mit der uns wohlbekannten Sublimierung (der Triebziele) zusammenfallt, in anderen sich noch von ihr sondern laBt. Die Triebsublimierung ist ein besonders hervorstechender Zug der Kulturentwicklung, sie macht es moglich, daB hohere psychische Tlitigkeiten, wissenschaftliche, kiinstlerische, ideologische, eine so bedeutsame Rolle im Kulturleben spielen. Wenn man dem ersten Eindruck nachgibt, ist man versucht zu sagen, die Sublimierung sei iiberhaupt ein von der Kultur erzwungenes Triebschicksal. Aber man tut besser, sich das noch Hinger zu iiberlegen. Drittens 2 endlich, und das scheint das Wichtigste, ist es unmoglich ZU ilbersehen, in welchem AusmaB die Kultur auf Triebverzicht aufgebaut ist, wie sehr sie gerade die Nichtbefriedigung (Unterdriickung, Verdrangung oder sonst etwas?) von mlichtigen Trieben zur Voraussetzung hat. Diese »Kulturver5agung« beherrscht das groBe Gebiet der sozialen Beziehungen der Mensdien; wir wissen bereits, sie ist die Ursache der Feind,. seligkeit, gege11. die alle Kulturen zu klimpfen haben. Sie wird auch an unsere wissenschaftliche Arbeit schwere Anforderungen stellen, wir haben da viel Aufklarung zu geben. Es ist nicht leicht zil verstehen, wie man es moglich macht, einem Trieb die Befrjedigung zu entziehen. Es ist gar nicht so ungeflihrlich; wenn man eynicht okonomisch kompensiert, kann man sich auf ernste Storunge~gefaBt machen.

1 C£ my 'Character and Anal Erotism' (1908b), and numerous further contributions, by Ernest Jones (1918] and others. I (Freud had already mentioned two other factors playing a part m the 'process' of civilization: character-formation and sublimation.]

1 S. >Charakter und Analerotik< (1908 b) und zahlreiche weitere Beitrage von E. Jones {1918] u.a. !J [ficud hatte vorher bereits zwei andere Faktoren erwahnt, die im •KulturprozeBc Mo Rolle spielen: Charakterb~.w:i.d Sublimierung.]

We~n wir aber wissen wollen, wel~en Wert unsere Auffassung der Kulturentwicklung als eihes besonaeren Prozesses,

227

98

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

comparable to the normal maturation of the individual, we must clearly attack another problem. We must ask ourselves to what influences the development of civilization owes its origin, how it arose, and by what its course has been determined.1 1 [Freud returns to the subject of civilization as a 'process' below, on p. 122 and again on p. 139 ff. He mentions it once more in his open letter to Einstein, Why War? (1933b).]

Das TJnbeha-gen in der-Kuttur(tft) vergleichbar der · normalen Reifung des Individuums, beanspruchen kann, miissen wir offenbar ein anderes Problem in Angriff nehmen, uns die Frage stellen, w~chen Einfl.iissen die Kulturentwicklung ihren Ursprung dankt, wie sie entstanden ist und wodurch ihr Lauf bestimmt wurde 1 • [Freud kehrt zu ·dem Thema der Kultur als eines •Prozessesc unten, auf S. 249 sowie S. 264 !£., nodi. einmal zuriidt; ferner beriihrt er es in den beiden langen Fu.6noten zu Anfang und am Sdi.lufi von Kapitel IV. Einen Oberblick iiber Gesdi.idite und B~ deutung dieses Begritfs mit weiteren Verweisen enthalt die >Editorisdie Vorbemerku~' zur vorliegenden Arbeit, oben~_S~ 193-4.]

1

IV

task seems an immense one, and it is natural to feel diffidence in the face of it. But here are such conjectures as I have been able to make. After primal man had discovered that it lay in his own hands, literally, to improve his lot on earth by working, it cannot have been a matter of indifference to him whether another man worked with or against him. The other man acquired the value for him of a fellow-worker, with whom it was useful to live together. Even earlier, in his ape-like prehistory, man had adopted the habit of forming families, and the members of his family were probably his first helpers. One may suppose that the founding of families was connected with the fact that a moment came when the need for genital satisfaction no longer made its appearance like a guest who drops in suddenly, and, after his departure, is heard of no more for a long time, but instead took up its quarters as a permanent lodger. When this happened, the male acquired a motive for keeping the female, or, speaking more generally, his sexual objects, near him; while the female, who did not want to be separated from her helpless young, was obliged, in their interests, to remain with the stronger male. 1 In this primitive family one essential feature of THE

1 The organic periodicity of the sexual process has persisted, it is true, but its effect on psychical sexual excitation has rather been reversed. This change seems most likely to be connected with the diminution of the olfactory stimuli by means of which the menstrual process produced an effect on the male psyche. Their role was taken over by visual excitations, which, in contrast to the intermittent olfactory stimuli, were able to maintain a permanent effect. The taboo on menstruation is derived from this 'organic repression', as a defence against a phase of development that has been surmounted. All other motives are probably of a secondary nature. (Cf. C. D. Daly, 1927.) This process is repeated on another level when the gods of a superseded period of civilization tum into demons. The diminution of the olfactory stimuli seems itself to be a consequence of man's raising himself from the ground, of his assumption of an upright gait; this made his genitals, which were previously concealed, visible and in need of protection, and so provoked feelings of shame in him. The fateful process of civilization would thus have set in with man's adoption of an erect posture. From that point the chain of events would have proceeded through the devaluation of olfactory stimuli and the

99

IV Diese Aufgabe scheint iibergroB, man darf seine Verzagtheit eingestehen. Hier das wenige, was ich erraten konnte. Nachdem der Urmensch entdeckt hatte, daB es - wortlich so verstanden - in seiner Hand lag, sein Los auf der Erde durch Arbeit zu verbessern, konnte es ihm nicht gleichgiiltig sein, ob ein anderer mit oder gegen ihn arbeitete. Der andere gewann fiir ihn den Wert des Mitarbeiters, mit dem zusammen zu leben niitzlich war. Noch vorher, in seiner affenahnlichen Vorzeit, hatte er die Gewohnheit angenommen, Familien zu bilden; die Mitglieder der Familie waren wahrscheinlich seine ersten Helfer. Vermutlich hing die Griindung der Familie damit zusammen, daB das Bediirfnis genitaler Befriedigung nicht mehr wie ein Gast auftrat, der plotzlich bei einem erscheint und nach seiner Abreise lange nichts mehr von sich horen laBt, sondern sich als Dauermieter beim Einzelnen niederlieB. Damit bekam das Mannchen ein Motiv, das Weib oder allgemeiner: die Sexualobjekte bei sich zu behalten; die Weibchen, die sich von ihren hilflosen Jungen nicht trennen wollten, muBten auch in deren Interesse beim starkeren Mannchen bleiben 1 • In dieser primitiven familie vermissen wir noch einen wesentlichen Zug 1 Die organische Periodizitat des Sexualvorgangs ist zwar erhalten geblieben, aber ihr Einflull auf die psychische Sexualerregung hat sich eher ins Gcgenteil verkehrt. Diese Veranderung hangt am ehesten zusammen mit dem Zuriicktrcten der Gcruchsreizc, durch welche dcr Menstruationsvorgang auf die mannliche Psyche einwirkte. Deren Rolle wurde von Gesichtserregungen iibernommen, die im Gcgensatz zu den intcrmittierenden Geruchsreizen eine permancnte Wirkung unterhalten konnten. Das Tahu der Menstruation entstammt dieser •organischen Verdrangung« als Abwehr einer iibcrwundenen Entwicklungsphasc; alle anderen Motivierungen sind wahrscheinlich sekundarer Natur. (Vgl. C. D. Daly, 1927.) Dieser Vorgang wiederholt sich auf anderem Niveau, wenn die Gotter einer iiberho!ten Kulturperiode zu Damonen wen:lerr. Das Zuriicktreten der Geruchsreize sdieint aber selbst Folge der Abwendung des ¥enschen von der Erde, des Entschlusses zum aufrediten Gang, dcr nun die bishef gedeckten Genitalien sichtbar und sdiutzbediirftig madit und so das Schamen hervorrufl:.

Am Beginne 9es verhangnisvollen Kulturprozesses stiinde also die Aufrichtun~ des Me~­ schen. Di~ Verkettung laufl: von hier aus iiber die Entwertung der Gcruchsre1zc und die

100

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Das UnbehaK,en in der Kultur

civilization is still lacking. The arbitrary will of its head, the father, was unrestricted. In Totem and Taboo [1912-13] 1 I have tried to show how the way led from this family to the succeeding stage of communal life in the form of bands of brothers. In overpowering their father, the sons had made the discovery that a combination can be stronger than a single individual. The totemic culture is based on the restrictions which the sons had

der Kultur; die Willkiir des Oberhauptes und Vaters war unbeschrankt. In Totem und Tabu (1912-13] 1 habe ich versucht, den Weg aufzuzeigen, der von dieser Familie zur nachsten Stufe des Zusammenlebens in Form der Briiderbiinde fiihrte. Bei der Oberwaltigung des Vaters hatten die Sohne die Erfahrung gemacht, dafi eine Vereinigung starker sein kann als der Einzelne. Die totemistische Kultur ruht auf den Einschrankungen, die sie zur

isolation of the menstrual period to the time when visual stimuli were paramount and the genitals became visible, and thence to the continuity of sexual excitation, the founding of the family and so to the threshold of human civilization. This is only a theoretical speculation, but it is important enough to deserve careful checking with reference to the conditions of life which obtain among animals closely related to man. A social factor is also unmistakably present in the cultural trend towards cleanliness, which has received ex post facto justification in hygienic considerations but which manifested itself before their discovery. The incitement to cleanliness originates in an urge to get rid of the excreta, which have become disagreeable to the sense perceptions. We know that in the nursery things are different. The excreta arouse no disgust in children. They seem valuable to them as being a part of their own body which has come away from it. Here upbringing insists with special energy on hastening the course of development which lies ahead, and which should make the excreta worthless, disgusting, abhorrent and abominable. Such a reversal of values would scarcely be possible if the substances that are expelled from the body were not doomed by their strong smells to share the fate which overtook olfactory stimuli after man adopted the erect posture. Anal erotism, therefore, succumbs in the first instance to the 'organic repression' which paved the way to civilization. The existence of the social factor which is responsible for the further transformation of anal erotism is attested by the circumstance that, in spite of all man's developmental advances, he scarcely finds the smell of his own excreta repulsive, but only that of other people's. Thus a person who is not clean-who does not hide his excreta-is offending other people; he is showing no consideration for them. And this is confirmed by our strongest and commonest terms of abuse. It would be incomprehensible, too, that man should use the name of his most faithful friend in the animal world-the dog-as a term of abuse if that creature had not incurred his contempt through two characteristics: that it is an animal whose dominant sense is that of smell and one which has no horror of excrement, and that it is not ashamed of its sexual functions. [Cf. some remarks on the history of Freud's views on this subject in the Editor's Note, p. 60 f. above.] 1 (What Freud here calls the 'primitive family' he speaks of more often as the 'primal horde'; it corresponds to what Atkinson (1903), to whom the notion is largely due, named the 'Cyclopean family'. See, for all this, Standard Ed., 13, 142 ff.]

lsolierung der Period~ zum Obergewidit der Gesiditsreize, Siditbarwerden der Genitalien, weiter zur Kontinuitat der Sexualerrcgung, Griindung der Familie und damit zur Sdiwelle der mensdilidien Kultur. Dies ist nur einc theoretisdic Spekulation, aber widitig gcnug, um cine exakte Nadipriifung an den Lcbensverhaltnissen der dcm Menschen nahestehenden Tiere zu verdiencn.

Audi in dem Kulturstreben nach Reinlichkeit, das in hygienisdien Riicksichten eine nachtragliche Rcditfcrtigung findet, aber sidi bereits vor diesel' Einsicht geauBcrt hat, ist ein soziales Moment unverkcnnbar. Der Antrieb zur Reinlidikeit cntspringt dem Drang nadi Beseitigung der Exkrementc, die der Sinncswahrnehmung unangcnchm geworden sind. Wir wissen, daB es in der Kinderstube anders ist. Die Exkrementc erregcn ;)cim Kinde keincn Absdieu, ersdieinen ihm als losge!Oster Tei! seines Kiirpcrs wertvoll. Die Erziehung dringt hicr besonders cnergisch auf die Beschleunigung des bevorstchcnden Entwicklungsganges, der die Exkremente wertlos, ekelhaft, absdieulidi und verwerflich machen soil. Eine soldie Umwertung ware kaum miiglich, wenn dicse dem Kiirper cntzogenen Stoffc nicht durdi ihre starken Geriidie verurteilt warcn, an dcm Schicksal teilzunchmen, das nach der Aufrichtung des Menschen vom Boden den Geruchsreizcn vorbchalten ist. Die Analcrotik crliegt also zunadist der •organischcn Verdrangung•, die den Weg zur Kultur gebahnt hat. Der soziale Faktor, der die weiterc Umwandlung der Analerotik besorgt, bezeugt sidi durdi die Tatsache, daB trotz aller Entwicklungsfortschritte dem Menschen der Geruch der eigenen Exkremente kaum anstoBig ist, immer nur der der Ausscheidungen des anderen. Der Unreinliche, d. h. der, der seine Exkrementc nicht verbirgt, beleidigt also den anderen, zeigt keine Riicksicht fiir ihn, und dassclbe bcsagen ja auch die kraftigstcn, gebrauchlichsten Besdiimpfungen. Es ware audi unverstandlich, daB der Mensch den Namcn seines treuesten Freundes in der Ticrwclt als Schimpfwort verwendet, wenn der Hund nidit durch zwei Eigenschaften die Verachtung des Menschen auf sich ziige, dall er ein Gerudistier ist, das sidi vor Exkrementen nidit sdieut, und dall er sidi seiner sexuellen Funktionen nicht sdiamt. [Vgl. einigc Bemerkungen iiber die Entstehung von Freuds Ansiditen iiber dieses Thema in der >Editorisdicn VorbemerkungInter urinas et faeces nascimur [wir werdcn zwischen Urin und Faeces geborcn]< nchmen alle Neurotiker und viele auBer ihnen AnstoB. Die Gcnitalien erzeugen auch starkc Geruchsempfindungen, die vielen Mcnschen unertraglich sind und ihncn den Scxualverkehr verlciden. So ergabe sich als tiefste Wurzel der mit der Kultudortschreitenden Sexualvcrdrangung die organische Abwehr der mit dem aufrcchtcn Gang gcwonncnen neuen Lcbensform gegcn die friihere animalische Existenz, ein Rcsultat wisscnschaA:licher Erforschung, das sich in merkwiirdigcr Weise mit oA: laut gewordcncn banalen Vorurteilen deckt. Immerhin sind dies derzeit nur ungcsichcrte, von der WissenschaA: nicht erhartete Moglichkeitcn. Wir wollen auch nicht vergcssen, daB trotz der unlcugbaren Entwertung der Geruchsreize es selbst in Europa Volker gibt, die die starken, uns so widrigen Genitalgeriiche als Reizmittel der Scxualitat hochschatzen und auf sie nicht verzichten wollen. (Siehe die folkloristischen Erhebungen auf die >Umfrage< von I wan Bloch >Uber den Geruchssinn in der vita

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

107

sexualis'] published in different volumes of Friedrich S. Krauss's Anthropophyteia.)

[On the difficulty of finding a psychological meaning for 'maleness' and 'femaleness', see a long footnote added in 1915 to the third of Freud's Three Essays (l905d), Standard Ed., 7, 219-20.-The important consequences of the proximity between the sexual and excretory organs were first indicated by Freud in the unpublished Draft K sent to Fliess on January 1, 1896 (Freud, 1950a). He returned to the point frequently. Cf., for instance, the 'Dora' case history (1905e (1901]), Standard Ed., 7, 31-2, and the second paper on 'The Psychology of Love' (1912d), ibid., 11, 189. Cf. also the Editor's Note, p. 60 f. above.]

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (IV) se;x;ualis< in vemhiedenen Jahrgangen der Anthropropbyteia von Friedridi S. KrauB.) [Hinsichtlidi der Schwierigkeit, die psydiologisdie Bedeutung von •Mannlichkeit« und •Weiblidikeit« zu bestimmen, s. die lange FuBnote, die Freud 1915 seinen Drei Abbandlungen zur Se;x;ualtbeorie (1905 d), Studienausgabe, Bd. 5, S. 123 f., hinzugefiigt hat, ferner eine Eriirterung zu Beginn der 33. Vorlesung der Neuen Folge der Vorlesungen (1933 a), ibid., Bd. 1, S. 545-8. - Freud hat die bedeutsamcn Folgen der Nachbarsdiaft von Sexual- und Aussdieidungsorganen erstmals in seinem Manuskript K angedeutet, das er am 1. Januar 1896 an FlieB sdiickte (Freud, 1950 a). Spater kam er mchrfadi darauf zuriick. Vgl. z. B. die Krankengeschidite der •Dora« (1905 e [1901]), Studienausgabe, Bd. 6, S. 108 und Anm. 3, sowie den zweiten Artikel iiber die >Psydiologie des Licbeslebensc (1912d), ibid., Bd. 5, S. 208-9. Vgl. auch die >Editorische Vorbemerkungc, oben, S. 194.)

236 S.P. XXI-H

v work has shown us that it is precisely these frustrations of sexual life which people known as neurotics cannot tolerate. The neurotic creates substitutive satisfactions for himself in his symptoms, and these either cause him suffering in themselves or become sources of suffering for him by raising difficulties in his relations with his environment and the society he belongs to. The latter fact is easy to understand; the former presents us with a new problem. But civilization demands other sacrifices besides that of sexual satisfaction. We have treated the difficulty of cultural development as a general difficulty of development by tracing it to the inertia of the libido, to its disinclination to give up an old position for a new one. 1 We are saying much the same thing when we derive the antithesis between civilization and sexuality from the circumstance that sexual love is a relationship between two individuals in which a third can only be superfluous or disturbing, whereas civilization depends on relationships between a considerable number of individuals. When a love-relationship is at its height there is no room left for any interest in the environment; a pair of lovers are sufficient to themselves, and do not even need the child they have in common to make them happy. In no other case does Eros so clearly betray the core of his being, his purpose of making one out of more than one; but when he has achieved this in the proverbial way through the love of two human beings, he refuses to go further. So far, we can quite well imagine a cultural community consisting of double individuals like this, who, libidinally satisfied in themselves, are connected with one another through the bonds of common work and common interests. If this were so, civilization would not have to withdraw any energy from sexuality. But this desirable state of things does not, and never did, exist. Reality shows us that civilization is not content with the ties we have so far allowed it. It aims at binding the members of the community together in a libidinal way as well and PsYCHO-ANALYTIC

1 [See, for instance, p. 103 above. For some remarks on Freud's use of the concept of 'psychical inertia' in general, see an Editor's footnote to Freud, 1915j, Standard Ed., 14, 272.)

v Die psychoanalytische Arbeit hat uns gelehrt, daB gerade diese Versagungen des Sexuallebens von den sogenannten Neurotikern nicht vertragen werden. Sie schaffen sich in ihren Symptomen Ersatzbefriedigungen, die aber entweder an sich Leiden schaffen oder Leidensquelle werden, indem sie ihnen Schwierigkeiten mit Umwelt und Gesellschaft bereiten. Das letztere ist leicht verstandlich, das andere gibt uns ein neues Ratsel auf. Die Kultur verlangt aber noch andere Opfer als an Sexualbefriedigung. Wir haben die Schwierigkeiten der Kulturentwicklung als eine allgemeine Entwicklungsschwierigkeit aufgefaBt, indem wir sie auf die Tragheit der Libido zuriickfiihrten, auf deren Abneigung, eine alte Position gegen eine neue zu verlassen 1• Wir sagen ungefahr dasselbe, wenn wir den Gegensatz zwischen Kultur und Sexualitat davon ableiten, daB die sexuelle Liebe ein Verhaltnis zwischen zwei Personen ist, bei dem ein Dritter nur iiberfliissig oder storend sein kann, wahrend die Kultur auf Beziehungen unter einer groBeren Menschenanzahl ruht. Auf der Hohe eines Liebesverhaltnisses bleibt kein Interesse fiir die Umwelt iibrig; das Liebespaar geniigt sich selbst, braucht auch nicht das gemeinsame Kind, um gliicklich zu sein. In keinem anderen Falle verrat der Eros so deutlich den Kern seines Wesens, die Absicht, aus mehreren eines zu machen, aber wenn er dies, wie es sprichwortlich geworden ist, in der Verliebtheit zweier Menschen zueinander erreicht hat, will er dariiber nicht hinausgehen. Wir konnen uns bisher sehr gut vorstellen, daB eine Kulturgemeinschaft aus solchen Doppelindividuen bestiinde, die, in sich libidinos gesattigt, durch das Band der Arbeits- und lnteressengemeinschaft miteinander verkniipft sind. In diesem Falle brauchte die Kultur der Sexualitat keine Energie zu entziehen. Aber dieser wiinschenswerte Zustand besteht nicht und hat niemals bestanden; die Wirklichkeit zeigt uns, daB die Kultur sich nicht mit den ihr bisher zugestandenen Bindungen begni.igt, daB sie die Mitglieder der Gemeinschaft auch libidinos aneinander binden will, t [S. beispielswcisc S. 232 f., oben. Freud erortert den Begriff der •psychischen Tragheit« allgemein am SchluB seiner Arbeit ilber einen Fall von Paranoia ( l 915 /); s. Studienausgabe, Bd. 7, S. 216, wo eine editonsche Anmerkung noch wciterc Vcrweise gibt.]

108 237

CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

109

employs every means to that end. It favours every path by which strong identifications can be established between the members of the community, and it summons up aim-inhibited libido on the largest scale so as to strengthen the communal bond by relations of friendship. In order for these aims to be fulfilled, a restriction upon sexual life is unavoidable. But we are unable to understand what the necessity is which forces civilization along this path and which causes its antagonism to sexuality. There must be some disturbing factor which we have not yet discovered. The clue may be supplied by one of the ideal demands, as we have called them,1 of civilized society. It runs: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.' It is known throughout the world and is undoubtedly older than Christianity, which puts it forward as its proudest claim. Yet it is certainly not very old; even in historical times it was still strange to mankind. Let us adopt a naive attitude towards it, as though we were hearing it for the first time; we shall be unable then to suppress a feeling of surprise and bewilderment. Why should we do it? What good will it do us? But, above all, how shall we achieve it? How can it be possible? My love is something valuable to me which I ought not to throw away without reflection. It imposes duties on me for whose fulfilment I must be ready to make sacrifices. If I love someone, he must deserve it in some way. (I leave out of account the use he may be to me, and also his possible significance for me as a sexual object, for neither of these two kinds of relationship comes into question where the precept to love my neighbour is concerned.) He deserves it if he is so like me in important ways that I can love myself in him; and he deserves it if he is so much more perfect than myself that I can love my ideal of my own self in him. Again, I have to love him if he is my friend's son, since the pain my friend would feel if any harm came to him would be my pain too-I should have to share it. But if he is a stranger to me and if he cannot attract me by any worth of his own or any significance that he may already have acquired for my emotional life, it will be hard for me to love him. Indeed, I should be wrong to do so, for my love is valued by all my own people as a sign of my preferring them, and it is an injustice to them if I put a stranger on 1

[Seep. 94 above. Cf. also '"Civilized" Sexual Morality' (1908d),

Standard Ed., 9, 199.]

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur

daB sie sich aller Mittel hiezu bedient, jeden Weg begiinstigt, starke Identifizierungen unter ihnen herzustellen, im groBten AusmaBe zielgehemmte Libido aufbietet, um die Gemeinschaftsbande durch Freundschaftsbeziehungen zu kraftigen. Zur Erfiillung dieser Absichten wird die Einschrankung des Sexuallebens unvermeidlich. Uns fehlt aber die Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit, welche die Kultur auf diesen Weg drangt und ihre Gegnerschaft zur Sexualitat begriindet. Es muB sich um einen von uns noch nicht entdeckten sti:irenden Faktor handeln. Eine der sogenannten Idealforderungen 1 der Kulturgesellschaft kann uns hier die Spur zeigen. Sie lautet: »Du sollst den Nachsten lieben wie dich selbst«; sie ist weltberiihmt, gewiB alter als das Christentum, das sie als seinen stolzesten Anspruch vorweist, aber sicherlich nicht sehr alt; in historischen Zeiten war sie den Menschen noch fremd. Wir wollen uns naiv zu ihr einstellen, als horten wir von ihr zum ersten Male. Dann konnen wir ein Gefiihl von Oberraschung und Befremden nicht unterdriicken. Warum sollen wir das? Was soll es uns helfen? Vor allem aber, wie bringen wir das zustande? Wie wird es uns moglich? Meine Liebe ist etwas mir Wertvolles, das ich nicht ohne Rechenschaft verwerfen darf. Sie legt mir Pflichten auf, die ich mit Opfcrn zu erfiillen bereit sein muB. Wenn ich einen anderen liebc, muB er es auf irgendeine Art verdienen. (Ich sehe von dem Nutzen, den er mir bringen kann, sowie von seiner moglichen Bedeutung als Sexualobjekt fiir mich ab; diese beiden Arten der Beziehung kommen fiir die Vorschrift der Nachstenliebe nicht in Betracht.) Er verdient es, wenn er mir in wichtigen Stuck.en so ahnlich ist, daB ich in ihm mich selbst lieben kann; er verdicnt es, wenn er so viel vollkommener ist als ich, daB ich mein Ideal von meiner eigenen Person in ihm lieben kann; ich rnuB ihn lieben, wenn er der Sohn meines Freundes ist, denn der Schmerz des Freundes, wenn ihm ein Leid zustoBt, ware auch mein Schmerz, ich miiBte ihn teilen. Aber wenn er mir fremd ist und mich durch keinen eigenen Wert, keine bereits erworbene Bedeutung fiir mein Gefiihlsleben anziehen kann, ~ird es mir schwer, ihn zu lieben. Ich tue sogar unrecht damit, denn meine Liebe wird von all den Meinen als Bevorzugung geschatzt; es ist ein Unrecht an ihnen, wenn ich den Fremden ihnen gleichstelle.

t

[Siebe S. 224, obcn. Vgl. auch >Die •kulturclle• Sexualmoral< (1908 d), obcn, S. 28.]

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a par with them. But if I am to love him (with this universal love) merely because he, too, is an inhabitant of this earth, like an insect, an earth-worm or a grass-snake, then I fear that only a small modicum of my love will fall to his share-not by any possibility as much as, by the judgement of my reason, I am entitled to retain for myself. What is the point of a precept enunciated with so much solemnity if its fulfilment cannot be recommended as reasonable? On closer inspection, I find still further difficulties. Not merely is this stranger in general unworthy of my love; I must honestly confess that he has more claim to my hostility and even my hatred. He seems not to have the least trace oflove for me and shows me not the slightest consideration. If it will do him any good he has no hesitation in injuring me, nor does he ask himself whether the amount of advantage he gains bears any proportion to the extent of the harm he does to me. Indeed, he need not even obtain an advantage; ifhe can satisfy any sort of desire by it, he thinks nothing of jeering at me, insulting me, slandering me and showing his superior power; and the more secure he feels and the more helpless I am, the more certainly I can expect him to behave like this to me. If he behaves differently, if he shows me consideration and forbearance as a stranger, I am ready to treat him in the same way, in any case and quite apart from any precept. Indeed, if this grandiose commandment had run 'Love thy neighbour as thy neighbour loves thee', I should not take exception to it. And there is a second commandment, which seems to me even more incomprehensible and arouses still stronger opposition in me. It is 'Love thine enemies'. If I think it over, however, I see that I am wrong in treating it as a greater imposition. At bottom it is the same thing. 1 i A great imaginative writer may permit himself to give expressionjokingly, at all events-to psychological truths that are severely proscribed. Thus Heine confesses: 'Mine is a most peaceable disposition. My wishes are: a humble cottage with a thatched roof, but a good bed, good food, the freshest milk and butter, flowers before my window, and a few fine trees before my door; and if God wants to make my happiness complete, he will grant me the joy of seeing some six or seven of my enemies hanging from those trees. Before their death I shall, moved in my heart, forgive them all the wrong they did me in their lifetime. One must, it is true, forgive one's enemies-but not before they have been hanged.' (Gedanken und Eirifdlle [Section I].)

Wenn ich ihn aber lieben soll, mit jener Weltliebe, blol.1 wcil er auch ein Wesen dieser Erde ist, wie das Insekt, der Rcgenwurm, die Ringelnatter, dann wird, fiirchte ich, ein geringer Betrag Liebe auf ihn entfallen, unmoglich so viel, als ich nach dem Urteil der VernunA: berechtigt bin, fiir mich selbst zuriickzubehalten. Wozu eine so feierlich auftretende VorschriA:, wenn ihre Erfiillung sich nicht als verniinftig empfehlen kann? Wenn ich naher zusehe, finde id1 noch mehr Schwierigkeiten. Dieser Fremde ist nicht nur im allgemeinen nicht liebenswert, ich mua ehrlich bekennen, er hat mehr Anspruch auf meine Feindseligkeit, sogar auf meinen Haa. Er scheint nicht die mindeste Liebe fiir mich zu haben, bezeigt mir nicht die geringste Riicksicht. Wenn es ihm einen Nutzen bringt, hat er kein Bedenken, mich zu schadigen, fragt sich dabei auch nicht, ob die Hohe seines Nutzens der GroBe des Schadens, den er mir zufiigt, entspricht. Ja, er braucht nicht einmal einen Nutzen davon zu haben; wenn er nur irgendeine Lust damit befriedigen kann, macht er sich nichts daraus, mich zu verspotten, zu beleidigen, zu verleumden, seine Macht an mir zu zeigen, und je sicherer er sich fiihlt, je hilfloser ich bin, desto sicherer darf ich dies Benehmen gegen mi ch von ihm erwarten. Wenn er sich anders verhalt, wenn er mir als Fremdem Riicksicht und Schonung erweist, bin ich ohnedies, ohne jene VorschriA: bereit, es ihm in ahnlicher Weise zu vergelten. Ja, wenn jenes groaanige Gebot lauten wiirde: »Liebe deinen Nachsten, wie dein Nachster dich liebt«, dann wiirde ich nicht widersprechen. Es gibt ein zweitcs Gebot, das mir noch unfaBbarer scheint und ein noch hef tiger es Strauben in mir entfesselt. Es heiBt: »Liebe deine Feinde.« Wenn ich's recht iiberlege, habe ich unrecht, cs als eine noch starkere Zumutung abzuwcisen. Es ist im Grunde dasselbe 1 • Ein groBcr Dichtcr darf sich gcstattcn, schwcr vcrpontc psychol~gisdic Wahrhcit~n wenigstens schcrzcnd zum Ausdruck zu ~ringc~. So gcst~ht H. H~me: ~Ich habc die fricdlichste Gesinnung. Mcinc Wiinschc smd: cine bcschc1dcne Huttc, em Strohdach, abcr cin guccs Bctt, guccs Essen, Milch und Butter, schr frisch, _vor dcm F~_nst~r Blumen, vor dcr Tiir einigc schone Baumc, und wcnn dcr licbc Gott m1ch g.inz gluckli~ m:chcn will, JaBt er mich die Frcudc crlcbcn, daB an dicscn Baumcn ct.wa. scd1s bis ~1cbcn mcincr Feinde aufgchangt wcrdcn. Mit gcriihrtcm Hcrzcn w_crdc 1ch 1hncn _vor 1hr~m Tode alle Unbill verzcihen, die sic mir im Leben zugcfiigt - Ja, ma~ mull sc1ncn Femdcn verzcihen, aber niche friihcr, als bis sic gchcnkt wcrdcn.• (Herne, Gedanken und Einfiille [Abschnitt I].)

1

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lll

I think I can now hear a dignified voice admonishing me: 'It is precise! y because your neighbour is not worthy oflove, and is on the contrary your enemy, that you should love him as yourself.' I then understand that the case is one like that of Credo quia absurdum. 1 Now it is very probable that my neighbour, when he is enjoined to love me as himself, will answer exactly as I have done and will repel me for the same reasons. I hope he will not have the same objective grounds for doing so, but he will have the same idea as I have. Even so, the behaviour of human beings shows differences, which ethics, disregarding the fact that such differences are determined, classifies as 'good' or 'bad'. So long as these undeniable differences have not been removed, obedience to high ethical demands entails damage to the aims of civilization, for it puts a positive premium on being bad. One is irresistibly reminded of an incident in the French Chamber when capital punishment was being debated. A member had been passionately supporting its abolition and his speech was being received with tumultuous applause, when a voice from the hall called out: 'Que messieurs les assassins commencent!' 1 The element of truth behind all this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbour is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. Homo homini lupus.• Who, in the face of all his experience of life and of history, will have the courage to dispute this assertion? As a rule this cruel aggressiveness waits for some provocation or puts itself at the service of some other purpose, whose goal might also have been reached by milder measures. In circumstances that are favourable 1 [See Chapter V of The Future of an Illusion (1927c), p. 28 above. Freud returns to the question of the commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself below, on p. 142 f.] 1 ['It's the murderers who should make the first move.'] 1 ['Man is a wolf to man.' Derived from Plautus, Asinaria II, iv, 88.]

!ch glaube nun von einer wiirdevollen Stimme die Mahnung zu horen: »Eben darum, weil der Nachste nicht liebenswert und eher dein Feind ist, sollst du ihn lieben wie dich selbst.« Ich verstehe dann, das ist ein ahnlicher Fall wie das Credo quia absurdum 1• Es ist nun sehr wahrscheinlich, daB der Nachste, wenn er aufgefordert wird, mich so zu lieben wie sich selbst, genauso antworten wird wie ich und mich mit den namlichen Begriindungen abweisen wird. Ich hoffe, nicht mit demselben objektiven Recht, aber dasselbe wird auch er meinen. Immerhin gibt es Unterschiede im Verhalten der Menschen, die die Ethik mit Hinwegsetzung ilber deren Bedingtheit als »gut« und »base« klassifiziert. Solange diese unleugbaren Unterschiede nicht aufgehoben sind, bedeutet tlie Befolgung der hohen ethischen Forderungen eine Schadigung der Kulturabsichten, indem sie direkte Pramien fiir das Bosesein aufstellt. Man kann hier die Erinnerung an einen Vorgang nicht abweisen, der sich in der franzosischen Kammer zutrug, als ilber die Todesstrafe verhandelt wurde; ein Redner hatte sich leidenschaftlich fiir ihre Abschaffung eingesetzt und erntete stiirmischen Beifall, bis eine Stimme aus dem Saale die Worte dazwischenrief: »Que messieurs les assassins commencent!" Das gern verleugnete Stuck Wirklichkeit hinter alledem ist, daB der Mensch nicht ein sanftes, liebebediirftiges Wesen ist, das sich hochstens, wenn angegriffen, auch zu verteidigen vermag, sondern daB er zu seinen Triebbegabungen auch einen machtigen Anteil von Aggressionsneigung rechnen darf. Infolgedessen ist ihm der Nachste nicht nur moglicher Helfer und Sexualobjekt, sondern auch eine Versuchung, seine Aggression an ihm zu befriedigen, seine Arbeitskraft ohne Entschadigung auszuniitzen, ihn ohne seine Einwilligung sexuell zu gebrauchen, sich in den Besitz seiner Habe zu setzen, ihn zu demiitigen, ihm Schmerzen zu bereiten, zu martern und zu toten. Homo homini lupus 2 ; wer hat nach allen Erfahrungen des Lebens und der Geschichte den Mut, diesen Satz zu bestreiten? Diese grausame Aggression wartet in der Regel eine Provokation ab oder stellt sich in den Dienst einer anderen Absicht, deren Ziel auch mit milderen Mitteln zu erreichen ware. Unter ihr gilnstigen Umstanden, t (S. Die Zukunfl einer Illusion, oben, S. 162 und Anm. t. Auf das Gebot, scincn Nachsten wie sich sclbst zu lichen, kommt Freud noch einmal weiter untcn, auf S. 267 f., zu sprechen.]

I

[;Der Mensch ist des Mcnschen Wolf•, nach Plautus, Asinaria II, 4, 88.]

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to it, when the mental counter-forces which ordinarily inhibit it are out of action, it also manifests itself spontaneously and reveals man as a savage beast to whom consideration towards his own kind is something alien. Anyone who calls to mind the atrocities committed during the racial migrations or the invasions of the Huns, or by the people known as Mongols under Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane, or at the capture of Jerusalem by the pious Crusaders, or even, indeed, the horrors of the recent World War-anyone who calls these things to mind will have to bow humbly before the truth of this view. The existence of this inclination to aggression, which we can detect in ourselves and justly assume to be present in others, is the factor which disturbs our relations witl> ?ur neighbour and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure [of energy]. In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. The interest of work in common would not hold it together; instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests. Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts and to hold the manifesta-

tions of them in check by psychical reaction-formations. Hence, therefore, the use of methods intended to incite people into identifications and aim-inhibited relationships of love, hence the restriction upon sexual life, and hence too the ideal's commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself-a commandment which is really justified by the fact that nothing else runs so strongly counter to the original nature of man. In spite of every effort, these endeavours of civilization have not so far achieved very much. It hopes to prevent the crudest excesses of brutal violence by itself assuming the right to use violence against criminals, but the law is not able to lay hold of the more cautious and refined manifestations of human aggressiveness. The time comes when each one of us has to give up as illusions the expectations which, in his youth, he pinned upon his fellowmen, and when he may learn how much difficulty and pain has been added to his life by their ill-will. At the same time, it would be unfair to reproach civilization with trying to eliminate strife and competition from human activity. These things are undoubtedly indispensable. But opposition is not necessarily enmity; it is merely misused and made an occasion for enmity. The communists believe that they have found the path to

Das Unbeha?,en in der Kultur (V)

wenn die seelischen Gegenkraf te, die sie sonst hemmen, weggefallen sind, auBert sie sich auch spontan, enthiillt den Mensc:hen als wilde Bestie, der die Sc:honung der eigenen Art fremd ist. Wer die Greuel der Volkerwanderung, der Einbriic:he der Hunnen, der sogenannten Mongolen unter Dsc:hengis Khan und Timurlenk, der Eroberung Jerusalems durc:h die frommen Kreuzfahrer, ja selbst noch die Schreck.en des letzten Weltkriegs in seine Erinnerung ruft, wird sich vor der Tatsachlic:hkeit dieser Auffassung demiitig beugen miissen. Die Existenz dieser Aggressionsneigung, die wir bei uns selbst verspiiren konnen, beim anderen mit Recht voraussetzen, ist das Moment, das unser Verhaltnis zum Nac:hsten stort und die Kultur zu ihrem Aufwand [an Energie] notigt. Infolge dieser primaren Feindseligkeit der Mensc:hen gegeneinander ist die Kulturgesellsc:haft bestandig vom Zerfall bedroht. Das Interesse der Arbeitsgemeinschaft wiirde sie nicht zusammenhalten, triebhafte Leidenschaften sind starker als verniinf tige Interessen. Die Kultur muB alles aufbieten, um den Aggressionstrieben der Mensc:hen Sc:hranken zu setzen, ihre .ituBerungen durch psychische Reaktionsbildungen niederzuhalten. Daher also das Auf gebot von Methoden, die die Menschen zu Identifizierungen und zielgehemmten Liebesbeziehungen antreiben sollen, daher die Einschrankung des Sexuallebens und daher auc:h das Idealgebot, den Nachsten so zu lieben wie sic:h selbst, das sic:h wirklic:h dadurc:h rec:htfertigt, daB nichts anderes der urspriinglic:hen menschlichen Natur so sehr zuwiderlauft. Durch alle ihre Miihen hat diese Kulturbestrebung bisher nicht sehr viel erreic:ht. Die grobsten Aussc:hreitungen der brutalen Gewalt hoffi sie zu verhiiten, indem sie sic:h selbst das Recht beilegt, an den Verbrechern Gewalt zu iiben, aber die vorsic:htigeren und f eineren .ituBerungen der menschlichen Aggression vermag das Gesetz nic:ht zu erfassen. Jeder von uns kommt dahin, die Erwartungen, die er in der Jugend an seine Mitmenschen gekniipft, als Illusionen fallenzulassen, und kann erfahren, wie sehr ihm das Leben durc:h deren Obelwollen erschwert und schmerzhaft gemacht wird. Dabei ware es ein Unrecht, der Kultur vorzuwerfen, daB sie Streit und Wettkampf aus den menschlic:hen Betatigungen ausschlieBen will. Diese sind sicherlich unentbehrlic:h, aber Gegnerschaft ist nicht notwendig Feindsc:haft, wird nur zum AnlaB fiir sie miBbraucht.

Die Kommunisten glauben den Weg zur Erlosung vom Obel gefunden

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deliverance from our evils. According to them, man is wholly good and is well-disposed to his neighbour; but the institution of private property has corrupted his nature. The ownership of private wealth gives the individual power, and with it the temptation to ill-treat his neighbour; while the man who is excluded from possession is bound to rebel in hostility against his oppressor. If private property were abolished, all wealth held in common, and everyone allowed to share in the enjoyment of it, ill-will and hostility would disappear among men. Since everyone's needs would be satisfied, no one would have any reason to regard another as his enemy; all would willingly undertake the work that was necessary. I have no concern with any economic criticisms of the communist system; I cannot enquire into whether the abolition of private property is expedient or advantageous. 1 But I am able to recognize that the psychological premisses on which the system is based are an untenable illusion. In abolishing private property we deprive the human love of aggression of one of its instruments, certainly a strong one, though certainly not the strongest; but we have in no way altered the differences in power and influence which are misused by aggressiveness, nor have we altered anything in its nature. Aggressiveness was not created by property. It reigned almost without limit in primitive times, when property was still very scanty, and it already shows itself in the nursery almost before property has given up its primal, anal form; it forms the basis of every relation of affection and love among people (with the single exception, perhaps, of the mother's relation to her male child 2). Ifwe do away with personal rights over material wealth, there still remains prerogative in the field of sexual relationships, which is bound to become the

zu haben. Der Mensch ist eindeutig gut, seinem Nachsten wohlgesinnt, aber die Einrichtung des privaten Eigentums hat seine Natur verdorben. Besitz an privaten Giitern gibt dem einen die Macht und damit die Versuchung, den Nachsten zu miBhandeln; der vom Besitz Ausgeschlossene muB sich in Feindseligkeit gegen den Unterdriicker auflehnen. Wenn man das Privateigentum aufhebt, alle Giiter gemeinsam macht und alleMenschen an deren GenuB teilnehmen la!h, werden Obelwollen und Feindseligkeit unter den Menschen verschwinden. Da alle Bediirfnisse befriedigt sind, wird keiner Grund haben, in dem anderen seinen Feind zu sehen; der notwendigen Arbeit werden sich alle bereitwillig unterziehen. Ich habe nichts mit der wirtschafHichen Kritik des kommunistischen Systems zu tun, ich kann nicht untersuchen, ob die Abschaffung des privaten Eigentums zweckdienlich und vorteilhaft ist 1• Aber seine psychologische Voraussetzung vermag ich als haltlose Illusion zu erkennen. Mit der Aufhebung des Privateigentums entzieht man der menschlichen Aggressionslust eines ihrer W erkzeuge, gewiB ein starkes und gewiB nicht das starkste. An den Unterschieden von Macht und EinfluB, weldie die Aggression fiir ihre Absichten miBbraucht, daran hat man nichts geandert, auch an ihrem Wesen nicht. Sie ist nicht durch das Eigentum geschaffen worden, herrschte fast uneingeschrankt in Urzeiten, als das Eigentum noch sehr armselig war, zeigt sich bereits in der Kinderstube, kaum daB das Eigentum seine anale Urform aufgegeben hat, bildet den Bodensatz aller zartlichen und Liebesbeziehungen unter den Menschen, vielleicht mit alleiniger Ausnahme der einer Mutter zu ihrem mannlichen Kind 2. Raumt man das personliche Anrecht auf dingliche Giiter weg, so bleibt noch das Vorrecht aus sexuellen Bezichungen,

1 Anyone who has tasted the miseries of poverty in his own youth and has experienced the indifference and arrogance of the well-to-do, should be safe from the suspicion of h~ving no understanding or good will towards endeavours to fight against the inequality of wealth among men and all that it leads to. To be sure, if an attempt is made to base this fight upon an abstract demand, in the name of justice, for equality for all men, there is a very obvious objection to be made-that nature, by endowing individuals with extremely unequal physical attributes and mental capacities, has introduced injustices against which there is no remedy. 1 [Cf. a footnote to Chapter VI of Group Psyclwlogy (I92lc), Standard Ed., 18, IO In. A rather longer discussion of the point occurs near the end of Lecture XXXIII of the New Introductory Lectures (1933a).]

1 Wcr in scincn eigcncn jungcn Jahrcn das Elcnd dcr Armut vcrkostet, die Glcichgiltigkeit und den Hochmut dcr Bcsitzcnden crfahrcn hat, solltc vor dcm Verdacht gcschiitzt sein, dafi er kcin Verstandnis und kcin Wohlwollen fiir die Bcstrebungen hat, die Besitzungleichhcit dcr Mcnschcn und was sich aus ihr ableitct, zu bckampfen. Freilich, wcnn sich dicscr Kampf auf die abstraktc Gercchtigkcitsfordcrung dcr Glcichheit aller Menschen bcrufen will, licgt dcr Einwand zu nahc, daB die Natur durch die hochst ungleichmafiige korperlichc Ausstattung und gcistigc Bcgabung der Einzclnen Ungerechtigkciten eingcsctzt hat, gegcn die es kcine Abhilfe gibt.

2 [Vgl. cine Anmerkung zu Massenpsychologie (1921 c}, oben, S. 95, Anm. 2. Eine langcre Erorterung der Frage findct sich gcgcn Ende der 33. Vorlcsung dcr Neuen Falge der Vorlesungen (1933 a), Studienausgabe, Bd. 1, S. 563.)

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source of the strongest dislike and the most violent hostility among men who in other respects are on an equal footing. Ifwe were to remove this factor, too, by allowing complete freedom of sexual life and thus abolishing the family, the germ-cell of civilization, we cannot, it is true, easily foresee what new paths the development of civilization could take; but one thing we can expect, and that is that th.is indestructible feature of human nature will follow it there. It is clearly not easy for men to give up the satisfaction of this inclination to aggression. They do not feel comfortable without it. The advantage which a comparatively small cultural group offers of allowing this instinct an outlet in the form of hostility against intruders is not to be despised. It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness. I once discussed the phenomenon that it is precisely communities with adjoining territories, and related to each other in other ways as well, who are engaged in constant feuds and in ridiculing each otherlike the Spaniards and Portuguese, for instance, the North Germans and South Germans, the English and Scotch, and so on. 1 I gave this phenomenon the name of 'the narcissism of minor differences', a name which does not do much to explain it. We can now see that it is a convenient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression, by means of which cohesion between the members of the community is made easier. In this respect the Jewish people, scattered everywhere, have rendered most useful services to the civilizations of the countries that have been their hosts; but unfortunately all the massacres of the Jews in the Middle Ages did not suffice to make that period more peaceful and secure for their Christian fellows. When once the Apostle Paul had posited universal love between men as the foundation of his Christian community, extreme intolerance on the part of Christendom towards those who remained outside it became the inevitable consequence. To the Romans, who had not founded their communal life as a State upon love, religious intolerance was something foreign, although with them religion was a concern of the State and the State was permeated by religion. Neither was it an unaccountable chance 1 [See Chapter VI of Group Psychology (I92Ic), Standard Ed., 18, IOI, and 'The Taboo of Virginity' (191&), ibid., 11, 199.]

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (V)

das die Quelle der starksten MiBgunst und der heftigsten Feindseligkeit unter den sonst gleichgestellten Menschen werden muB. Hebt man auch dieses auf durch die vollige Befreiung des Sexuallebens, beseitigt also die Familie, die Keimzelle der Kultur, so lafh sich zwar nicht vorhersehen, welche neuen Wege die Kulturentwicklung einschlagen kann, aber eines darf man erwarten, daB der unzerstorbare Zug der menschlichen Natur ihr auch dorthin folgen wird. Es wird den Menschen offenbar nicht leicht, auf die Befriedigung dieser ihrer Aggressionsneigung zu verzichten; sie fiihlen sich nicht wohl dabei. Der Vorteil eines kleineren Kulturkreises, daB er dem Trieb einen Ausweg an der Befeindung der AuBenstehenden gestattet, ist nicht geringzuschatzen. Es ist immer moglich, eine groBere Menge von Menschen in Liebe aneinander zu binden, wenn nur andere for die AuBerung der Aggression iibrigbleiben. Ich habe mich einmal mit dem Phanomen beschaf ti gt, daB gerade benachbarte und einander au ch son st nahestehende Gem.einschaften sich gegenseitig befehden und verspotten, so Spanier und Portugiesen, Nord- und Siiddeutsche, Englander und Schotten usw 1. Ich gab ihm den Namen »NarziBmus der kleinen Differenzen«, der nicht viel zur Erklarung beitragt. Man erkennt nun darin eine bequeme und relativ harmlose Befriedigung der Aggressionsneigung, durch die den Mitgliedern der Gemeinschafl: das Zusammenhalten erleiditert wird. Das iiberallhin versprengte Volk der Juden hat sidi in dieser Weise anerkennenswerte Verdienste um die Kulturen seiner Wirtsvolker erworben; !eider haben alle Judengemetzel des Mittelalters nicht ausgereicht, dieses Zeitalter friedlicher und sicherer fiir seine christlichen Genossen zu gestalten. Nachdem der Apostel Paulus die allgemeine Menschenliebe zum Fundament seiner christlidien Gemeinde gemacht hatte, war die auBerste lntoleranz des Christcntums gegen die drauBen Verbliebenen eine unvermeidliche Folge geworden; den Romern, die ihr staatliches Gemeinwesen nicht auf die Liebe begriindet hatten, war religiose Unduldsamkeit fremd gewesen, obwohl die Religion bei ihnen Sache des Staates und der Staat von Religion durchtrankt war. Es war auch kein unverstandlicher Zufall,

I [S. Massenpsychologie, oben, S. 95, und >Das Tahu dcr Virginitat< (1918 a), Studienausgabe, Bd. 5, S. 219. Der Gedankc wird noch cinmal im Zusammcnhang mit dem Antisemitismus in Der Mann Moses und die monotbeistische Religion (1939 a), untcn, S. 538-9, erwahnt.]

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that the dream of a Germanic world-dominion called for antisemitism as its complement; and it is intelligible that the attempt to establish a new, communist civilization in Russia should find its psychological support in the persecution of the bourgeois. One only wonders, with concern, what the Soviets will do after they have wiped out their bourgeois. If civilization imposes such great sacrifices not only on man's sexuality but on his aggressivity, we can understand better why it is hard for him to be happy in that civilization. In fact, primitive man was better off in knowing no restrictions of instinct. To counterbalance this, his prospects of enjoying this happiness for any length of time were very slender. Civilized man has exchanged a portion of his possibilities of happiness for a portion of security. We must not forget, however, that in the primal family only the head of it enjoyed this instinctual freedom; the rest lived in slavish suppression. In that primal period of civilization, the contrast between a minority who enjoyed the advantages of civilization and a majority who were robbed of those advantages was, therefore, carried to extremes. As regards the primitive peoples who exist to-day, careful researches have shown that their instinctual life is by no means to be envied for its freedom. It is subject to restrictions of a different kind but perhaps of greater severity than those attaching to modem civilized man. When we justly find fault with the present state of our civilization for so inadequately fulfilling our demands for a plan of life that shall make us happy, and for allowing the existence of so much suffering which could probably be avoided-when, with unsparing criticism, we try to uncover the roots of its imperfection, we are undoubtedly exercising a proper right and are not showing ourselves enemies of civilization. We may expect gradually to carry through such alterations in our civilization as will better satisfy our needs and will escape our criticisms. But perhaps we may also familiarize ourselves with the idea that there are difficulties attaching to the nature of civilization which will not yield to any attempt at reform. Over and above the tasks of restricting the instincts, which we are prepared for, there forces itself on our notice the danger of a state of things which might be termed 'the psychological poverty of groups' •1 This danger is most threatening where 1 [The German 'psyclwlogisches Eltnd' seems to be a version of Janet's

daB der Traum einer germanischen Weltherrschaft zu seiner Erganzung den Antisemitismus aufrief, und man erkennt es als begreiflich, daB der Versuch, eine ncue kommunistische Kultur in RuBland aufzurichten, in der Verfolgung der Bourgeois seine psychologische Unterstiitzung findet. Man fragt sich nur besorgt, was die Sowjets anfangen werden, nachdem sie ihre Bourgeois ausgcrottet haben. Wenn die Kultur nicht allein der Sexualitat, sondern auch der Aggressionsneigung des Menschen so groGe Opfer auferlegt, so verstehen wir es besser, daB es dem Menschen schwer wird, sich in ihr begliickt zu finden. Der Urmensch hatte es in der Tat darin besser, da er keine Triebeinschraukungen kannte. Zurn Ausgleich war seine Sicherheit, sokhes Gluck lange zu genieBen, cine sehr geringe. Der Kulturmensch hat fiir ein Stiick Gliicksmoglichkeit ein Stiick Sicherheit eingetauscht. Wir wollen aber nicht vergessen, daB in der Urfamilie nur das Oberhaupt sich solcher Triebfreiheit erfrcute; die anderen lebten in sklavischer Unterdriickung. Der Gegensatz zwischen einer die Vorteile der Kultur genieBenden Minderheit und einer dieser Vorteile beraubten Mehrzahl war also in jener Urzeit der Kultur aufs KuBerste getrieben. Ober den heute lebenden Primitiven haben wir durch sorgfaltigere Erkundung erfahren, daG sein Triebleben keineswegs ob seiner Freiheit beneidet werden darf; es unterliegt Einschrankungen von anderer Art, aber vielleicht von groBerer Strenge als das des modernen Kulturmenschen. Wenn wir gegen unseren jetzigen Kulturzustand mit Recht einwenden, wie unzureichend er unsere Forderungen an eine begliickende Lebensordnung erfiillt, wieviel Leid er gewahren laBt, das wahrscheinlich zu vermeiden ware, wenn wir mit schonungsloser Kritik die Wurzeln seiner Unvollkommenheit aufzudecken streben, iiben wir gewiB unser gutes Recht und zeigen uns nicht als Kulturfeinde. Wir diirfen erwarten, allmahlich solche Abanderungen unserer Kultur durchzusetzen, die unsere Bediirfnisse besser befriedigen und jener Kritik entgehen. Aber vielleicht machen wir uns auch mit der !dee vertraut, daB es Schwierigkeiten gibt, die dem Wesen der Kul tur anhaften und die keinem Reformversuch weichen werden. AuBer den Aufgaben der Triebeinschrankung, auf die wir vorbereitet sind, drangt sich uns die Gefahr eines Zustandes auf, den man »das psychologische Elend der Masse« 1 benennen kann. Diese Gefahr droht am ehesten, wo 1

[Der Ausdruck »psychologisches Elendc scheint cine Obersetzung von Pierre Janets

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CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS

the bonds of a society are chiefly constituted by the identification of its members with one another, while individuals of the leader type do not acquire the importance that should fall to them in the formation of a group. 1 The present cultural state of America would give us a good opportunity for studying the damage to civilization which is thus to be feared. But I shall avoid the temptation of entering upon a critique of American civilization; I do not wish to give an impression of wanting myself to employ American methods.

die gesellschaftliche Bindung hauptsachlich durdi Identifizierung der Teilnehmer untereinander hergestellt wird, wahrend Fiihrerindividualitaten nicht zu jener Bedeutung kommen, die ihnen bei der Massenbildung zufallen sollte 2 • Der gegen wartige Kulturzustand Amerikas gabe eine gute Gelegenheit, diesen befiirchteten Kultursdiaden zu studieren. Aber idi vermeide die Versudiung, in die Kritik der Kultur Amerikas einzugehen; ich will nicht den Eindruck hervorrufen, als wollte ich midi selbst amerikanischer Methoden bedienen.

expression 'misere psychologique' applied by him to describe the incapacity for mental synthesis which he attributes to neurotics.] 1 Cf. Group Psychology and the Ana[ysis of the Ego (l92lc).

1

•misere psychologique« zu sein; Janet meint damit die von ihm den Neurotikern geschriebene Unfahigkeit zu psychischer Synthese.] S.: Massenpsychologie und I ch-Analyse (1921 c) [obcn, S. 65 ff.]

244

zu~

VI

VI

IN none of my previous writings have I had so strong a feeling as now that what I am describing is common knowledge and that I am using up paper and ink and, in due course, the compositor's and printer's work and material in order to expound things which are, in fact, self-evident. For that reason I should be glad to seize the point if it were to appear that the recognition of a special, independent aggressive instinct means an alteration of the psycho-analytic theory of the instincts. We shall see, however, that this is not so and that it is merely a matter of bringing into sharper focus a tum of thought arrived at long ago and of following out its consequences. Of all the slowly developed parts of analytic theory, the theory of the instincts is the one that has felt its way the most painfully forward.1 And yet that theory was so indispensable to the whole structure that something had to be put in its place. In what was at first my utter perplexity, I took as my starting-point a saying of the poet-philosopher, Schiller, that 'hunger and love are what moves the world'. 2 Hunger could be taken to represent the instincts which aim at preserving the individual; while love strives after objects, and its chief function, favoured in every way by nature, is the preservation of the species. Thus, to begin with, ego-instincts and object-instincts confronted each other. It was to denote the energy of the latter and only the latter instincts that I introduced the term 'libido'. 8 Thus the antithesis was between the ego-instincts and the 'libidinal' instincts oflove (in its widest sense') which were directed to an object. One of these object-instincts, the sadistic instinct, stood out from the rest, it is true, in that its aim was so very far from being loving. Moreover it was obviously in some respects attached to the egoinstincts: it could not hide its close affinity with instincts of mastery which have no libidinal purpose. But these discrepancies were got over; after all, sadism was clearly a part of 1 [Some account of the history of Freud's theory of the instincts will be found in the Editor's Note to his paper 'Instincts and their Vicissi1 ['Die Weltweisen.'] tudes' (1915c), Standard Ed., 14, 113 ff.] 1 [In Section II of the first paper on anxiety neurosis (1895b).] ' [I.e. as used by Plato. See Chapter IV of Group Psychology (1921c),

Ich habe bei keiner Arbeit so stark die Empfindung gehabt wie diesmal, daB ich allgemein Bekanntes darstelle, Papier und Tinte, in weiterer Folge Setzerarbeit und Druckerschwarze aufbiete, um eigentlich selbstverstandliche Dinge zu erzahlen. Darum greife idi es gerne auf, wenn sidi der Anschein ergibt, daB die Anerkennung eines besonderen, selbstandigen Aggr~ssionstriebes eine Abanderung der psychoanalytischen Trieblehre bedeutet.

Standard Ed., 18, 99.] 117

Es wird sich zeigen, daB dem nicht so ist, daB es sich bloB darum handelt, eine Wendung, die langst vollzogen worden ist, scharfer zu fassen und in ihre Konsequenzen zu verfolgen. Von allen langsam entwickelten Stiicken der analytischen Theorie hat sich die Trieblehre am miihseligsten vorwarts getastet. Und sie war doch dem Ganzen so unentbehrlich, daB irgend etwas an ihre Stelle geriickt werden muBte. In der vollen Ratlosigkeit der Anfange gab mir der Satz des Dichterphilosophen Schiller den ersten Anhalt, daB »Hunger und Liebe« das Getriebe der Welt zusammenhalten 1• Der Hunger konnte als Vertreter jener Triebe gelten, die das Einzelwesen erhalten wollen, die Liebe strebt nach Objekten; ihre Hauptfunktion, von der Natur in jeder Weise begiinstigt, ist die Erhaltung der Art. So traten zuerst Ichtriebe und Objekttriebe einander gegeniiber. Fiir die Energie der letzteren, und ausschlieBlich fiir sie, fiihrte ich den Namen Libido ein 2 ; somit lief der Gegensatz zwischen den Ichtrieben und den aufs Objekt gerichteten »libidinosen« Trieben der Liebe im weitesten Sinne 3 • Einer von diesen Objekttrieben, der sadistische, tat sich zwar dadurch hervor, daB sein Ziel so gar nicht liebevoll war, auch schloB er sich offenbar in manchen Stiicken den Ichtrieben an, konnte seine nahe Verwandtschaft mit Bemachtigungstrieben ohne libidinose Absicht nicht verbergen, aber man kam iiber diese Unstimmigkeit hinweg; der Sadismus gehorte doch

1

2

3

[•Die Weltweisen.•] [In der ersten Arbeit iiber Angstneurose (1895 b), Studienausgabe, Bd. 6, S. 37.] [So etwa bei Plato. S. Massenpsychologie, oben, S. 85-6.]

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sexual life, in the activities of which affection could be replaced by cruelty. Neurosis was regarded as the outcome of a struggle between the interest of self-preservation and the demands of the libido, a struggle in which the ego had been victorious but at the price of severe sufferings and renunciations. Every analyst will admit that even to-day this view has not the sound of a long-discarded error. Nevertheless, alterations in it became essential, as our enquiries advanced from the repressed to the repressing forces, from the object-instincts to the ego. The decisive step forward was the introduction of the concept of narcissism-that is to say, the discovery that the ego itself is cathected with libido, that the ego, indeed, is the libido's original home, and remains to some extent its headquarters. 1 This narcissistic libido turns towards objects, and thus becomes object-libido; and it can change back into narcissistic libido once more. The concept of narcissism made it possible to obtain an analytic understanding of the traumatic neuroses and of many of the affections bordering on the psychoses, as well as of the latter themselves. It was not necessary to give up our interpretation of the transference neuroses as attempts made by the ego to defend itself against sexuality; but the concept of libido was endangered. Since the ego-instincts, too, were libidinal, it seemed for a time inevitable that we should make libido coincide with instinctual energy in general, as C. G. Jung had already advocated earlier. Nevertheless, there still remained in me a kind of conviction, for which I was not as yet able to find reasons, that the instincts could not all be of the same kind. My next step was taken in Bryand the Pleasure Principle (1920g), when the compulsion to repeat and the conservative character of instinctual life first attracted my attention. Starting from speculations on the beginning of life and from biological parallels, I drew the conclusion that, besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to join it into ever larger units, 1 there must exist another, contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to bring them back to their primaeval, inorganic 1

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur

offenbar zum Sexualleben, das grausame Spiel konnte das zartliche ersetzen. Die Neurose erschien als der Ausgang eines Kampfes zwischen dem lnteresse der Selbstbewahrung und den Anforderungen der Libido, ein Kampf, in dem das Ich gesiegt hatte, aber um den Preis schwerer Leiden und Verzichte. Jeder Analytiker wird zugeben, daB dies auch heute nicht wie ein !angst iiberwundener Irrtum klingt. Doch wurde cine Abanderung unerlaBlich, als unsere Forschung vom Verdrangten zum Verdrangenden, von den Objekttrieben zum Ich fortschritt. Entscheidend wurde hier die Einfiihrung des Begriffes NarziBmus, d. h. die Einsicht, daB das Ich selbst mit Libido besetzt ist, sogar deren urspriingliche Heimstatte sei und gewissermaBen auch ihr Hauptquartier bleibe. Diese narziBtische Libido wendet sich den Objekten zu, wird so zur Objektlibido und kann sich in narziBtische Libido zuriickverwandeln. Der Begriff NarziBmus machte es moglich, die traumatische Neurose sowie viele den Psychosen nahestehende Affektionen und diese selbst analytisch zu erfassen. Die Deutung der Obertragungsneurosen als Versuche des Ichs, sich der Sexualitat zu erwehren, brauchte nicht verlassen zu werden, aber der Begriff der Libido geriet in Gefahr. Da auch die Ichtriebe libidinos waren, schien es eine Weile unvermeidlich, Libido rnit Triebenergie iiberhaupt zusammenfallen zu !assen, wie C. G. Jung schon friiher gewollt hatte. Doch blieb etwas zuriick wie eine noch nicht zu begriindende GewiBheit, daB die Triebe nicht alle von gleicher Art sein konnen. Den nachsten Schritt machte ich in ]enseits des Lustprinzips (1920g), alsmir der Wiederholungszwang und der konservative Charakter des Trieblebens zuerst auffiel. Ausgehend von Spekulationen iiber den Anfang des Lebens und von biologischen Parallelen zog ich den SchluB, es miisse auBer dem Trieb, die lebende Substanz zu erhalten und zu immer groBcren Einheiten zusammenzufassen 1, einen anderen, ihm gegensatzlichen geben, der diese Einheiten aufzulosen und in den uranfanglichen, anorganischen Zustand zuriickzufiihren strebe.

[C£ in this connection the editorial Appendix B to The Ego and tJu

Id, Standard Ed., 19, 63.] 1

The opposition which thus emerges between the ceaseless trend by Eros towards extension and the general conservative nature of the instincts is striking, and it may become the starting-point for the study of further problems.

1 Der Gcgcnsatz, in den hierbci die rastlose Ausbreitungstcndcnz des Eros zur allgemeincn konservativcn Natur der Triebe tritt, ist auffallig und kann der Ausgangspunkt wcitcrer Problcmstellungen wcrdcn.

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119

state. That is to say, as well as Eros there was an instinct of death. The phenomena of life could be explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of these two instincts. It was not easy, however, to demonstrate the activities of this supposed death instinct. The manifestations of Eros were conspicuous and noisy enough. It might be assumed that the death instinct operated silently within the organism towards its dissolution, but that, of course, was no proof. A more fruitful idea was that a portion of the instinct is diverted towards the external world and comes to light as an instinct of aggressiveness and destructiveness. In this way the instinct itself could be pressed into the service of Eros, in that the organism was destroying some other thing, whether animate or inanimate, instead of destroying its own self. Conversely, any restriction of this aggressiveness directed outwards would be bound to increase the self-destruction, which is in any case proceeding. At the same time one can suspect from this example that the two kinds of instinct seldom-perhaps never-appear in isolation from each other, but are alloyed with each other in varying and very different proportions and so become unrecognizable to our judgement. In sadism, long since known to us as a component instinct of sexuality, we should have before us a particularly strong alloy of this kind between trends of love and the destructive instinct; while its counterpart, masochism, would be a union between destructiveness directed inwards and sexuality -a union which makes what is otherwise an imperceptible trend into a conspicuous and tangible one. The assumption of the existence of an instinct of death or destruction has met with resistance even in analytic circles; I am aware that there is a frequent inclination rather to ascribe whatever is dangerous and hostile in love to an original bipolarity in its own nature. To begin with it was only tentatively that I put forward the views I have developed here, 1 but in the course of time they have gained such a hold upon me that I can no longer think in any other way. To my mind, they are far more serviceable from a theoretical standpoint than any other possible ones; they provide that simplification, without either ignoring or doing violence to the facts, for which we strive in scientific work. I know that in sadism and masochism we have always seen before us manifestations of the destructive instinct 1

[Cf. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g), Standard Ed., 18, 59.]

Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (VI)

Also auBer dem Eros cinen Todestrieb; aus dem Zusammen- und Gegencinanderwirken dieser beiden lieBen sich die Phanomene des Lebens erklaren. Nun war es nicht leicht, die Tatigkeit dieses angenommenen Todestriebs aufzuzeigen. Die KuBerungen des Eros waren auffallig und gerauschvoll genug; man konnte annehmen, daB der Todestrieb stumm im Inneren des Lebewesens an Editorischen VorbemerkungDie Ballade vom vertriebenen und heimgekchrten GrafenP-Mn.LER, R. See FtlLOP-Mn.!.ER, R., and ECKSTEIN, F. FEDERN, P. (1926) 'Einigc Variationen des lchgefiihls', Int. Z· Psychoan., 12, 263. (66) [Trans.: In Ego Psychology and the Psychoses, New York, 1952, 25.] (1927) 'Narzissmus im Ichgeftige', Int. Psychoan., 13, 420. (66) [Trans.: In Ego Psychology and the Psychoses, New York, 1952,

z.

.

~J

FENICHEL, O. (1930) 'Zur prligenitalen Vorgeschichte des Odipuskomplexes', Int. Psychoan., 16, 319. (242) [Trans.: 'The Pregenital Antecedents of the Oedipus Complex', Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 12 (1931), 141.] FERENCZI, S. (1913) 'Entwicklungsstufen des Wirklichkeitssinnes', Int. (lirztl.) Psychoanal., 1, 124. (66) [Trans.: 'Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality', First Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, London, 1952, Chap. VIII.] FREUD, S. (1894a) 'Die Abwehr-Neuropsychosen', G.S., 1, 290; G.W., 1, 59. (151, 153) [Trans.: 'The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence', C.P., 1, 59; Standard

z.

z.

Ed.,3.] (1895b) "Ober die Berechtigung, von der Neurasthenic einen bestimmten Symptomenkomplex als "Angstneurose" abzutrennen', G.S., 1, 306; G.W., 1, 315. (117) [Trans.: 'On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the Description "Anxiety Neurosis"', C.P., 1, 76; Standard Ed., 3.] (1895f) 'Zur Kritik der "Angstneurose" ', G.S., 1, 343; G. W., 1, 357. (242) [Trans.: 'A Reply to Criticisms of my Paper on Anxiety Neu· rosis', C.P., 1, 107; Standard Ed., 3.] (1898a) 'Die Sexualitlit in der Atiologie der Ncurosen', G.S., 1, 439; G.W., 1, 491. (60) [Trans.: 'Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses', C.P., 1, 220; Standard Ed., 3.] (1899a) "Ober Deckerinnerungen', G.S., 1, 465; G.W., 1, 529. (21, 259) [Trans.: 'Screen Memories', C.P., 5, 47; Standard Ed., 3.] (1900a) Du Traumdeutung, Vienna. G.S., 2-3; G.W., 2-3. (17, 67, 121, 212, 213, 242) [Trans.: The Interpretation of Dreams, London and New York, 1955; Standard Ed., 4-5.] (190la) Ober den Traum, Wiesbaden. G.S., 3, 189; G. W., 2-3, 643. (133) [Trans.: On Dreams, London and New York, 1951; Standard Ed., 5, 633.]

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263

(190lh) Zur Psychopatlwlogi4 J.es Alltagslebens, Berlin, 1904. G.S., 4, 3; G. W., 4. (45, 69) [Trans.: The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Standard Ed., 6.] (1905c) Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten, Vienna. G.S., 9, 5; G.W., 6. (50, 160, 161, 163, 165, 213) [Trans.: Jokes and tluir Relation to the Unconscious, Standard Ed., 8.] (1905d) Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtluorie, Vienna. G.S., 5, 3; G. W., 5, 29. (60, 61-2, 83, 107, 149, 150, 225, 232, 240) [Trans.: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexualiry, London, 1949; Standard Ed., 7, 125.] (1905e [1901]) 'Bruchsttick einer Hysteric-Analyse', G.S., 8, 3; G. W., 5, 163. (90, 107) [Trans.: 'Fragment of an Analysis ofa Case of Hysteria', C.P., 3, 13; Standard Ed., 7, 3.] , (1907a) Der Wahn und du Trliume in W. Jensens 'Gradiva', Vienna. G.S., 9, 273; G.W., 7, 31. (149, 213) [Trans.: Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's 'Gradiva' Standard Ed 9, 3.] • ., (1907b) 'Zwangshandlungen und Religionsubung', G.S., 10, 210; G. W., 7, 129. (3, 43-4) [Trans.: 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices', C.P., 2, 25; Standard Ed., 9, 116.] (1907d) Antwort auf cine Rundfrage Vom Lesen und von guten Bile/um, Vienna. (213) [Trans.: Contribution to a Questionnaire on Reading, Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 32, 319; Standard Ed., 9, 245.] (1908b) 'Charakter und Analerotik', G.S., 5, 261; G.W., 7, 203. (97, 216) [Trans.: 'Character and Anal Erotism', C.P., 2, 45,· Standard Ed 9, 169] . . ., (1908c) 'Ober infantile Scxualtheorien', G.S. 5, 168· G W: 7 171. (150) • • • ., •

[Trans.: 'On the Sexual Theories of Children' C.P. 2 59· Standard Ed., 9, 207] ' ' ' ' (19~) 'Die "kulturelle" Sexualmoral und die moderne NerVOS1tlit', G.S., 5, 143; G.W., 7, 143. (48, 61, 109, 126) [Trans.: ' "Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness', C.P., 2, 76; Standard Ed., 9, 179.] {1908' [1907]) 'Der Dichter und das Phantasieren', G.S., 10, 229; G.W., 7, 213. (14, 213) [Trans.: 'Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming', C.P., 4, 173; Standard Ed., 9, 143.] (1909a) 'Allgemeines tiber den hysterischcn Anfall', G.S., 5, 255; G.W., 7, 235. (176, 181) [Trans.: 'Some General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks' C.P. 2, 100; Standard Ed., 9, 229] ' ' (1909b) 'Analyse der Phobic eines fi.infj~gen Knaben', G.S., 8, 129; G. W., 7, 243. (62)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fuuo, S. (cont.) [Trans.: 'Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy', C.P., 3, 149; Standard Ed., 10, 3.] (1909d) 'Bemerkungen uber einen Fall von Zwangsneurose', G.S., 8, 269; G.W., 7, 381. (61, 149-50) [Trans.: 'Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis', C.P., 3, 293; Standard Ed., 10, 155.] (1910c) Eitu Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo tla Vinci, Vienna. G.S., 9, 371; G.W., 8, 128. (44, 150, 153, 157, 212, 213) [Trans.: Leonardo da Vinci and a Merrwry of His Childhood, Sta.ndard Ed., 11, 59.] (191lb) 'Formulierungen uber die zwei,Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens', G.S., 5, 409; G.W., 8, 230. (67, 81) [Trans.: 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning', C.P., 4, 13; Sta.ndard Ed., 12, 215.] (191lc) 'Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen uber einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paronoia (Dementia Para· noides}', G.S., 8, 355; G. W., 8, 240. (66) [Trans.: 'Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)', C.P., 3, 387; Standard Ed., 12, 3.] (1912d) 'Ober die allgemeinste Etniedrigung des Liebeslebens', G.S., 5, 198; G. W., 8, 78. (61, 107) [Trans.: 'On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love', C.P., 4, 203; Stontlard Ed., 11, 179.] (1912f) 'Zur Onanie-Diskussion', G.S., 3, 324; G.W., 8, 332.

76 (l ) ' . ' ', [Trans.: 'Contrt'butions to a D'IScuss1on on Masturb ation Standard Ed., 12, 243.] (1912-13) Totem und Tahu, Vienna, 1913, G.S., 10, 3; G.W., 9, (3, 17, 22-4, 42, 100-1, 131, 136, 183, 186, 235) [Trans.: Totem and Taboo, London, 1950; New .York, 1952; Standard Ed., 13, 1.] (1913f) 'Das Motiv der K1istchenwahl', G.S., 10, 243; G.W., 10, 244. (91, 213) [Trans.: 'The Theme of the Three Caskets', C.P., 4, 244; Standard Ed., 12, 291.] (1913j) 'Das lnteresse an der Psychoanalyse', G.S., 4, 313; G. W., 8, 390. (213) [Trans.: 'The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest', Sta.ndard Ed., 13, 165.] (1914b) 'Der Moses des Michelangelo', G.S., 10, 257; G.W., 10, 172. (213) [Trans.: 'The Moses of Michelangelo', C.P., 4, 257; Sta.ndard Ed., 13, 211.] (1914c) 'Zur Einfiihrung des Narzissmus', G.S., 6, 155; G. W., 10, 138. (23) ' [Trans.: 'On Narcissism: an Introduction', C.P., 4, 30; Sta.ndard Ed., 14, 69.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY 265 (1915b) 'Zeitgem!sses iiber Krieg und Tod', G.S., 10, 315; G. W., 10, 324. (38, 125) [Trans.: 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death', C.P., 4, 288; Sta.ndard Ed., 14, 275.] (1915c) 'Triche und Triebschicksale', G.S., 5, 443; G.W., 10, 210. (62, 67, 117) [Trans.: 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', C.P., 4, 60; Sta.ndard Ed., 14, 111.] (1915d) 'Die VerdrAngung', G.S., 5,466; G. W., 10,248. (153,242-3) [Trans.: 'Repression', C.P., 4, 84; Sta.ndard Ed., 14, 143.] (1915f) 'Mitteilung eines der psychoanalytischen Theorie wideraprechenden Falles von Paranoia', G.S., 5, 288; G. W., 10, 234. (108, 227, 233) [Trans.: 'A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the PsychoAnalytic Theory of the Disease', C.P., 2, 150; Sta.ndard Ed., 14, 263.] (1916a) 'Verglinglichkeit', G.S., 11, 291; G.W., 10, 358. (213) [Trans.: 'On Transience', C.P., 5, 79; Stontlard Ed., 14, 305.] (1916d) 'Einige Charaktertypen aus der psychoanalytischen Arbeit', G.S., 10, 287; G.W., 10, 364. (187, 213, 216, 234) [Trans.: 'Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work', C.P., 4, 318; Standard Ed., 14, 311.] (1916-17) Vorluungm r.ur Einfthrung in die. Psychoana[yse, Vienna G.S., '1; G.W., 11. (81, 150, 251) [Trans.: Introdu&tory Lecturu on Psycho-Analysis, revised ed., London, 1929 (A. Gmeral Introdu&tion to Psychoanalysis, New York, 1935); Sta.ndard Ed., 15-16.] (1917b) 'Eine Kindheitserinnerung aus Dichtung und Wahrheit', G.S., 10, 357; G. W., 12, 15. (213) [Trans.: 'A Childhood Recollection from Dichtung und Wahrluit', C.P., 4, 357; Sta.ndard Ed., 17, 147.] (19171 [1915]) 'Trauer und Melancholic', G.S., 5, 535; G. W., 10, 428. (165) [Trans.: 'Mourning and Melancholia', C.P., 4, 152; Sta.ndard Ed., 14, 239.] (1918a) 'Das Tahu der Virginitit', G.S., 5, 212; G.W., 12, 161. (114, 231) [Trans.: 'The Taboo of Virginity', C.P., 4, 217; Standard Ed., 11, 193.] (1919e) ' "Ein Kind wird geschlagen" ', G.S., 5, 344; G. W., 12, 197. (231) [Trans.:' "A Child is Being Beaten" ', C.P., 2, 172; Sta.ndard Ed., 17, 177.] (1919h) 'Das Unheimliche', G.S., 10, 369; G.W., 12, 229. (213) [Trans.: 'The "Uncanny"', C.P., 4, 368; Sta.ndard Ed., 17, 219.] (1920a) 'Ober die Psychogenese eines Falles von weiblicher Homosexualitit', G.S., 5, 312; G. W., 12, 271. (229) [Trans.: 'The Psychogenesis ofa Case of Female Homoaexuality', C.P., 2, 202; Sta.ndard Ed., 18, 147.]

266 / FREUD, S. (conL)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1920g) :Jmsei.ts tks Lustprinzips, Vienna. G.S., 6, 191; G.W., 13, 3. (62, 119, 122, 236) [Trans.: Beyond the Pleasur1 Prindpll, London, 1950; Standard &J.,

18, 3.] (192lc} Massenpsychologi4 und Ich-Analp, Vienna. G.S., 6, 261; G.W., 13, 73. (7, 113, 114, 116, 117, 165) [Trans.: GroupPsychologyandthe~oftheEgo,London, 1959; New York, 1960; Standard &J., 18, 67.] (1922b) 'Ober cinige new-otische Mechanismen bei Eifersucht, Paranoia und HomosexualitAt', G.S., 5, 387; G.W., 13, 195. (165) , [Trans.: 'Some Neurotic Mechanisms in jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality', C.P., 2, 232; Standard &J., 18, 223.] (1923b) Das Ich und das Es, Vienna. G.S., 6, 353; G.W., 13, 237. (11, 62, 65-0, 118, 125, 135, 164, 216, 226, 233) [Trans.: The Ego and the Id, London, 1927; Standard Ed., 19, 3.] (1923c) 'Bemerkungen zur Theorie und Praxis der Traum· deutung', G.S., 3, 305; G.W., 13, 301. (203) [Trans.: 'Remarks on the Theory and Practice of DreamInterpretation', C.P., 5, 136; Standard &J., 19, 109.] (19231) 'Die infantile Genitalorganisation', G.S., 5, 232; G.W., 13, 293. (150, 153) [Trans.: 'The Infantile Genital Organization', C.P., 2, 244; Standard &J., 19, 141.] (1923g) Preface to Max Eitingon's Blricht iJblr die Bwlinlr Psychoanalytisclu Poliklinik, Vienna. G.S., 11, 256; G. W., 13, 441. (257) [Trans.: Preface to Eitingon's Report on the Berlin PsychoAnalytical Clinic, Standard &J., 19, 285.] (1924b) 'Neurose und Psychose', G.S., 5, 418i G.W., 13, 387. (155) [Trans.: 'Neurosis and Psychosis', C.P., 2, 250; Standard &J., 19,

149.] (1924c) 'Das 6konomische Problem des Masochismua', G.S., 5, 374; G.W., 13, 371. (54, 123, 150) [Trans.: 'The Economic Problem of Masochism', C.P., 2, 255; Standard Ed., 19, 157.] (1924d) 'Der Untergang des Odipuskomplexes', G.S., 5, 423; G. W., 13, 395. (229) [Trans.: 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex', C.P., 2, 269; Standard Ed., 19, 173.] (19241) 'Die RealitAtsverlust bei Neurose und Psychose', G.S., 6, 409; G. W., 13, 363. (150, 155) [Trans.: 'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis', C.P., 2, 277; Standard Ed., 19, 183.] (1925d [1924]) Sllbstdarst.ellung, Vienna, 1934. G.S., 11, 119; G.W., 14, 33. (211, 238-9) [Trans.: An A.utobiographieal Stutfy, London, 1935 (A.uJobwgra/Jliy, New York, 1935); Standard &J., 20, 3.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

267

(1925') 'Die Widerstinde gegen die Psychoanalyse', G.S., 11, 224; G. W., 14, 99. (61) [Trans.: 'The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis', C.P., 5, 163; Standard &J., 19, 213.] (1925h) 'Die Vemeinung', G.S., 11, 3; G.W., 14, 11. (67) [Trans.: 'Negation', C.P., 5, 181; Standard Ed., 19, 235.] (1925j) 'Einige psychische Folgen des anatomischen Geschlechtsunterschieds', G.S., 11, 8; G. W., 14, 19. {150, 157, 223, 240) [Trans.: 'Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes', C.P., 5, 186; Standard Ed., 19, 243.] (1926d) H1111111U1lg, Symptom und Angst, Vienna. G.S., 11, 23; G. W., 14, 113. (36, 128, 135) [Trans.: InhibitWns, Symptoms and A.nxutJI, London, 1960 (TM Probllm of AnxietJI, New York, 1936); Standard Ed., 20, 77.] (1926'} Di4 Frag1 tkr Laimanalys1, Vienna. G.S., 11, 307; G.W., 14, 209. (21, 83, 176, 247, 248) [Trans.: 'IM QputWn of Lqy Analysis, London, 1947; Standard Ed., 20, 179.] . (1926i) 'Dr. Reik und die Kurpfuschereifrage', A Letter to the Ntu1 Frli4 Pru.r1, N1111 Frli4 Pru11, July 18, 12. [Trans.: 'Dr. Reik and the Problem of Quackery', Standard &J., 21, 247.] (1927b) 'Nachtrag zur Arbeit Uber den Moses des Michelangelo', G.S., 11, 409; G.W., 14, 321. (213) [Trans.: 'Supplement to "The Moses of Michelangelo" ', Standard Ed., 13, 237.) (1927c) Di4 Zukueft linlr Illusion, Vienna. G.S., 11, 411; G.W., 14, 325. (59, 61, 64, 65, 74, 87, 89, 94, Ill, 136, 144, 218} [Trans.: The Futur1 of an Illusion, London and New York, 1928; Standard Ed., 21, 3.) (1927d} 'Der Humor', G.S., 11, 402; G.W., 14, 383. (213) [Trans.: 'Humour', C.P., 5, 215; Standard &J., 21, 159.] (19271) 'Fetischismua', G.S., 11, 395; G.W., 14, 311. (43) [Trans.: 'Fetishism', C.P., 5, 198; Standard Ed., 21, 149.] (192&} 'Ein religi6ses Erlebnis', G.S., 11, 467; G.W., 14, 393. [Trans.: 'A Religious Experience', C.P., 5, 243; Standard Ed., 21, 167.] (1928b) 'Dostojewski und die VaterWtung', G.S., 12, 7; G.W., 14, 399. (213, 230, 252) [Trans.: 'Dostoevsky and Parricide', C.P., 5, 222; Standard Ed., 21, 175.] (1929a) 'Ernestjones zum 50 Geburtstag', G.S., 12, 395; G.W., 14, 554. [Trans.: 'Dr. Emestjones (on his 50th Birthday)', Int. :J. PsychoAnal., 10, 123; Standard Ed., 21, 249.] (1929b} Letter [in French] to Maxime Leroy on some Dreams of Descartes', G.S., 12, 403; G. W., 14, 558. [Trans.: Standard Ed., 21, 199.]

268

BIBLIOGRAPHY

FREUD, S. (cont.) (1930a) Das Unhehagen in der Kultur, Vienna. G.S., 12, 29; G.W., 14, 421. (3, 6, 9, 43, 163, 217) [Trans.: Civilization and its Discontents, London and New York, 1930; Standard Ed., 21, 59.] (1930b) Preface to :(,ehn Jahre Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut, Vienna. G.S., 12, 388; G. W., 14, 572. [Trans.: In 'Personal Memories', in Max Eitingon In Memoriam, Jerusalem, 1951, 47; Standard Ed., 21, 257.] (1930c) Introduction to the Special Psychopathology Number of Tll4 Medical &view of Reviews, New York, 36, 103; Standard Ed., 21, 254. [German Text: G.S., 12, 386; G. W., 14, 570. German original first appeared in 1934.] (1930d)LettertoDr.AlfonsPaquet,G.S.,12,406;G.W.,14,545.(214) [Trans.: Standard Ed., 21, 207.] (1930e) Ansprache im Frankfurter Goethe-Haus, G.S., 12, 408; G. W., 14, 547. (214) [Trans.: Address delivered in the Goethe House at Frankfort, Standard Ed., 21, 208.] (1930/ (1929]) Letter to Theodor Reik, in Reik's Freud als Kulturkri.tiker, Vienna. (176, 214) [Trans.: In Reik's From Thirty rears with Freud, New York, 1940; London, 1942; Standard Ed., 21, 195.] (193la) "Ober libidinC>se Typen', G.S., 12, 115; G. W., 14, 509. (84) [Trans.: 'Libidinal Types', C.P., 5, 247; Standard Ed., 21, 215.] (193lb) 'Ober die weibliche Sexualitit', G.S., 12, 120; G.W., 14, 517. (216, 252) [Trans.: 'Female Sexuality', C.P., 5, 252; Standard Ed., 21, 223.] (193lc) Introduction to Edoardo Weiss's Elementi di Psi&oanalisi, G.S., 12, 389; G.W., 14, 573. [Trans.: Standard Ed., 21, 256.] (193ld) 'Das Fakultiltsgutacbten im Prozess Halsmann', G.S., 12, 412; G.W., 14, 541. (189) [Trans.: 'The Expert Opinion in the Ha1smann Case', Standard Ed., 21, 251.] (193le) Letter to the Burgomaster of P.fibor, G.S., 12, 414; G.W., 14, 561. [Trans.: Standard Ed., 21, 259.] (1932a) 'ZurGewinnungdesFeuers', G.S., 12, l4l;G.W., 16,3. (90) [Trans.: 'The Acquisition and Control of Fire', C.P., 5, 288; Standard Ed., 22.] (1932b) Preface to Hermann Nunberg's Allgemeine Neurosen/.e/zre auf psychoanalytischer Grundlage, G.S., 12, 390; G. W., 16, 273. [Trans.: Standard Ed., 21, 258.] (1933a) Neru Folge der Vorlesungen z:.ur Eirif'rihrung in die Psychoanalyse, Vienna. G.S., 12, 151; G.W., 15, 207. (3, 62, 113, 157, 224, 239) [Trans.: New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, London and New York, 1933; Standard Ed., 22.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY 269 (1933b) Wanun Krieg?, G.S., 12, 349; G. W., 16, 13. (3-4, 9, 61, 98) [Trans.: WJvi War?, C.P., 5, 273; Standard Ed., 22.J (1933d) Preface [in French] to Marie Bonaparte's Edgar Poe, ltwk psychanalytique, Paris. German Text: G.S., 12, 391; G.W., 16, 276. (214) [Trans.: Preface to Marie Bonaparte's Edgar Allan Poe, London, 1949; Standard Ed., 22.] (1935a) Postscript (1935) to An Autobiographical Stut,fy, new edition, London and New York; Standard Ed., 20, 71. (3) [German Text: 'Nacbschrift 1935 zur Selbstdarstellung', 2nd edition, Vienna, 1936; G. W., 16, 31. German original first appeared late in 1935.] (1936a) Letter to Romain Rolland: 'Eine Erinnerungsstorung auf der Akropolis', G.W., 16, 250. (25-6) [Trans.:'ADisturbanceofMemoryontheAcropolis',C.P.,5,302; Standard Ed., 22.] (1939a (1937-39]) Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion, G. W., 16, 103. (4, 43, 45, 127) [Trans.: Moses and Monotheism, London and New York, 1939; Standard Ed., 23.] (1940a (1938]) Abriss der Psychoanalyse, G. W., 17, 67. (62, 151, 153, 211, 251) [Trans.: An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, London and New York,

1949; Standard Ed., 23.] {19401 [1938]) 'Die lchspaltung im Abwehrvorgang', G. W., 17, 59. (150-1) [Trans.: 'Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence', C.P., 5, 372; Standard Ed., 23.] (1942a (1905-6]) 'Psychopathic Characters on the Stage', StanJard Ed., 7, 305. (213) [Gmnan Text (unpublished): 'Psychopathische Personen aufder Bilhnc.'] (1950a (1887-1902]) Aus den A~en der Psychoanalyse, London. Includes 'Entwurf einer Psychologie' (1895). (60, 67, 107, 126, 151, 182, 193, 213, 225, 238, 242) [Trans.: The Origins of Psycho-Analysis, London and New York, 1954. (Partly, including 'A Project for a Scientific Psychology', in Sl4ndard Ed., 1.)] FULOP-Mn.Lu., R. {1924) 'Dostojewskis Heilige Krankheit', Wissm unJ uben, Zurich, Heft 19-20. (181, 182, 187) FULOP-Mn.Lu., R., and ECKSTEIN, F. (ed.) (1925) Dostojewski am &ulette, Munich. (178, 181, 182, 190, 191) (1926) Der unbekannle Dostojewski, Munich. (178) (1928) Die Urgestalt der BriJder Karamasojf, Munich. (175-6) GoUHIER, H. (1958) Les premieres pens/es de Descartes, Paris. (200) HORNEY, K. (1926) 'Flucht aus der Weiblichkeit', Int.:(,. Psychoan., 12, 360. (243) [Trans.: 'The Flight from Womanhood', Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 7 (1926), 324.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

joNES, E. (1908) 'Rationalization in Everyday Life', J. almmm. Psycliol., 3, 161; Papers on Psyclw-Analysis, London and New York, 1948, Chap. I. (249) (1913) Papers on Psyclw-Analysis, London and New York. (2nd ed., 1918; 3rd ed., 1923; 4th ed., 1938; 5th ed., 1948.) (250) (1918) 'Anal-Erotic Character Traita' J. ahnorm. Psycliol., 13,.261; Papers on Psyclw-Analysis, London and New York, 1918 (2nd ed.) Chap. XL. (97) (1927) 'The Early Deve1opment of Female Sexuality', Int. J. Psyc/w-Anal., 8, 459. (24 3) (1951) Essays in Applied PsycM-Analysis (2 vols.), London and New York. (250) (1955) Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, VoL 2, London and New York. (Page references are to the English edition.) (149, 150, 212) (1957) Sigmund Freud: Life and Work, Vol. 3, London and New York. (Page references are to the English edition.) (59, 63, 91, 149, 160, 168, 176, 195, 223, 259) JUNG, C. G. (1913) 'Versuch einer Darstellung der psychoanalytischcn Theorie', Jb. psyclwan. psychopath. Forsch., 5, 307. (229) [Trans.: 7118 Tll8ory of PsychD-Analysis, New York, 1915.] KLEIN, M. (1928) 'Friihstadien des Odipuskonfilktes', Int. Z· Psychoan., 14, 65. (242) [Trans.: 'Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict', Int. J. PsychoAnal., 9 (1928), 167.] LAFoRGUE, R. (1926) 'Verdrii.ngung und Skotom.isation', Int. Z. Psyclwan., 12, 54. (153) LAMPL - DB GROOT, J. (1927) 'Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Psychoan., 13, 269. (241-2) Odipuskomplexes der Frau', Int. [Trans.: 'The Evolution of the Oedipus Complex in Women', Int. J. Psyclw-Anal., 9 (1928), 332.] Lnov, M. (1929) Descartes, philosopll4 au masgw (2 vols.), Paris. (199-201) Mn.um, O. (1921) 'Zur Lebensgeschichte Dostojewski's, in F. M. Dostojewski's Autobiographiscll4 Schriften, Munich. (Russian original first published 1883.) (181-2) MoEBIUS, P.J. (1903) Ober timphysiologischen &Ju.uaduinn du Wlihu (5th ed.), Halle. (48) NEUFELD, J. (1923) Dostoj1WSki: Ski.t:.u zu seiner Psychoanalp, Vienna. (176, 194) . R.A.Nx, O. (1924) Das Trauma tkr Geburt, Vienna. (155) [Trans.: TM Trauma of Birth, London, 1929.] Rmc, T. (1927) 'Dogma und Zwangsidee': cine psychoanalyti.sche Studie zur Entwicklung der Religion', Imago, 13, 247; in book form, Vienna, 1927. (43-4) [Trans.: In Dogma and Compulsions: Psychoanalytie Studiu on Myths and Religions, New York, 1951.] (1929) Article on S. Freud's 'Dostojewski und die Vatert6tung' (Freud, 1928b), Imago, 15, 232. (195-6)

(1930) Freud als Kulturkritiker, Vienna. (195) (1940) From Thirty Tears with Freud, New York; London, 1942. (195) RICKKA.N,J. (ed.) (1939) Civilit:ation, War and Death: Sel4ctionsftom Thru Works ~ Sigmund Freud, London. (63) SANCTJS, 8ANTE DE (1924) La cotwersione religiosa, Bologna. (171-2) STRA.K.Hov, N. (1921) 'Ober Dostojewskis Leben und literarische Tlitigkeit', in F. M. Dostojewski's Literarisc/14 Schriften, Munich. (Russian original first published 1883.) ( 178) vADUNGER., H. (1922) Du Philosophie du Als Ob, Berlin. (7th and 8th ed.; 1st ed., 1911.) (28-9) [Trans.: 7118 Philosophy of'As if', London, 1924.] VIERECK, G. S. {the Elder) (1930) Glimpses of tll4 Great, London. (168) ZWEIG, S. ( 1920) Drei Meister, (VoL 1 of Die Baumeister tier Welt}, Leipzig. (178, 191) [Trans.: Thru Masters, New York and London, 1938.] (1927) Du Verwinung tier Gefilhl.4, Leipzig. (191-4) [Trans.: Coq/li&ts, New York and London, 1939.]

270

z.

u

271

ADDENDUM

FuUD, S. (1937c} 'Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse', G. W., 16, 59. (63) [Trans.: 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', C.P., 5, 316;

Standard Ed., 23.]

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS G.S.

- Freud, Gesamt114lte Schriften (12 vols.), Vienna, 1924-30

G.W.

- Freud, Gesamt114lte Werke (18 vols.), London, from 1944

C.P.

- Freud, Collected Papers (5 vols.), London, 1924-50

Standard Ed. - Freud, Standard Edition (24 vols.), London, from 1953 Almanach 1928 - Almanach fer das Jahr 1928, Vienna, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1927 Almanach 1929 - Almanach fer das Jahr 1929, Vienna, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1928 Almanach 1930 .. Almana.ch d8r Psychoanalyse, Vienna, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1929

273

GENERAL INDEX This index includes the names of non-technical authon. It also include, the names of technical authon where no reference is made in the text to specific works. For reference to specific technical works, the Bibliography should be consulted.-The compilation of the index was undertaken by Mn. R. S. Partridge. Absmeu, 180 religion in, 19 American civilization, 116 Acropolis, the, 25 Active and passive (s11 also Mascu- Amnesia, traumatic, 155 line and feminine), 106 n., 224, Anaclitic object-choice, 23-4 Anal 236-7, 239-42 Activity of narcissistic charactercharacter, 96-7 erotism, 96-7, 99 n., 106, 113 ~, 218-19 Addiction and masturbation, 193 n. Analogies addiction to narcotics, 49 Adler, A., 62, 62 n., 157 n. 2 barbarian migrations, 177 Aesthetic pleuure (.ru also Art), bare leg on cold night, 88 81-3, 92-4 Aesthetics, theory of, 82-3, 213-14 cautious business-man, 84 cranial index of bandaged heads Affect and humour, 162 47 garrison in conquered city, 124 and term 'repression', 153 guest who becomes a permanent quota of, 242 n. lodger, 99 Affective epilepsy, 181 infinitesimal calculus, 36-7 Aggressiveness (su also Death instinct} man with a jemmy, 252 Minoan-Mycenean civilization, and civilization, 7, 10-12, 61-3, 80 111-15, 117-23, 134 226 136-8, 142-3, 145 physiological development, 71 and narcissism, 218-19 planet revolving round a central in children, 113, 129-31, 237-8 body, 141 in erotic relationships, 106 n., 171, Polar expedition, ill-equipped, 134n. 218, 220, 234 in girl's relation to mother, 237-8 prehistoric saurians and crocodile, in jokes, 163 68 introjected, in the super-ego, 123Rome, growth of, 69-71 132, 137-9, 142 smallholden on earth and estates in the moon, 50 AtrlPfa.• 70 Aim-inhibited love (.ru lolubited stick with two ends, 189 n. l, aim) 230 n., 252 n. Alexander, F. (su also Bibliography), Ananke, 53, 54 n., 101, 139 138n. 2 Animal gods, 23 Ahtosha (in Tll6 Brothers KarflllllJQ)v), Animals, 5-6, 10, 68, 75-6, 89, 99 189 105 n. 3, 123 Ambition and fire, 90 n. Anthropophyteia (ed. F. S. Kraus), Ambivalence, 24, 62, 132-3, 137, 106 n.-107 n. 183, 235 Anti-semitism (su also Jews), 114Amentia, Meynert!.s, 43 ll5, 120 Anxiety (su also Fear), 16-17, 24, America 43, 77, 125, 128, 135, 137, 145, Prohibition in, 49 n. psycho-analysis in, 254-5 238 I.I', XXI--1* 275

n.,

n.,

n.,

GENERAL INDEX

276

Appu-Tree, The (by J. Galsworthy), 105 n. 2

Aristotle, 30, 209 Art (se1 also Aesthetic pleasure; Aesthetics), 79-81, 213-14 and civilization, 12-14, 93-4, 97 and religion, 74-5 'As if', philosophy of, 28-9, 35 Asinaria (Plautus), 111 n. 3 Athens, 25 Athletic belt a.a fetish, 156-7 Aurelian, the Emperor, 69 Ausonius, 200 and n. 1, 201 Auto-erotism (se1 Masturbation)

Baillet, A. (se1 also Bibliography). 199-201 Beauty (see Aesthetic pleasure) Berlin Psycho-Analytic Institute, 257 Bible, the, 169 Biography and psycho-analysis, 211212 Birth, trauma of, 155 Bisexuality, 105 n. 3, 183-5, 220, 227 Bloch, I., 106 n. Bodensee, 25 Bonaparte, Princess Ma,U, 62-3 Boniface, St., 40 Boys (see also Men) · relation to father, 157, 171, 183-7, 225-6, 229, 231, 235 relation to mother, 113,183, 193194, 225, 228-9, 233, 235, 239 Brain defects and epilepsy, 180-1 Brill, A. A., 254 Brothers KaramJU:.ov, TM (by Dostoevsky), 175-7, 182, 188-9, 230 n., 252 Bruck, Moelkr van rkn, 175 Brunswick, R. M. (su also Bibliography), 238 Busch, W., 75 n. Campagne in Frankreich (by Goethe), 210

Candide (by Voltaire), 75, 80 n. Cannibalism, 10-11 Carlyle, Tlwmas, 133 n. Cases of 'Dora', 90 n., 107 n. offetishism, 152, 155-7 of 'Little Hans', 62 of'Rat Man', 60-1, 149-50 of Schreber, 66 n. 1

Castration symbolized by cutting off hair, 157 threat of, 154, 183, 233 Castration complex, 153-7, 183-5, 229, 233 in women, 229-30, 232-3, 241 Censorship, 136 Character-types, 83-4, 96-7, 216-20 Chemical factor in sexuality, 240 Childhood impressions and instinctual disposition, 9 as source offetishism, 149, 155-7 Children (se1 also Infantile) aggressiveness in, 113, 129-31, 237-8 and the family, 102-3 and parents (su also Father; Mother; Oedipus complex; Primal scene), 102-3, 125 and religion, 47-8, 51-2 development of super-ego in, 11, 129-31 education of, 60, 134 n. helplessness of, 17-18, 23-4, 30, 49, 91 instinctual impulses of, 10, 129-30 love in, 231 neuroses of, 42-3 over-strictness towards, 130 and

n. 2 play of, 236-7 psycho-analysis of, 247 sense of guilt in, 125-6, 131 spailing of, 130 n. 2 Chinese custom of mutilating feet, and fetishism, 157 Christian Science, 120 Christianity, 20, 38, 87, 109, 114, 136, 169, 177 Civilization aggressive impulses and, 7, 10-12, 61-3, 80 n., 111-15, 117-23, 134 n., 136-8, 142-3, 145 art and, 12-14, 79-83, 92-4, 97 defined, 3-6, 89-96 development of, compared to that of the individual, 139-44 evaluation of, 144-5 hostility of individual to, 6, 9-16, 37, 86-7, 96-7, 104 moral demands of, 11-12, 15, 18-19, 95, 111, 115, 120, 142-8, 145 neuroses of, 144

GENERAL INDEX "organic repression' and, 60, 99 n., 105 n. 3 pleasure principle as motive force of, 94, 115 presents conflict between Eros and the death instinct, 101-3, 112, 118-19, 122-4, 132-3, 137, 139-41, 143, 145 rational basis for, 40-1, 43-4, 46-7, 53-4 religion and, 18-22, 34-5, 37-9, 43-52, 54, 94, 122, 136 restrictions imposed by, 7-16, 18, 37, 43, 50, 60-1, 86-7, 90 n., 95-7, 103~5, 106 n., 108-9, 112, 115, 126-9, 145 science and, 6, 31, 34-5, 37, 50, 54-6, 77, 79, 87-8, 90-1, 94, 97 sense of guilt and, 61, 134-6 social aspect of, 6-7, 9, 11-12, 40-4, 60, 63, 94-7, 100-9, 132133, 139-42 Cleanliness and anal erotism, 96-7 and civilization, 93-4, 97, 99 n. Clitoris, 157, 225, 228-9, 232, 239 Columbus, 30 Comic, the (su also Humour; Jokes), 162, 165-6 Communism, 112-13, 115, 143 Component instincts, 61, 80 n., 106 n., 119, 139, 220 Compulsion to repeat, 93, 118 Confusional states, 43 Conscience, 123-32, 136-7, 142, 185, 218-19 Consciousness of anxiety, 135 of guilt, 134-5, 137, 142 Constance (town), 25 Convulsions, hysterical, 179 Corsican vendetta, 40 Coupeur rk nattes, 157 Crldo quia absurdum, 28-9, 111 Crime (su also Delinquency), 112, 186-7, 190, 220 Criminal tendencies in Dostoevsky, 177-9 Crusades, 112 Culture and civilization, 3-4, 6, 89 Cutting off hair as castration symbol, 157 Danger, 24, 72, 124 Dayton 'monkey trial', 38

277

Death and disavowal, 155-6 fear of, 182 riddle of, 16-19 simulated in neurotic attacks, 182-3 survival after (see Immortality) Death instinct (see also Aggressiveness), 61-3 in conflict with Eros, 101-3, 112, 118-24, 132-3, 137-41, 143, 145 Death-wish, 183 against father, 171, 183, 187 against mother, 237 Defence, 151, 186, 243 humour as, 162-4, 166 neuroses of, 151 n. Dekker, E. D., 54 n. Delinquency (see also Crime}, 130 n. 2 Delusions, 31, 81, 84-5, 227 n. 1 of persecution; 165 Dementia praecox, 153 n. 2 Demons, 99 n. Depressive states (see also Melancholia}, 179, 182 Descartes, R (see also Bibliography}, dreams of, 199-204 Destructiveness (see Aggressiveness; Death instinct; Self-destruction) Deutsch, H. (see also Bibliography), 226-7 Deutsch/and (by Hew), 50, 122 n. 3 Devil, the, 120 Duurot, 251 Disavowal, 43, 104, 150-1, 153-7 Distortion in dreams, 209 in neurotic symptoms, 165 in religious doctrine, 44 Dmitri (in The Brothers Karanuu;oo), 189, 252 Dogs and man, 99 n. 'Dora', case of, 90 n., 107 n. Dostoevsky, Andrey (brother to Fyodor}, 182 Dostoevsky, Fyodor (su also Bibliography) and The Brothers Karama.tov, 175-7, 182, 188-9, 230 n., 252 criminal tendencies of, 177-9 cpileptoid attacks of, 176, 179 182, 184-7, 189

GENERAL INDEX

278

Dostoevsky, Fyodor (cont.)

n.,

in Siberia. 182 and 186 IlllUOchism of, 176, 178-9, 185, 196 morality of, 177-8 neurosis of, 177-9, 182, 188-90,

194-6 Oedipus complex of, 176 passion for gambling of, 176-8, 190-1, 194, 196 relations with his father, 181-2, 185-7 relations with his wife, 178, 190-1 repressed homosexuality of, 184-5 sadism of, 178-9 sense of guilt of, 176, 178, 185-7, 190-1, 196 Dream of Etruacan grave (Fmul's), 17 Dream-interpretation, 201-4 Dreams and the unconscious, 203, 209 Aristotle on, 209 distortion in, 209 'from above', 203 of Ducarlls', 199-204 wish-fulfilment in, 17 Dream-work, 17

Eckstein, F. (su also Bibliography), 175-6 Economic factors in civilization, 6-7, 10, 104 Economics of the libido, 78-9, 80 83, 84 n. 2, 141 Economy in expenditure, and humour, 161-2 Ecstasy, 163 Education, 8-9, 47-9, 51-2, 54, 60, 134 n. Ego, 65-6, 164 and external world, 66-8, 72, 162-3 and id, 66, 143 and objects, 66-7, 102, 164-5 and super-ego, 123-6, 129, 130 n. 2, 136-7, 143, 164-5, 185-6, 218-19 as reservoir of libido, 118 desires omnipotence, 121 in neuroses and psychoses, 155-6, 179 masochism of, 136, 185 narcissistic organization of, 118, 121, 162

n.,

GENERAL INDEX

splitting of, 150-1 Ego-development, 66, 68 Ego-feeling, 66, 68, 72 Ego-instincts (.su also Death instinct; Self-preservative instinct), 117118 . Ego-libido, 63, 118, 141

Einstein, A., 3

Eitingon, M., 195 n. 2, 257 Electra complex, 229 Enemas, 238 Epilepsy, 179-81, 189-90 Epileptoid attaclc.s of Dostomky, 176, 179-82, 184-7, 189 Erect posture of man, 60, 90 n. 106 n. Eros (su also Libido; Sexual instinct), 108, 210 in conflict with death-instinct, 101-3, 112, 118-24, 132-3, 137-41, 143, 145 Erotic character-type, 83, 217-20 Ethics (.su Morality) Excretory function, 97, 99 n. organs and sexual organs, prox· Unity between, 106 107 n. External world (su also Reality principle) disavowal of, 43, 104, 150-1, 153-7 ego and, 66-8, 72, 162-3 fulfils repressed wiah, 186 man's control over, 49, 52, 55-6, 72, 77-94, 101, 121, 145, 212, 236 religion and knowledge of, 25, 31-4, 53, 75 repudiated by super-ego, in humour, 166

n.,

Family, the, 99 and n., 101-3, 114, 122, 132-3 Fate, 16, 18, 36, 50, 82, 126-7, 185, 188, 194 Father child's relation to, 30, 43, 125, 129-30, 164, 183-6, 226, 229, 235 daughter's attachment to, 225-8. 230-1, 233, 237-9, 241-3 death of, and disavowal, 155-6 death-wiah against (.su also Parricide), 171, 183, 185-7 equated with forces of nature, 17

equated with God, 17-19, 22-4, 30, 42, 49, 74, 127, 171 fear of, 17, 24, 184-5, 194, 237 primal, 42, 100-1 131-3, 136-7, 141-2, 186 son's identification with, 157, 163, 183-6 son's rivalry with, 171, 183, 225, 231 Faust (GoelM), 120 n. 4, 209, 212 n. 2 Fear of being found out, 125 of being killed by the mother, 227, 237 of castration (su Castration complex) of conscience, 218 of death, 182 of the father, 17, 24, 184-5, 194, 237 of female genitals, 154-5, 229 of feminine attitude, 184 oflou of love, 124-8, 218 of punishment, 124, 128, 184 Fligmbaum, D., 254-5 Feminine (su Masculine and feminine) Feminism, 230 n Fetish athletic belt as, 156-7 equated with the mother's Ill.Wing penis, 152-5 foot as, 149-50, 155, 157 fur as, 155 nose as, 152 penis as prototype of, 157 shine on nose as, 152 shoe as, 155 underclothes as, 155 velvet as, 155 Fetishism contrary ideas expressed in, 156-7 in prixnitive societies, 127 splitting of the ego in, 150-1

Fire

as phallic symbo~ 90 n. man's control over, 90 and n. First Milon I""' Stou, TM (by Mark Twain), 126 n. 2 Flius, W., 60, 107 n., 126 n 2., 151 n., 182 n. 2, 193 n. 1, 225 n., 238 n. Fluss family, 259 Fontan#, T., 75

Foot as symbol for female genitals, 150

279

Foot-fet.ishmn, 149-50, 155, 157 Forgetting (.su also Amnesia· Memory), 69 ' Foucault, J. B. L., 26 Frands of Assisi, St., 102 Frankfurt, 206-8 Fr"'4ridc tM Gr1at, 83 n. 2 Freedom, desire for, 95-6, 105 Freiberg, 259 French Revolution, 46 Frltld, A.malil, 259 Frltld, Anna, 160, 206-7, 259 n. 1

Frltld's

birthplace, 259 lack of religious faith, 169-70 Fromm1 Helm6, Dil (by W. Buse/&), 75 n. 2 Frustration of instinct, cultural, 10, 87, 97, 108, 126, 130 n. 2, 131, 138 FiJJ4p.MiJkr, R. (su also Bibliography), 175-6 Fur as fetish, 155

Galsworthy, John, 105 n. 2 Gambling, 176, 178, 190-4 GarganJua (Rabelais), 90 n; Garnett, Constanu, 189 n. 1, 252 n. C,tfankm UJld r:i':Ml'QJ,U (HtW) 110 ft. Genitals .....,11 , ' and man's erect posture, 99 n., 106 n. and sense of smell, 99 n., 106 n. exciting, but not beautiful, 83

Genitals, female

and castration fear, 154-5, 229 boy's curiosity about, 150, 155 fetish as symbol for, 150, 154 G#Of'g1, Stefan, 206 German desire for world-dominion, 115 Girls (su also Women) attitude to father, 225-31, 233, 237-9, 241-3 attitude to mother, 224-8, 230-9, 241-2 phallic phase in, 232, 237-9, 241243 God and the Devil, 120 belief in, 32-4, 37-41, 46-7, 52-4, 85, 169-71, 187, 202 equated with father, 17-19, 22-4, 30, 42, 49, 74, 127, 171 man's likeness to, 91-2, 120

GENERAL INDEX

GENERAL INDEX

280 Gods

and demons, 99 n, animal, 23 of antiquity, 17-19, 24, 91 Goethe, 74-5, 76 n. l, 120 n. 2, 120 n. 4, 133, 206-12, 251 n. 2 Goethe House, 206, 208 Goethe Prize, 206 Grabbe, C. D., 65 n. 2 Grand Inquisitor, the (in The Brothers Karamaz.oo), 177, 188 Groups, 'psychological poverty' of, 115-16

Guilt, sense of, 61,

12~,

131-9, 176, 183, 185, 188-90, 210, 240 in children, 125--6, 131 inDostoevsky, 176, 178, 185-7, 190191, 196 unconscious, 135, 137, 139, 142, 183 Gullivn's Travels, 90 n.

Hadrian, the Emperor, 70 Hair, cutting off, as castration symbol, 157 Hallucinations, 43, 169, 171 Halsmann, Philipp, 189 n. 2, 251-3 Hamkt, 134 n., 188-9 Hannibal (by C. D. Crabbe), 65 n. 2 'Hans, Littl.e', case of, 62 Happiness (su Pleasure principle) subjectivity of, 89 Hein8, 50, 110 n., 122 n. 3 Helmholtt:, H., 180 Helplessness of children, 17-18, 23-4, 30, 49, 91 of man before nature, 17-18, 2224, 30, 49, 86, 124 Herder, Frau, 210 Hitler, Adolf, 145 n. Homosexuality, 90 154, 184-5, 229-30 House as womb symbol, 91

n.,

Humour (se1 also Comic; Jokes) and economy in expenditure, 161-2

defensive function of, 162-4, 166 first and second person in, 161-2 role of super-ego in, 160, 164-6 yield ofpleasurefrom, 161-2, 166 Hunger as type of ego-instinct, 117 Hysteria, 179, 181, 220, 227 ,240 Hysterical attacks, 176, 181

convulsions, 179 phantasy, 238 n. symptoms, 185, 187 Hystero-epilepsy, 179, 181 Id, the, 66, 143, 155, 218 Ideals, cultural, 12-14, 94-5, 97, 109, 144-5

Identification, 13-14, 129, 132, 157, 163, 182-3, 190, 242 son's, with father, 157, 163, 183-6

Idiocy and epilepsy, 180 Illusion art al, 75, 80-1

cultural ideals as, 145 humour as, 166 religious doctrine as, 30-4, 43, 49, 51-6, 64, 84-5 Immortality, 19, 28, 30, 33-4, 50, 54, 143, 169 Incest, taboo on, I 04 Incestuous impulses, 10-13, 23 6061, 104, 209 Inertia, psychical, 108 Infantile (.su also Childhood;

Children) sexual theories, 150, 152-7, 171, 223, 229, 240 sexuality, 31, 104, 229, 231, 234-5

lnfantilism, psychical, and religion, 84-5 Inhibited aim, 102-3, 109, 112, 118, 121, 231 Initiation rites, 103 Innsbruck, 251 n. 1, 252-3 International Psycho-Anaiytical Congress of 1927 at, 160 Instincts (.su also Component instincts; Death instinct; Egoinstincts; Self-preservative instinct; Sexual instinct) conservative character of, 118 and

n. dominance of, 46-9, 51, 53, 143 frustration of, 10, 87, 97, 108, 126, 130 n. 2, 131, 138 intelligence and, 48-9, 51, 53 pressure of civilization on, 7-16, 18, 37, 43, 50, 60-1, 86-7, 90 95-7, 103-5, 106 n. 108-9, 112, 115, 126-9, 145 relation oflibido to, 121 n. 1 repression and, 42-3 sublimation of, 79, 80 n., 84, 97, 103, 106 n., 179

n.,

n.,

theory of, 106 117, 249 wealth and satisfaction of, 6-7 Instinctual character, 179 demands of the id, 218 clilcharge in epilepsy, 180-1 energy, 242 n. impulses, 68-9, 78-80, 84, 95, 105 n. 3, 126, 132, 136-7, 153

n. 4 Intellectual work, 79, 94 Intelligence impaired in epilepsy, 179-00 intimidated by religion, 84-5 primacy of, over instincts, 48-9, 51, 53

International Psycho-Analytical Association, 257 International Psycho-analytical Congress of 1927 at Innsbruck, 160 of 1908 at Salzburg, 249 Interpretation of dreams, 201-4 Intoxication, 75, 78, 84, 163 lntrojection of aggressive impulses, 123-32, 137-9, 142

Iphig1ni4 (Golthe), 210 Isaacs, Susan, 138 n. 2 Isola Bella, 93 Israel, people of, 127 Ivan the Tmibk, 177

]QtUt, P., 115 n. Jealousy, 231, 239 delusional, 227 n. 1

Jmghi.c Khan,

112

Jerusalem, capture of, 112 ]mu Christ, 142, 169, 171, 187 equated with primal father, 136 142 Jews, 19, 89, 114-15, 120, 127, 170 Jokes (su also Comic; Humour), 162-3, 165--6

281

Lampl - di Groot, J. (su also Bibliography), 226-7, 241 n. Last, H., 69 n. 2 Latency period, 60 Laughter, 166 Lay analysis, 247-8 Leadership, 8-9, 141 Legends, 90 n. Leibnitz:, 200 Llonardo da Vuu;i, 150, 153 n. 1, 157 n. I, 208, 212 n. 1 Leroy, M. (su also Bibliography), 199-204

Libido (su also Eros; Sexual instinct) and character-types, 217-20 communities united by, 108-9, 122, 139

displaceability of, 79, 82, 84, 97, 103-4, 106

n., 108, 231

n.,

economics of, 78-9, 80 83, 84 n. 2, 141 ego-, 63, 118, 141 narcissistic, 24, 80 118 object·, 63, 84 n. 2, 117-18, 141 phases of, in female sexuality, 236,

n.,

239-40, 242-3

theory, 62-3, 117-18, 121, 218 Life instinct (su Eros) Life of a Great Sinner, Tll4 (by Doslolvsky), 178 Liluli (by Romain Rolland), 65 n. 1 Literature, creative, 175-7, 188-9, 191, 193, 196, 211-14

'Liuu Hans', case of, 62 London, 71, 249

Louis XIV, 93 Love and civilization, 82 ,101-3, 108-9, 112

and the pleasure principle, 82, 101-3, 108-9, 112

]oMs, Emut (su also Bibliography),

fear ofloss of, 124-8, 218 in childhood, 231 of mankind, 102, 109-12, 114,

138 n. 2, 249-50 ]'11111, C. G. (su also Bibliography),

sexual (.su also Sexual instinct),

118

Justice, 95-6, 104, 112, 113 n. 2 Kllin, Melanil (su also Bibliography), 130 n. I, 138 n. 2 'Kreft' (in Goethe's letten), 210 KrOU$S, F. S., 106 n.-107 n. KllJ>li;o, ]., 251 n. 1

142-3, 178 82, 101-3, 108-9, 117, 119-20 state of being in, 66, 164-5, 234 various meanings of word, 102

with inhibited aim (su Inhibited aim)

Mania, 78, 165 Marriage, 105, 230-1, 234

282

GENERAL INDEX

GENERAL INDEX

Maaculine and feminine (• also Active and paasive), 105 n. 3,

107 n., 183-5, 228, 232, 236, 240, 243 Masculinity complex, 230 and n., 242 Masochiam, 119, 241 Dostoevsky's, 176, 178-9, 185, 196 of ego, 136, 185 Masaes, the and civilization, 7-9, 12-13, 52 and religion, 37-9, 52, 7+.-5 Masturbation, 176, 196, 232-3 and addictions, 193 n. clitoridal, 232, 239 gambling replacea, 193--4, 196 in girls, 232-3, 239, 241 Medicine and psycho-analysis, 247248 Melancholia (• also Depressive states), 165, 240 Memory (su also Forgetting) and phantaay, 238 n. influence of shock on, 253 Memory-trace, 69 Men (su also Boys) civilization the business of, 103-4 role of, in family life, 99, 101, 103-4 sexual development in, 226-32, 241 Mensuuation, 99 n. Mephistoplulu (in Goetlu's Faust), 120 n. 4, 212 and n. 2 Messiah, the, 31 Meyn.m's amentia, 43 n. 3 Mi&Ml, Dr., 207 Micturition and fire, 90 n. Mirya (in TM Brotlurs Kararrw:,oa), 230 n. Moira, 18 Monarchy, 48 n. 2, 177, 187 'Monkey trial' at Dayton, Tennesaee, 38 and n. 2 Monogamy, 105 Morality and civilization, 11-12, 15, 1819, 95, 111, 115, 120, 142-3, 145 and education, 13 and religion, 18, 33, 37-8, 143 and sense of guilt, 124-6 in Dostoevsky, 177, 196 n. 1 Mother absence of penis in, 152-5 and child, 24, 113, 236

boy's relation to, 113, 183, 193--4, 225, 228-9, 233, 235, 239 death-wish against, 237 fear of being devoured by, 227, 237 girl's relation to, 224-8, 230-9, 241-2 phantaay of aexual initiation by, 193--4 woman's corpse arouses memory of, 170-1 Mourning, 186 'Multatuli' (E. D. D,/Wr), 54 n. Murderous impulaes (• also Parricide), 10-12, 15, 23, 39-42, 190 Mysticism, 72-3 Myths, 44-5, 142

Napo/Mm I, 93 Narcissism, 16, 62, 118, 121, 143, 162, 190 and cultural ideals, 13-14 'of minor differences', 114 Narcissistic attachment to penis, 153, 229 character-type, 83-4, 217-19 118 libido, 24, 80 Nature, man and the forces of, 1519, 21-2, 86, 88, 90-4, 121 Nero, tJu Emperor, 70 N1111 Fr1i6 PrlS#, 247-8, 251 n. 1 Neuraathenia, 60 Neuroses (• also Hysteria; Obsessional neurosis; Transference neuroses; Trawnatic neuroses) as outcome of conflict between ego- and object-instincts, 118 as aubstitute aatiafaction, 84, 109 compared to psychoses, 153 n. 2 conceal unconscious aenae of guilt, 139 infantile, 42-3 of defence, 151 n. preconditions of, 184, 219-20, 226 religion and, 42-4, 46, 53 result from pressure of civilization, 87 study of, 135, 142-3, 257-8 Neurotic symptoms (S# Symptoms) Neurotics, 10-11, 106 115

n.,

182 n. 1

n.,

n.,

Neveu "6 llameau, LI (by Dit!m>t), 251 Normal mental processes, 135, 144, 165, 185, 208, 217, 219-20

Nose as fetish, 152 NoV